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**Defence reviews in times of economic turmoil  
British and German reserve forces in transformation (2010-2015 / 1970-1979)**

De Soet, Jeannine V De Soet

*Awarding institution:*  
King's College London

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## DOCTORAL THESIS

**Defence Reviews in Times of Economic Turmoil:  
British and German Reserve Forces in Transformation  
(2010-2015 / 1970-1979)**

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Submitted by  
Jeannine V. de Soet

for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

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*Begegnet uns jemand, der uns Dank schuldig ist, gleich fällt es uns ein. Wie oft können wir jemand begegnen, dem wir Dank schuldig sind, ohne daran zu denken.*<sup>1</sup>

- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe -<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> 'If we meet someone who owes us gratitude, we are quick to remember. However, how often do we meet someone to whom we owe our gratitude without remembering to give thanks'. Translated by the author; Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Maximen und Reflexionen: Sprüche in Prosa* (Berlin: Contumax, 2016), Google Books Online Reader, 4.

<sup>2</sup> German Writer and Poet (1749-1832).

# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>1 Study Approach</b>	<b>10</b>
1.1 Introduction . . . . .	10
1.1.1 The Thesis in a Nutshell . . . . .	10
1.1.2 Research Questions . . . . .	11
1.2 Methodology . . . . .	12
1.2.1 The Most Similar Systems Design . . . . .	12
1.2.2 The Mixed Methods Approach . . . . .	28
1.3 Academic Discourse and Research Gap . . . . .	31
1.3.1 Literature Analysis Process . . . . .	31
1.3.2 Research Gap and Contribution . . . . .	49
1.4 Sources and Data Collection . . . . .	49
1.4.1 Primary Sources: Types of Sources Used . . . . .	49
1.4.2 Primary Sources: Access and Sources Collection . . . . .	56
1.4.3 Secondary Sources: Types of Sources Used . . . . .	59
1.4.4 Secondary Sources: Access and Sources Collection . . . . .	64
<b>2 Britain's Future Reserve 2020</b>	<b>65</b>
2.1 The Future Reserve 2020 in Context . . . . .	66
2.1.1 The 2010 Review: Key Documents . . . . .	66
2.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure . . . . .	72
2.1.3 The Security Environment . . . . .	75
2.2 The Future Reserve 2020 . . . . .	82
2.2.1 Identified Issues and Proposed Solutions . . . . .	82
2.2.2 The Future Reserve 2020 in the Single Services . . . . .	93
2.3 Key Findings . . . . .	98
<b>3 Britain's Post-Mason Review Reserve Force</b>	<b>100</b>
3.1 The Post-Mason Reserve Force in Context . . . . .	101
3.1.1 The 1975 Mason Review: Key Issues and Envisaged Measures . . . . .	101
3.1.2 Defence Spending in Context . . . . .	110
3.1.3 The Security Environment . . . . .	111
3.2 The Post-Mason Reserve Force . . . . .	115
3.2.1 Army . . . . .	115

3.2.2	Royal Navy . . . . .	122
3.2.3	Royal Air Force . . . . .	127
3.3	Key Findings . . . . .	129
<b>4</b>	<b>Germany's 2012 Conception of Reserve</b>	<b>131</b>
4.1	The 2012 Conception of Reserve in Context . . . . .	132
4.1.1	Envisaged Measures and Financial Considerations . . . . .	132
4.1.2	Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure in Context . . . . .	138
4.1.3	The Security Environment . . . . .	141
4.2	The 2012 Conception of Reserve . . . . .	148
4.2.1	Revised Structures for Homeland Defence . . . . .	148
4.2.2	Societal Roles and Recruitment . . . . .	156
4.3	Key Findings . . . . .	169
<b>5</b>	<b>Germany's 1970s <i>Wehrstrukturreform</i> and the Reserve Force</b>	<b>171</b>
5.1	The <i>Wehrstrukturreform</i> in Context . . . . .	172
5.1.1	The 1970s: A Decade of Defence Reviews . . . . .	172
5.1.2	Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure . . . . .	181
5.1.3	Security Environment . . . . .	183
5.2	The Reserve in the 1973 <i>Wehrstrukturreform</i> . . . . .	194
5.2.1	The 1970s: Discovering the Importance of the Reserve . . . . .	194
5.2.2	Recruitment and the <i>Außerparlamentarische Opposition</i> . . . . .	199
5.3	Key Findings . . . . .	206
<b>6</b>	<b>Comparative Analyses and Conclusion</b>	<b>208</b>
6.1	Comparative Analyses . . . . .	209
6.1.1	The Contemporary Examples . . . . .	209
6.1.2	The Historical Examples . . . . .	216
6.2	Findings . . . . .	223
6.3	Conclusion . . . . .	225
6.4	Suggested Further Research . . . . .	226
	<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>228</b>
	<b>Appendix A: Glossary of Terms</b>	<b>278</b>
	<b>Appendix B: Ethical Approval</b>	<b>282</b>

# List of Tables

1.1	Extraneous Variance: Austria, Britain, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland	17
1.2	Experimental Variance, Explanatory Factors, and Outcome: Britain and Germany . . . . .	20
2.1	Defence Expenditure (2010-2015) . . . . .	74
2.2	MoD Staff and Military Staff Costs (2010-2015) . . . . .	76
2.3	Total Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005) . . . . .	85
2.4	Army Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005) . . . . .	86
2.5	Maritime Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005) . . . . .	86
2.6	RAF Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005) . . . . .	87
3.1	Army Regulars in Numbers (1970-1979) . . . . .	107
3.2	Royal Navy Regulars in Numbers (1970-1979) . . . . .	108
3.3	Royal Air Force Regulars (1970-1979) . . . . .	109
3.4	Defence Expenditure (1974-1978) . . . . .	110
3.5	Defence Expenditure (1979-1983) . . . . .	111
3.6	Army Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979) . . . . .	116
3.7	Royal Navy Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979) . . . . .	123
3.8	Royal Air Force Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979) . . . . .	128
4.1	Total Numbers of MoD Personnel (2010 and Aspired) . . . . .	137
4.2	Annual Service Members Salaries in Million Euros (2006-2010) . . . . .	138
4.3	Annual Service Members Salaries in Million Euros (2011-2015) . . . . .	139
4.4	Federal Defence Expenditure (2010-2014) . . . . .	140
4.5	Commands and RSSU Reservists Numbers (Status: 12/2017) . . . . .	157
4.6	Advertising Expenditure in Million Euros (2006-2015) . . . . .	169
5.1	Federal Defence Expenditure (1970-1974) . . . . .	182
5.2	Federal Defence Expenditure (1975-1979) . . . . .	183
5.3	<i>Kriegsdienstverweigerer</i> (1965-1980) . . . . .	201
5.4	<i>Zivildienstleistende</i> (1965-1980) . . . . .	204
6.1	Contemporary Examples: Defence Budgets and Economisation Measures	211
6.2	British and German Defence Expenditure (2010-2014) . . . . .	212
6.3	Contemporary Examples: Perceived Threats . . . . .	213
6.4	Contemporary Examples: Implications for Reservists . . . . .	215
6.5	Contemporary Examples: Explanatory Factor and Outcome . . . . .	216
6.6	Historical Examples: Defence Budgets and Economisation Measures . . .	218
6.7	British and German Defence Expenditure (1970-1974) . . . . .	219
6.8	British and German Defence Expenditure (1975-1979) . . . . .	219
6.9	Historical Examples: Perceived Threats and Strategical Focus . . . . .	221
6.10	Historical Examples: Implications for Reservists . . . . .	222

6.11 Historical Examples: Explanatory Factor and Outcome . . . . .	223
6.12 Findings . . . . .	224

# List of Figures

1.1	GDP Change in Per Cent, Britain and Germany (2007-2012) . . . . .	24
1.2	GDP Change in Per Cent, Britain and Germany (1970-1979) . . . . .	27
4.1	Reservists in Regular <i>Bundeswehr</i> Units . . . . .	152
4.2	The Pillars of the Reserve . . . . .	153
4.3	Command Structure and Organisation . . . . .	155



# List of Abbreviations

<b>1971-COR</b>	1971 Conception of Reserve
<b>1972-CSR</b>	1972 Commission on Structural Reform
<b>2003-CFR</b>	2003 Conception for Reservists
<b>2010-CSR</b>	2010 Commission on Structural Reform
<b>2010-NSS</b>	2010 National Security Strategy
<b>2010-SDSR</b>	2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review
<b>2011-DPG</b>	2011 Defence Policy Guidelines
<b>2012-COR</b>	2012 Conception of Reserve
<b>ABM-Treaty</b>	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
<b>APO</b>	<i>Außerparlamentarische Opposition</i>
<b>BAOR</b>	British Army of the Rhine
<b>BCTT</b>	<i>Bundeswehr</i> Command for Territorial Tasks
<b>CSCE</b>	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>CSSR</b>	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
<b>DRA</b>	Defence Reform Act
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FF-2020</b>	Future Force 2020
<b>FR-2020</b>	Future Reserves 2020
<b>FRG</b>	Federal Republic of Germany
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GDR</b>	German Democratic Republic
<b>GNP</b>	Gross National Product

<b>LSMPA</b>	Legal Status of Military Personnel Act
<b>LSRA</b>	Legal Status of Reservists Act
<b>MBFR</b>	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
<b>MDSD</b>	Most Different Systems Design
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>MSSD</b>	Most Similar Systems Design
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NGOs</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations
<b>NPA</b>	National People's Army
<b>NPT</b>	Non-Proliferation Treaty
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>RSSU</b>	Regional Security and Support Units
<b>RAF</b>	Royal Air Force
<b>RAuxAF</b>	Royal Auxiliary Air Force
<b>1996-RFA</b>	1996 Reserve Forces Act
<b>RMR</b>	Royal Marine Reserve
<b>RMVR</b>	Royal Marine Volunteer Reserve
<b>RN</b>	Royal Navy
<b>RNR</b>	Royal Naval Reserve
<b>RUSI</b>	Royal United Services Institute
<b>SACEUR</b>	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
<b>SALT</b>	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
<b>SIPRI</b>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<b>TAVR</b>	Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve
<b>UKLF</b>	United Kingdom Land Forces
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council

# Chapter 1

## Study Approach

*Das Höchste wäre: zu begreifen, daß alles Faktische schon Theorie ist. [...]  
Man suche nur nichts hinter den Phänomenen: sie selbst sind die Lehre.<sup>3</sup>*

- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe -

This thesis presents a study on the subject of reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil. In a total of six chapters, this topic is explored by discussing and comparing British and German attempts to restructure their national reserve forces following the 2008 financial crisis and in response to the economic challenges of the 1970s. This first chapter constitutes the introduction of the thesis and encompasses both the research focus and the methodological considerations that framed this study.

### 1.1 Introduction

#### 1.1.1 The Thesis in a Nutshell

This study aims to investigate whether and how reservists' roles and responsibilities change when governments conduct defence reviews in times of economic turmoil. This subject is explored by examining Britain's and Germany's defence posture following the 2008 financial crisis and during the 1970s when both countries were confronted with severe economic challenges brought about by the 1973's oil price shock. Central to the

---

<sup>3</sup> 'The ultimate thing would be to realise that everything factual is already theory. [...] Do not look for the hidden meaning of the phenomena: they themselves are the teaching'. Translated by the author; *ibid.*, Google Books Online Reader, 74.

discussion is the respective reserve forces' reform; namely, the British Future Reserves 2020 (FR-2020) and Germany's 2012 Conception of Reserve (2012-COR) as well as their historical 1970s counterparts.<sup>4</sup> Based on a comparative analysis of these examples, this thesis argues that incumbent governments envisaged and widely implemented a shift of responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force; most notably as regards homeland defence. In this context, it is reasoned that governments undertook this step to allow the professional elements of the militaries, namely, the regular force, to concentrate on cost and training intensive tasks such as overseas deployments. This study further argues that governments did not solely advocate this step based on reservists' alleged proficiency in homeland defence, but instead perceived it as a necessity to implement redundancies in the regular force to realise required economies and to balance national budgets.

### 1.1.2 Research Questions

The author's interest to conduct a study on the implications of economic turmoil on reserve forces' structures was sparked by the commencement of Germany's 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*. Accelerated by the economies imposed on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the *Bundeswehr* had entered a profound transformation process, which, mainly due to the suspension of conscription, was branded the most significant military reform in postwar Germany.<sup>5</sup>

While scholars from various backgrounds have widely recognised this correlation between government finances and defence reviews, their analyses tended to focus primarily on general reform plans and somewhat neglected to address the subsequently launched reserve forces' reforms;<sup>6</sup> at least as regards the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve. Intrigued by this gap in

<sup>4</sup> The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020* (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2011), and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2012), accessed 27 April 2014, [http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FctBCoAwDAXRs3iBZO\\_OW6i7VL8SKmlpQwu e3srsHgzvPDJpeotrMnl45e3QOXQK\\_QRVL1CPRXA5qKCINFBM9iL\\_A6n5IEXnHJfpA4F1hmk!/](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/FctBCoAwDAXRs3iBZO_OW6i7VL8SKmlpQwu e3srsHgzvPDJpeotrMnl45e3QOXQK_QRVL1CPRXA5qKCINFBM9iL_A6n5IEXnHJfpA4F1hmk!/).

<sup>5</sup> cf. Tilman Brück, 'Die Ökonomie der Bundeswehrreform'. *DIW Berlin*, Wochenbericht Nr. 37/2010, 2010, accessed 18 December 2014, [http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw\\_01.c.361115.de/10-37-4.pdf.pdf](http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.361115.de/10-37-4.pdf.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Christina Mölling, and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, *The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence: Annex*, European Parliament, 2011, accessed 12 November 2012, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Moelling\\\_Brune\\\_EU\\\_Studie\\\_2011\\\_Teil2\\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Moelling\_Brune\_EU\_Studie\_2011\_Teil2\_ks.pdf), Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, 'Breaking the Mould: The United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010', *International Affairs* 86, No 2 (2010): 395-410,

the literature, the author decided that exploring the implications of the 2012-COR would constitute an interesting starting point for a project aiming to examine the influence of financially driven defence reviews on reserve forces' reforms. Hence, the 2012-COR was defined as the springboard example for this thesis.

With this inductive approach to the research topic, the author sought to draw informed conclusion from empirical data rather than to test a hypothesis.<sup>7</sup> In other words, it was aspired to develop a theory on how governments restructure their reserve forces in times of economic turmoil by exploring and describing examples of this phenomenon. Consequently, the following two research questions were phrased to guide this study:

1. How do reserve forces' structures, roles and responsibilities change in the course of financial driven defence reviews?
2. Do financially driven defence reviews similarly shift reserve forces' responsibilities in different European countries?

## **1.2 Methodology**

### **1.2.1 The Most Similar Systems Design**

#### **1.2.1.1 Theory**

When considering the research questions, three factors can be identified that are important as regards the methodology. First, examples of reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil should be investigated. Second, these examples should be compared to one another. Third, the sample size is limited due to the European focus and, therefore, rather small than large. Combined, these three aspects, therefore, suggest that this study falls into the realm of comparative politics; more precisely, they indicate that countries and their governments' decisions need to be compared.

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DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00888.x, and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, Marcel Dickow, Hilmar Linnenkamp, and Christian Mölling, 'The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis', *SWP Comments* 13, (2010), accessed 27 March 2013, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2010C13\\_brn\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2010C13_brn_ks.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> cf. Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, *Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures*, (Oxen, and New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 41.

**Most Similar Systems Design.** When reviewing the literature on comparative politics, it quickly becomes apparent that scholars have identified both the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) as the preferred method of choice for conducting studies that exhibit the aforementioned characteristics.<sup>8</sup> Derived from Mill's methods of difference and agreement, Przeworski and Teune first advocated specifying Mill's approaches in 1970 by differentiating more rigorously between the MSSD and the MDSD.<sup>9</sup> While both methods aim to select examples purposefully rather than randomly, they begin research from different angles.<sup>10</sup>

According to Peters, the MSSD is the preferred method scholars use in comparative politics.<sup>11</sup> When applying this approach, researchers first need to identify countries, which are most similar as regards their extraneous variance and exhibit the same (political) outcome, hereafter also referred to as dependent variable or phenomenon.<sup>12</sup> In doing so, it is aspired to limit the influence of external factors on the dependent variable.<sup>13</sup> In this context, Jahn alluded to the examples of European countries.<sup>14</sup> According to Jahn, Western European countries are easier to compare to one another than trying to compare them to their Eastern European counterparts as these two groups are too different as regards their postwar history of democracy and socialism.<sup>15</sup> In addition to high extraneous variance, Jahn emphasised that countries need to display a high experimental variance;<sup>16</sup> i.e., countries with high extraneous variance should be different as regards factors relevant to the research focus, e.g., foreign policy objectives. By seeking a high experimental

<sup>8</sup> cf. Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 234.

<sup>9</sup> According to Mill's method of agreement, the presence of an explanatory factor must result in the same outcome for all examined examples. The method of agreement, on the other hand, stipulates that the absence of this factor explains why different examples experience a different outcome; cf. Adam Przeworski, and Genry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), 31 et seq., B. Guy Peters, *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 39, and John Stuart, Mills, *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*, 8th ed (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1870) cited in Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 167-168.

<sup>10</sup> B. Guy Peters, *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods*, 39.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, 40.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> cf. Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*

variance, Jahn argued that an explanatory factor for the outcome could be identified with more certainty, because the experimental variance already eliminated other potential explanatory factors.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, the absence of the explanatory factor may explain why the phenomenon in question did not manifest itself in other examples.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, by looking at empirical evidence, a theory on the cause of the dependent variable can be developed.<sup>19</sup>

**Most Different Systems Design.** While the MSSD is believed to be the ideal choice for conducting small sample size studies, Peters has argued that it is less suitable for studies aiming to test hypotheses.<sup>20</sup> According to Peters, this shortcoming stems from the fact that no researcher can be sure that s/he has eliminated all potential explanatory factors;<sup>21</sup> however, this reasoning was opposed by Jahn, who asserted that any factor unrelated to the research focus might be omitted in the investigation.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless, both authors agreed that researchers aiming to test hypotheses and transfer their conclusions to other examples should apply the MDSD.<sup>23</sup> Again, examples are selected by examining countries' extraneous variance.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to the MSSD, however, the MDSD seeks to identify nations that are most different as regards their extraneous variance while exhibiting the same political outcome.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the level on which research is conducted differs. While the MSSD approach usually focuses on examining countries and systems, the MDSD is mostly applied to study developments on the subsystem level, e.g., individuals' behaviours.<sup>26</sup> Using the MDSD approach, therefore, seeks to prove that the emergence of a particular explanatory factor may cause the outcome in question in any given setting;<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> cf. B. Guy Peters, *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *ibid.*, and Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>21</sup> B. Guy Peters, *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods*, 40.

<sup>22</sup> Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>23</sup> *ibid.*, 234-235, and B. Guy Peters, *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods*, 40.

<sup>24</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 40-41.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*, 41.

<sup>27</sup> cf. *ibid.*

i.e., the MDSD attempts to examine causal relationships of variables.<sup>28</sup>

### 1.2.1.2 Application

In summary, the MSSD is most suitable to examine countries and systems, while the MDSD seeks to support studies that hope to generalize findings by studying the relationship of variables on the subsystem level.<sup>29</sup> In theory, both methods could have been applied in this thesis; i.e., based on the springboard example, countries with either a low (MDSD) or high (MSSD) extraneous variance in comparison to Germany could have been selected to examine reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil. In a MDSD approach, Asian or Latin American countries would have constituted good examples as they show a low extraneous variance compared to Germany as regards historical, political, and economic aspects.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, this comparison would have contradicted the second research question, which explicitly asks to examine reserve forces' reforms in Europe. Moreover, a study involving countries from such diverse backgrounds would need to be conducted by a multi-lingual team to ensure the full exploitation of primary sources, e.g., government publications, in their original language.<sup>31</sup>

**Extraneous Variance.** Based on the aforementioned considerations, the author decided to apply the MSSD. For the selection process, four English and German-speaking countries in Europe were considered; namely, Austria, Britain, Ireland, and Switzerland.<sup>32</sup> First, the

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<sup>28</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 40.

<sup>31</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), 84.

<sup>32</sup> In addition to these countries, France would have constituted an interesting example due to her high extraneous variance in comparison to Germany; especially when considering that the former hereditary enemies France and Germany have intensely been collaborating in security matters since 1987. Back then, then-President François Mitterrand and then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl established the German-French Defence and Security Council, which was intended to facilitate close defence collaboration. Following this milestone in bilateral relations, the Franco-German Brigade was founded to manifest the permanent military cooperation of both countries. However, the selection process had to be limited to English and German-speaking countries only, as the author does not possess working proficiency in other languages; cf. *ibid.*, and Deutsch-französischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat (1988), <http://www.france-allemande.fr/IMG/pdf/VerteidigungsratProtokoll88.pdf>, 18 March 2018, and Bundeswehr, 'Die Geschichte der Bundeswehr', Bundeswehr, accessed 29 April 2015, [https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/streitkraefte/grundlagen/geschichte/!ut/p/z1/hU69DoIwGHwWB9Z-tSigG6iDBhONJEIXU7AWTWIJqdTHF-NkovG2-80BhRyoYv1VMHvVismBFzQ4JVGapWRGSLZbLPF66yfJeE9INAnh-C9ABxv\\_QIzhcOZQDBvhr41sFcABKNAb69kDtdpYyS1i1eshFDVTZ8l3uorfWgaokLp8X49V6UcCqOEXbrhBdzPltbVtN\\_ewh51zSGgtJEeVbjz8rVLRzkL-mYS2yR32p7JP49ETxeawAQ!dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922TPCD0IM3BB1Q22TE6](https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/streitkraefte/grundlagen/geschichte/!ut/p/z1/hU69DoIwGHwWB9Z-tSigG6iDBhONJEIXU7AWTWIJqdTHF-NkovG2-80BhRyoYv1VMHvVismBFzQ4JVGapWRGSLZbLPF66yfJeE9INAnh-C9ABxv_QIzhcOZQDBvhr41sFcABKNAb69kDtdpYyS1i1eshFDVTZ8l3uorfWgaokLp8X49V6UcCqOEXbrhBdzPltbVtN_ewh51zSGgtJEeVbjz8rVLRzkL-mYS2yR32p7JP49ETxeawAQ!dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TPCD0IM3BB1Q22TE6).



countries' extraneous variance in comparison to Germany was examined. As highlighted in Table 1.1, the political, economic and defence-related situation of each country in 2010 was considered.<sup>33</sup>

When consulting Table 1.1, it first appears as if all countries exhibit a high extraneous variance with Germany. For instance, all examples are considered to be stable post-war democracies. Furthermore, except for Switzerland, all other countries had launched comprehensive defence reviews following the 2008 financial crisis.<sup>34</sup>

In addition to these two factors, the territorial security environment, which this thesis defines as the absence of an imminent threat to a nation's territorial integrity, was judged to be stable. However, the countries already differ as regards the second component of the security environment, namely, the ideological element. Although acknowledging that geography plays a vital role in the assessment of countries' security environments, official alignment with international defensive alliances must be taken into consideration as well. For instance, during the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were geographical neighbours. However, due to their respective Western and Eastern allegiances, their territorial integrity did not depend on their location but rather on the decisions made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, membership in either the European Union (EU) or NATO may force a nation to go to war even if her territory is not under attack. Therefore, these memberships should be considered when estimating countries'

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<sup>33</sup> The only exception is Switzerland's number of troops. Here, numbers from 2019 had to be included as the number of troops in 2010 was not published; cf. 'Die Armee in Zahlen', Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport, accessed November 19 2019, <https://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/vbs/zahlen-fakten/armee.html>.

<sup>34</sup> In contrast to most of Switzerland's neighbours, the 2008 crisis primarily affected UBS, Switzerland's largest bank, and only to a lesser extent the country's overall economy. Austria, on the other hand experienced a sharp rise in debt numbers between 2007 and 2010 and subsequently launched a comprehensive review of her militia forces as of mid-2013. Ireland was in a similar situation. Here, the government aspired to cut defence budgets by 15.00 per cent over the course of four years to combat soaring debt numbers following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, the government decided to continue and expand the examination of the national reserve force in 2012; cf. Jean-Pierre Roth, *Globale Krise: Wie ist die Schweiz betroffen?*, Speech (Frankfurt Main, 2009), published by *Schweizerische Nationalbank*, accessed 12 July 2017, [https://www.snb.ch/de/mmr/speeches/id/ref\\_20090302\\_jpr/source/ref\\_20090302\\_jpr.de.pdf](https://www.snb.ch/de/mmr/speeches/id/ref_20090302_jpr/source/ref_20090302_jpr.de.pdf), 4-5, Christian Mölling, and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, *The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence: Annex*, 35, and 55, Christoph Vavrik, *Anfrage der Abgeordneten Christoph Vavrik, Kollegin und Kollegen an den Bundesminister für Landesverteidigung und Sport betreffend Neuausrichtung der Miliz*, 1, Department of Defence, *Strategy Statement 2011-2014* (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2012), 14, and Department of Defence, *Value for Money Review of the Reserve Defence Force* (Dublin: Department of Defence, 2012).

extraneous variance.

Table 1.1: Extraneous Variance: Austria, Britain, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland

	Austria	Britain	Germany	Ireland	Switzerland
<b>Extraneous Variance</b>					
Post-War Democracy	stable	stable	stable	stable	stable
Financially Driven Defence Reviews	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Territorial Security Environment	stable	stable	stable	stable	stable
EU Member**	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
NATO Member**	no	yes	yes	no	no
Political Neutrality	yes	no	no	semi	yes
Gross Domestic Product*	354.67	2283.51	3198.28	201.48	416.85
Number of Troops**	27.300	175.690	250.613	10.460	140.304***
Professional Forces	no	yes	as of 2011	yes	no
*Average GDP 2007-2012 in bn US\$.					
**In 2010.					
***In 2019.					

Sources: European Parliament, NATO, Swiss Army, and OECD, including own calculations.

As seen in Table 1.1, only Britain and Germany are a part of both alliances, which suggests that they are more likely to be obliged to contribute troops to missions undertaken by these defensive organisations, while Austria, Ireland and Switzerland may opt to participate or not.<sup>35</sup> This discrepancy is further illustrated by political neutrality. Britain and Germany are not neutral countries and, therefore, must take additional threats into account when planning defence strategies.<sup>36</sup> In conclusion, these factors suggest that only Britain has a comparable extraneous variance to Germany as regards her ideological security environment.

<sup>35</sup> This thesis was composed from 2013 through 2018 and covers events from 2010 through 2015 as well as from 1970 through 1979. Moreover, by the time this thesis was submitted after final revisions in late 2019, Britain was still a member of the EU. Therefore, the subject of Brexit was excluded from the analysis; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'NATO Member Countries', North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed 11 May 2017, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato\\_countries.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm), and European Union, 'Countries', European Union, accessed 11 May 2017, [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en).

<sup>36</sup> While Ireland is not considered neutral in the context of international law, such as Austria and Switzerland, Ireland's foreign policy objectives and her decision not to join NATO reflects that Ireland can be considered semi-neutral; cf. Ronan Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1, No 3 (1982): 27-38, accessed 21 November 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/30001722>.

While factors such as the state of nations' post-war democracy and security environment are a widely accepted measures of extraneous variance, one could argue that the reference to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or military capabilities (number of troops) should be moved to the experimental variance examination.<sup>37</sup> However, in the context of this thesis, these two factors constitute framing conditions as both economic power and military capabilities are the basis for defence planning; i.e., these factors are starting conditions (extraneous variance) rather than experimental elements. As regards GDP, it is apparent that Britain, again, exhibits the highest extraneous variance to Germany, while Austria, Ireland and Switzerland show significantly smaller economic power. This discrepancy must undoubtedly be attributed to the countries' relatively small size. Still, it also suggests that Austria, Ireland and Switzerland cannot spend as much on defence in real terms as Britain or Germany. This reasoning is also somewhat reflected when considering military capabilities. As highlighted in Table 1.1, Britain's number of troops is again more comparable to Germany's than Ireland's or Austria's.<sup>38</sup> Switzerland, on the other hand, is an outlier in this context as she has a similar number of troops at her disposal as Britain. Nevertheless, this number does not suggest comparability to Britain or Germany. Like Austria, Switzerland maintains a based militia system.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, total troop numbers may not entirely reflect military capabilities as not all counted service members may be fully trained to engage in combat. This reasoning is also reflected in Austria's and Switzerland's military personnel statistics. In Austria, young adults complete their basic obligatory military service in six months, while participation in subsequent training is usually optional.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, upon completion of their basic training, former conscripts

<sup>37</sup> cf. Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>38</sup> Britain seems to have 75,000 fewer troops at her disposal than Germany. However, the *Bundeswehr* numbers must be treated with caution, as the statistics also include 30,000 conscripts. When subtracting the latter and comparing the number of service members to the countries' population, it shows that 0.70 per cent of the British population are members of the armed forces, while 0.26 per cent of Germans serve in the *Bundeswehr*. Thus, the 2010 indicate a good level for comparison; cf. 'The World Fact Book: United Kingdom', Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 10 May 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html>, and Central Intelligence Agency, 'The World Fact Book: Germany', Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 10 May 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

<sup>39</sup> See 'Dauer des Grundwehrdienstes', Oesterreich.gv.at, accessed 19 November 2019, [https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/themen/leben\\_in\\_oesterreich/wehrdienst/3/Seite.1401081.html](https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/themen/leben_in_oesterreich/wehrdienst/3/Seite.1401081.html), 'Dienstpflicht', Schweizer Armee, accessed 19 November 2019, <https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/mein-militaerdienst/allgemeines-zu-m-militaerdienst/dienstpflicht.html>, and BV Art. 59.

<sup>40</sup> By law, participation in military exercises is mandatory for all, who completed basic military training.

are not included in personnel statistics.<sup>41</sup> In Switzerland, on the other hand, basic obligatory military service, the *Rekrutenschule*, lasts only 4.5 months;<sup>42</sup> however, graduates of the *Rekrutenschule* remain members of the armed forces for 12 years after completing basic military training.<sup>43</sup> Switzerland has, therefore, more troops at her disposal than Austria; at least statistically speaking.

**Experimental Variance.** In summary, only Britain exhibited sufficient extraneous variance compared to Germany in 2010. Therefore, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland were excluded from further evaluations, which, as elaborated before, need to include the experimental variance.<sup>44</sup> Recalling from the paragraph on the theory of MSSD, examining the latter serves the purpose of identifying other aspects that might have caused the dependent variable other than the assumed explanatory factor.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, variables defined as experimental variance should be relevant to the research focus.<sup>46</sup>

The first section of Table 1.2, therefore, lists four aspects that were defined as influential factors on defence planning. The first one considered was British and German attitudes on how defence policies should be enforced. Here, it was judged that Britain pursues a proactive strategy while Germany adheres to a rather reluctant approach. This conclusion is best explained by looking at politicians' reactions to a recent crisis in international security. In 2014, when the Ukraine crisis worsened, different journalists independently confronted both the British and German defence ministers with the same query;<sup>47</sup> namely, they were

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However, citizens are usually not drafted for training when enough volunteers report for duty. These post-basic military service exercises are primarily designed to train future officers; see 'Dauer des Grundwehrdienstes', Oesterreich.gv.at, accessed 19 November 2019, [https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/themen/leben\\_in\\_oesterreich/wehrdienst/3/Seite.1401081.html](https://www.oesterreich.gv.at/themen/leben_in_oesterreich/wehrdienst/3/Seite.1401081.html).

<sup>41</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> 'Dienstpflicht', Schweizer Armee, accessed 19 November 2019, <https://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/mein-militaerdienst/allgemeines-zum-militaerdienst/dienstpflicht.html>.

<sup>43</sup> During this period, citizens have to return to the armed forces for annual training to refresh and advance their skills. In total, citizens must participate in six *Wiederholungskurse*, which last for 19 days each; cf. *ibid.*, and MG Art. 13.

<sup>44</sup> cf. Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>45</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> Widely regarded by the West as a violation of international law, Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 has exacerbated political tensions between NATO and Russia. Due to Russia's subsequent conduct of concentrating troops at her border with Ukraine, NATO members in Eastern Europe have urged the alliance to increase military presence in their countries; see, for example, Philip Hammond, interviewed by Andrew Marr, *The Andrew Marr Show*, broadcasted by BBC Two, 30 March 2014.

asked to elaborate what they considered the most appropriate reaction to the increasing tensions in Eastern Europe.<sup>48</sup> Responding to this question, then-British Defence Secretary Philip Hammond asserted that it was necessary to demonstrate military strength and stressed Britain's commitment to the safety of NATO's Baltic member states.<sup>49</sup> German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, on the other hand, emphasised that economic power rather than military might constitutes Europe's competitive advantage.<sup>50</sup> Hence, so she continued, financial resources such as sanctions should be used to enforce diplomatic solutions.<sup>51</sup>

Table 1.2: Experimental Variance, Explanatory Factors, and Outcome: Britain and Germany

	Britain	Germany
<b>Experimental Variance</b>		
Defence Policies/Enforcement	proactive	reluctant
Political Self-Perceptions	positive	critical
Foreign Policy Objectives	global	European
Attitudes towards the Armed Forces	positive/neutral	negative/neutral
<b>Explanatory Factor</b>		
2008 Financial Crisis	yes	yes
Financially Driven Defence Reviews	yes	yes
<b>Dependent Variable</b>		
Post-2010 Reserve Forces' Reform	yes	yes

Source: OECD, including own calculations.

At first glance, these statements seemed to express consent as regards the ends (desired outcome), namely, preventing further breaches of the territorial integrity of sovereign European states.<sup>52</sup> Looking more closely, however, politicians unintentionally highlighted

<sup>48</sup> *ibid.*, and Ursula von der Leyen, interviewed by Günther Jauch, *Günther Jauch*, broadcasted by ARD, 04 May 2014.

<sup>49</sup> Philip Hammond, interviewed by Andrew Marr.

<sup>50</sup> Ursula von der Leyen, interviewed by Günther Jauch.

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> cf. Bruce Reider, 'Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq', *Parameters* XXXVII, No Winter 2007-08 (2007): 46-57, accessed 01 December 2014, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07winter/reider.pdf>, 48.

their countries' differences regarding the desired ways (strategy) and means (resources) to enforce the said outcomes.<sup>53</sup> Reasons for this discrepancy can be found in the respective country's contemporary defence strategy papers. For instance, the 2010 National Security Strategy (2010-NSS) stated that Britain's '[...] national interest requires [Britain] to project power and [...] to act well beyond [her] shores', while the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines (2011-DPG) elaborated that '[...] Germany is prepared to use the complete spectrum of national policy instruments [...] to defend itself'.<sup>54</sup>

These citations emphasise Britain's and Germany's differences as regards their approach towards defence policy and their willingness to deploy armed forces. However, they also implicitly hint at Britain's and Germany's divergence regarding their self-perceived role in world affairs. Britain openly accepts to play an active part in the global theatre, while Germany is rather critical and prefers to remain passive and use force purely as a means of self-defence. Further evidence for this inference is found in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010-SDSR), which stated that Britain aims to contribute 'to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks [...] and [by] applying [her] instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at the source'.<sup>55</sup> Germany's 2011-DPG, on the other hand, stressed that '[m]ilitary operations have far-reaching political consequences' and that '[...] there must be a clear answer to the question of whether German interests and the related fulfilment of international responsibility require and justify an operation and what the consequences of non-action would be'.<sup>56</sup>

This proactive British approach, and Germany's cautious attitude, further alludes to the countries' different strategic focuses. Again referring to the policy papers, it becomes apparent that the former's objectives are on a global scale where 'power projection' and 'strategic presence' around the world is necessary.<sup>57</sup> Germany's strategic focal point,

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<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, Cm 7953 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010), 21, and German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines* (Berlin: German Ministry of Defence, 2011), accessed 05 November 2017, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157024/Germany%20engl.pdf>, 3.

<sup>55</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, Cm 7948 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010), 9.

<sup>56</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 4.

<sup>57</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 4, and HM

however, is European and the 2011-DPG support this claim as its authors purposely juxtaposed the striving for national objectives to Germany's dedicated role 'as a strong partner in a united Europe,' who is 'committed to serving world peace'.<sup>58</sup>

Considering Britain's and Germany's experience with the use of force in the 20th century, these different attitudes are not surprising. For instance, authors' of the 2010-SDSR affirmed that '[...] [w]e have a proud history of standing up for the values we believe in and we should have no less ambition for our country in the decades to come.'<sup>59</sup> This excerpt implies that military involvements have been beneficial for Britain. For Germany, on the other hand, the experiences of the two world wars still exercise a significant influence on the formulation of security policies. For instance, the 2011-DPG stated that 'German security interests are a result of our history' and that overseas deployments require '[t]he involvement of the German *Bundestag* with regard to the employment of the armed forces as stipulated in the constitution' as this '[...] will continue to be an indispensable basis of German security policy'.<sup>60</sup>

Besides these political aspects, the respective public's different attitudes towards the armed forces are rather interesting. In the context of this thesis, this point is quite important, as the public's acceptance of the military strongly correlates with the MoD's potential to recruit.<sup>61</sup> In Britain, the public's opinion of the military is believed to be split between support of the armed forces and a critical stance on the overseas missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>62</sup> As noted by Hines et al., this discrepancy might be explained by Britain's former status as a global empire, which required frequent overseas deployment of troops.<sup>63</sup> Meaning, the public is somewhat used to this process and values the service of its military staff while simultaneously questioning the necessity of the said deployments.<sup>64</sup> However,

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Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 12.

<sup>58</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 4.

<sup>59</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 3.

<sup>60</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 3-4.

<sup>61</sup> See Lindsey A. Hines et al., 'Are the Armed Forces Understood and Supported by the Public? A View from the United Kingdom', *Armed Forces & Society* 41, No 4 (2015): 688-713, DOI:10.1177/0095327X14559975, 689.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, 688.

<sup>63</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> *ibid.*

Cornish and Dorman relativised this judgment by stating that ‘the murder of Drummer Rigby in May 2013 and the protests against some of the homecoming parades of British forces indicate that there are elements of society that are not only hostile to UK foreign policy but also view Britain’s armed forces as potential targets’.<sup>65</sup> In Germany, this friction between the public and the armed forces manifests itself even beyond the topic of overseas deployments. In general, the public expresses little to no interest in the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>66</sup> In 2012, Reeb predicted that this problem might further increase in the course of the suspension of conscription as no more former draftees would return to civilian life.<sup>67</sup> One year later, statistical proof for his prognosis was delivered; according to a *Bundeswehr* survey, almost 80.00 per cent of Germans receive information about the armed forces from mainstream media and not from personal interaction with service members.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, 20.00 per cent express hostile opinions about the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>69</sup> As regards overseas deployment, public consent seems to be tied to the nature of the said mission.<sup>70</sup> In general, it appears that the public tends to judge deployments more positively when they involve less military and more humanitarian aspects.<sup>71</sup>

**Explanatory Factors.** The evaluation of Britain’s and Germany’s experimental variances suggests that both countries are somewhat different as regards their strategic defence thinking. While comparable defence and foreign policy objectives would have suggested an explanation for taking similar strategic steps in defence planning, these aspects can be excluded as explanatory factors for launching defence reviews in 2010; i.e., the experimental variance does not reveal why the dependent variable emerged. However,

<sup>65</sup> Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Fifty Shades of Purple? A Risk-Sharing Approach to the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review’, *International Affairs* 89, No 5 (2013): 1183-1202, DOI:10.1111/1468-2346.12066.x, 1191.

<sup>66</sup> Hans-Joachim Reeb. ‘Wandel der Sicherheitskultur durch die Bundeswehrreform’, ed. Detlef Buch (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 32.

<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Thomas Buhlmann, and Meike Wanner, *Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“: Forschungsbericht* (Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, 2013), 6.

<sup>69</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> See Matthias Mader, ‘Bevölkerungseinstellungen zu Auslandseinsätzen’, (doctoral thesis, University of Bamberg, 2016).


<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, 44 and 93.



as indicated in Table 1.2, two other intertwined factors can be identified as explanatory factors; namely, the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequently launched financially driven defence reviews.

To assess whether Britain and Germany were affected by the 2008 financial crisis, the development of national GDPs was examined. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, both countries experienced a similar downward trend in GDP, starting in the second quarter of 2008 and reaching a negative peak in the first quarter of 2009. Thereafter, Germany's GDP resumed positive growth in the second quarter of 2009, followed by Britain in the subsequent quarter; negative growth, therefore, concentrated in 2009, which echoes the peak of the 2008 financial crisis in Europe.<sup>72</sup>

Figure 1.1: GDP Change in Per Cent, Britain and Germany (2007-2012)



Source: OECD.

As the GDP is an important indicator to measure national income, these negative developments suggest that both Britain's and Germany's economies experienced severe ramifications following the 2008 financial crisis. Subsequently, namely, in 2010, both Britain and Germany launched comprehensive defence reviews. In Britain, findings of the

<sup>72</sup> cf. Stormy-Annika Mildner, 'Germany and the Financial Crisis: Lessons to be Learned'. *China and Germany as Actors in World Politics - Mutual Challenges, Common Positions?*, (Beijing: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010), 61 et seq.

review were consolidated in the 2010-NSS/SDSR package.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, besides this parent review, the British government commissioned a report on the reform of the reserve;<sup>74</sup> it was published in 2011.<sup>75</sup> In Germany, on the other hand, aims of the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* were expressed in three independent documents, namely, in the report by the 2010 Commission on Structural Reform (2010-CSR), in the 2010 review of the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*, as well as in the 2011-DPG.<sup>76</sup> Similarly to Britain, Berlin followed London's example in 2012 by publishing the 2012-COR.<sup>77</sup> As discussed in more detail in Chapters Two through Five, the parent reforms were primarily driven by financial considerations and set the objectives for the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR respectively.

**Dependent Variable.** In addition to covering the experimental variable and the explanatory factors, Table 1.2 further alludes to the dependent variable; i.e., the phenomenon this thesis aims to study. As highlighted in Table 1.2, both Britain and Germany launched reviews of their national reserve forces after the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis. The dependent variable is the main focus of this study and is examined in Chapters Two through Five.

### 1.2.1.3 Sample Size and Assessment Periods

**Contemporary Examples.** This project commenced based on the motivation to explore reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil. Building on the defined springboard example, Britain was selected as a suitable candidate for comparison to Germany by using the MSSD approach. Therefore, the assessment period was set to span from the publication of the FR-2020's and 2012-COR's parent reforms, namely, the British 2010-SDSR / 2010-NSS and the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*, to the implementation of the FR-2020 and

<sup>73</sup> cf. HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, and HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*.

<sup>74</sup> cf. The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020*.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> cf. *Bericht des Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010*, 2010, accessed 27 April 2015, <http://www.sicherheitspolitik-bremen.de/media/5a3794b2ced6c3b7ffff80b1ffffef.pdf>, and German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*.

<sup>77</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*.

2012-COR.<sup>78</sup> Accordingly, the core period was defined as 2010 through 2015. However, noting that the economic implications of the 2008 financial crisis had to be reference frequently, pre-2010 developments were considered in the research process as well.

**Historical Examples.** The evaluation of the above mentioned contemporary examples already promised to deliver sufficient answers to the first research question. However, findings of the comparative analysis would somewhat be limited as they are only valid for these two countries during one period. Therefore, it was judged that additional examples of reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil should be investigated in this thesis to enhance theory building and increase the validity of findings.

As other countries had already been excluded due to their low extraneous variance, Britain's and Germany's postwar history was, therefore, assessed further. Again starting with the dependent variable, the author sought to identify examples of economic turmoil and subsequent defence reviews. Here, it was discovered that both Britain and Germany exhibited this constellation in the 1970s. In Britain, the so-called Mason Review was launched in 1975 and was accompanied by the review of reserve forces' structures and roles within the army, navy and air force.<sup>79</sup> Similar to the situation in 2008, Britain was also confronted with severe economic problems when the Mason Review was conducted. As highlighted by Cairncross, Britain experienced continuous growth after World War Two;<sup>80</sup> however, as illustrated in Figure 1.2, GDP started growing negatively and (or) fluctuated at low positive numbers when the price of oil and other commodities rose in the course of the 1973 oil price shock.<sup>81</sup>

A similar pattern was found in Germany. As noted by Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, postwar Germany had experienced strong and stable economic growth. However, after

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
<sup>78</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, and German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*.

<sup>79</sup> cf. *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1975), The National Archives Digitalised Records, Electronic Archive Signature CAB 129/181/21, chap. IV-1 et seq., *Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*, The National Archives, Reference DEFE 70/349, and Roy Mason, *Our Contribution to the Price of Peace: Britain's Defence Policy and Expenditure* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1975), The British Library, Reference Dewey: 355.6/22.

<sup>80</sup> Alexander Cairncross, 'Economic Policy and Performance, 1964-1990', eds. Roderick Floud, and Donald McCloskey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 67, and 81.

<sup>81</sup> *ibid.*

Figure 1.2: GDP Change in Per Cent, Britain and Germany (1970-1979)



Source: OECD.

the exponential rise in oil prices as of 1973, governments were confronted with severe economic turmoil, which lasted throughout the remaining years of the decade.<sup>82</sup> Simultaneously, as attested by the publication of five Defence White Papers between 1970 and 1979, the *Bundeswehr* as well Germany's defence policy underwent a thorough reform process.<sup>83</sup> Moreover, in the course of these defence reviews, the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve force was profoundly restructured, and their importance for Germany's defence posture was emphasised.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> cf. Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paqué, and Holger Schmieding, *The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 185.

<sup>83</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1970), Digital Archive of the Bundestag, Drucksache VI/765, Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1971), Digital Archive of the Bundestag, Drucksache VI/2920, Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1974), Digital Archive of the Bundestag, Drucksache 7/1505, Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1976), Digital Archive of the Bundestag, Drucksache 7/4554, Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Weißbuch 1979 Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Paul Dierichs, 1979), Digital Archive of the Bundestag. Drucksache 8/3568.

<sup>84</sup> cf. Ekkehart Guth, 'Reservisten der Luftwaffe', ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler), 215, Wilhelm Langer, 'Reservisten des Heeres', ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler, 1998), 125, and 153, and Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, *Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Analyse und Optionen* (Bonn: Wehrstruktur-Kommission, 1972/1973).

These developments demonstrate that both Britain and Germany exhibited similar dependent variables and explanatory factors in the 1970s and following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, both countries were Western democracies and members of NATO and the EU's predecessor, namely, the European Economic Community (EEC); hence, a comparable extraneous variance can be assumed. Considering these factors, the second assessment period was, therefore, first set between 1973 and 1979. However, to respect all Defence White Papers published by the German government during this decade, the assessment period was eventually defined as 1970 through 1979.

## 1.2.2 The Mixed Methods Approach

### 1.2.2.1 Theory

Similar to numerous other projects in the social sciences, this thesis' research focus cannot be examined in the laboratory setting.<sup>85</sup> Reasons for this are twofold. First, the author can neither influence whether and when an economic crisis occurs nor can she change governments' subsequent decisions on defence policy;<sup>86</sup> i.e., the dependent variable and explanatory factor emerge without the control of the author. Second, alternative strategies regarding reserve forces reforms cannot be simulated. Consequently, developments must be studied as they present themselves in real life.

Combined with the inductive character of the research questions, the aforementioned factors indicate that this thesis' research focus is best studied by qualitative means.<sup>87</sup> However, while certainly valid, this reasoning does not fully take the economic dimension of the research questions into account. Although economic developments may also be studied in a narrative, gathering and analysing data such as defence budgets needs to be done in a quantitative setting.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> cf. Anthony M. Orum, Joe R. Feagin, and Gideon Sjoberg, 'Introduction', eds. Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press), 6-7.

<sup>86</sup> cf. Anol Bhattacharjee, *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices*, 2nd edn. (Tampa: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 84-85.

<sup>87</sup> cf. Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, *Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures*, 39-41 et seq.

<sup>88</sup> cf. John W. Creswell, *A Concise Introduction to Mixed Methods Research* (London: Sage, 2015), 2.

**Multiple Methods Approach.** In principal, the literature suggests two strategies for dealing with research problems that encompass both qualitative and quantitative components.<sup>89</sup> Morse and Niehaus, for instance, discussed the multiple methods design as a rigorous strategy to apply both qualitative and quantitative approaches.<sup>90</sup> Nevertheless, they also highlighted that a '[m]ultiple method research program is a series of complete related qualitative and/or quantitative research projects'.<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, studies using the multiple methods approach must apply all aspects of the selected research approach and cannot mix qualitative and quantitative methods.<sup>92</sup> As this strategy is rather time-consuming, Morse and Niehaus recommend the application of multiple methods only for extended or related sequential projects.<sup>93</sup> For other studies that wish to combine qualitative and quantitative means, the authors recommend the mixed methods approach.<sup>94</sup>

**Mixed Methods Approach.** Instead of integrating all aspects of each method, researchers using the mixed method approach must select a core and a supplement component.<sup>95</sup> The core component drives the research and can either be qualitative or quantitative.<sup>96</sup> However, it must be chosen based on the research questions;<sup>97</sup> if they are inductive, namely, when they ask to study a phenomenon with empirical means, the mixed method study must be qualitatively driven.<sup>98</sup> Conversely, when the research questions ask to investigate relationships of variables, the project is deductive and, therefore, quantitatively driven.<sup>99</sup> In any case, both qualitative and quantitative data may be gathered and analysed.<sup>100</sup> This conduct, therefore, allows investigating the phenomenon in question from different angles, which is believed to advance the researcher's understanding of the research problem and,

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<sup>89</sup> See Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, *Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures*, 13-14.

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, 39.

<sup>93</sup> *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>94</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> *ibid.*, 13-14.

<sup>96</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> *ibid.*, 39.

<sup>98</sup> *ibid.*, 39-40.

<sup>99</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> John W. Creswell, *A Concise Introduction to Mixed Methods Research*, 2.

therefore, adds validity to the findings.<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless, both qualitative and quantitative methods need to follow their innate inductive or deductive character whenever they are applied.<sup>102</sup>

#### **1.2.2.2 Application**

As already mentioned above, this thesis research is driven by qualitative means that need to be supported by qualitative elements. Therefore, the mixed method approach is applied by using a qualitative core and quantitative supplementary component. This strategy allows investigating the research questions in five steps. First, relevant policy papers and the accompanying political discourse are examined for empirical evidence of the presence of the explanatory factor. In other words, documents are scrutinised for proof that economic turmoil has influenced the respective defence review. Second, to underscore these empirical findings, national defence budgets are examined before and after the emergence of economic turmoil. This step, therefore, aims to highlight the relationship between financial crises and government spending. Third, in order to assess the threats that regular service members and reservists face, Britain's and Germany's territorial and ideological security environments are examined. This step is accomplished by consulting relevant government publications. Four, changes to the role and responsibilities are explored and described by looking at the implications of the respective reserve forces' reforms on national reserve forces. Again, qualitative and quantitative reasoning is used here. On the one hand, policy papers as regards the reserve reforms are examined for envisaged plans. On the other hand, personnel statistics are used to illustrate how the composition of the reserve forces changed after the impact of economic turmoil. Five, the comparative analysis considers and compares these (new) roles and responsibilities of reservists in light of the financially driven defence reforms and security environments. In doing so, it aspired to develop a theory on how governments reform their reserve forces in times of economic turmoil. A detailed description of how and which sources were gathered and analysed is presented in Section 1.4 of this chapter.

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<sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, and Janice M. Morse, and Linda Niehaus, *Mixed Method Design: Principles and Procedures*, 14.

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, 39-40.

## **1.3 Academic Discourse and Research Gap**

### **1.3.1 Literature Analysis Process**

Authors in the field of defence studies discuss a vast number of specific topics and, therefore, contribute uncountable works to the literature every year. While reading publications on a variety of subjects can be an entertaining pastime, the process of reviewing available and relevant sources for this study served two particular purposes. First, publications discussing topics specifically related to this thesis' research focus, e.g., works focusing on the relevant defence reviews or reserve forces, were consulted to identify research gaps. Second, the literature needed to be consulted to locate works that would support exploring the stipulated research questions.

To sort through the vast collection of related literature, the analysis had to follow a structured process. To cater to both the demands of the research focus and the selected examples, it was, therefore, divided into two steps. First, the research scope had to be respected; although reserve forces' reforms can be categorised as a topic in defence studies, examining the former in the light of economic challenges also somewhat placed research in the realm of (political) economy. Thus, to consult the appropriate sources in both fields, the author decided to group the literature into five clusters as regards their thematic focus. Second, as this thesis employed Britain and Germany as examples, works discussing the individual themes needed to consider either Britain or Germany or both. As the latter is rarely found, it was further decided to break down the thematic clusters and, where applicable, to review the themes separately as regards Britain and Germany.

When research for this thesis commenced, the author, in line with the stipulated springboard example, first consulted the literature on the 2010 defence reviews and the subsequent reserve forces' reforms. This step was taken to gain an overview of the available publications and to determine to what extent scholars had already discussed the study's selected research focus. After concluding this first assessment, the same approach was repeated for exploring the relevant literature on the historical cases. Following this analysis, the author consulted complementary publications for context building. Here, publications on Anglo-German (defence) relations were consulted. Finally, works that were believed to



aid in theory building and background analysis, e.g., literature on economic theory and defence economics, were reviewed to select the most relevant publications.

### 1.3.1.1 2010 Defence Reviews

**The 2010-NSS/SDSR.** In Britain, the 2010-NSS/SDSR package drew much attention and scholars commented on developments in two phases, namely, pre-publication and post-publication. Prior to the 2010-NSS/SDSR package's release, the discussion chiefly focused on offering advice on how to approach the upcoming defence review to prevent its failure at the implementation stage.<sup>103</sup> In this context, Cornish and Dorman specifically stressed that the review process itself needed to be conducted thoroughly.<sup>104</sup>

While authors generally expressed a benevolent attitude towards the upcoming review, their opinion became increasingly hostile in the post-publication phase. Cavanagh, for instance, stipulated that the government had 'missed the chance for conducting a serious defence reform'.<sup>105</sup> His opinion was seconded by Philips, who highlighted that the government had neglected to set a clear direction, which, as argued by Dover and Phythian, lead to rendering the 2010-SDSR's main objectives obsolete.<sup>106</sup>

**The 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*.** Similar to the British discourse, German scholars began commenting on the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* already during the review process. At this stage, authors again published their recommendations; however, in contrast to their British colleagues, they primarily focused on highlighting desired outcomes rather than commenting on the review process itself. Brune et al., for instance, strongly advocated enhancing the *Bundeswehr*'s deployment capabilities by providing troops with suitable equipment and training.<sup>107</sup> In addition, former Defence Minister Scharping admonished the MoD not

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<sup>103</sup> See, for example, Wyn Rees, 'A Strategic Defence Review: Lessons From the Past', *The Political Quarterly* 81, No 3 (2010): 424-427. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2010.02105.x, and Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, 'Breaking the Mould: The United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010'.

<sup>104</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Matt Cavanagh, 'Missed Opportunity', *The RUSI Journal* 156, No 5 (2011): 6-13, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2011.626268, 214.

<sup>106</sup> Mark Phillips, 'Policy-Making in Defence and Security', *The RUSI Journal* 157, No 1 (2012): 28-35, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2012.664361, 32, and Robert Dover, and Mark Phythian, 'Lost Over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review - An Obituary', *Defence Studies* 11, No 3 (2011): 420-444, DOI:10.1080/14702436.2011.630175.x.

<sup>107</sup> cf. Sophie-Charlotte Brune, Marcel Dickow, Hilmar Linnenkamp, and Christian Mölling, 'The German Armed Forces and the Financial Crisis', 1-2.

to jeopardise military capabilities by significantly reducing the number of troops.<sup>108</sup>

Following this general approach to the topic, the discourse soon turned more specific, and authors who evaluated the ramifications of the suspension of conscription started to dominate the discussion.<sup>109</sup> Here, the risk of losing democratic control over the *Bundeswehr* after turning into an all-volunteer force was the most frequently quoted concern.<sup>110</sup>

**2010 Thematic Commonalities.** Although British and German scholars approached their respective country's defence reviews from different angles, there were also some common themes present in both academic discourses, namely, financial aspects and capability gaps. As regards the former, scholars in both countries agreed that economic considerations and not security concerns had sparked and guided the 2010 defence reviews. For example, Cornish and Dorman, as well as Punyani, claimed that British government's primary concern was to stop economic deterioration by limiting rising debt numbers.<sup>111</sup> Concerning the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*, judgement was less harsh; however, Brück insinuated that 'it [was] not a coincidence that one of the most profound reforms of the Bundeswehr [was] being planned during one of the most severe economic crises of recent decades'.<sup>112</sup>

As regards military capabilities, British scholars outlined that the ability to conduct 'enduring stabilization operation such as those undertaken recently in Iraq or Afghanistan would be significantly reduced' as with decreasing budgets, the government was not capable of tackling all potential hazards threatening Britain.<sup>113</sup> In Germany, on the other hand, authors

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<sup>108</sup> Rudolph Scharping, 'Sicherheit nach Kassenlage', *Berliner Republik*, <http://www.b-republik.de/archiv/sicherheit-nach-kassenlage?aut=822>, 27 April 2014.

<sup>109</sup> See, for example, Wenke Apt, 'Demographischer Wandel als Rekrutierungsproblem?: Regionale Ungleichheit und unerschlossene Potentiale bei der Nachwuchsgewinnung der Bundeswehr', *SWP-Aktuell* 41, (2010), accessed 05 December 2014, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A41\\\_apw\\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A41\_apw\_ks.pdf), and Detlef Buch, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht', ed. Detlef Buch (Frankfurt Main: Peter Lang, 2012).

<sup>110</sup> See, for example, Harald Kujat, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht', *APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 61, No 48 (2011): 3-7, and Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, 'Wehrpflicht und Zivildienst: Bestandteile der Politischen Kultur', *APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 61, No 48 (2011): 39-45.

<sup>111</sup> Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman. 'Dr Fox and the Philosopher's Stone: The Alchemy of National Defence in the Age of Austerity', *International Affairs* 87, No 2 (2011): 335-353, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00976.x, and Sameer Punyani, 'The Economics of National Defence in an Age of Austerity', *Chatham House in collaboration with McKinsey & Company*, Meeting No. 3: On Year on from the SDSR, accessed 16 November 2014, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Security/171011report.pdf>.

<sup>112</sup> Tilman Brück, 'Die Ökonomie der Bundeswehrreform'. Translated by the author.

<sup>113</sup> Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman. 'Dr Fox and the Philosopher's Stone: The Alchemy of National

anticipated military capabilities to decline as a result of the suspension of conscription.<sup>114</sup> Kujat, for example, predicted that the state's inability to draft would result in a shortage in manpower, both quantitatively and qualitatively.<sup>115</sup> Apt, on the other hand, argued that shrinking age cohorts, as well as factors such as lack of physical aptitude and improving levels of education, would exacerbate recruitment challenges.<sup>116</sup>

### 1.3.1.2 1970s Defence Reviews

**The 1975 Mason Review.** Although the 1975 Mason Review is not a frequently addressed topic in the recent academic discourse, earlier publications such as books and journal articles discussed this defence reform sporadically. As regards the former, authors usually embedded the discussion on the 1975 Mason Review in a broader analysis of Britain's postwar security policy. Dockrill, for example, referred to the 1975 Mason Review in the context of Britain's defence policy on the 1970s.<sup>117</sup> Elaborating that this decade was characterised by severe economic turmoil, Dockrill insinuated that the review's primary purpose was to reallocate government funding from defence to welfare, social security, and government investments in the private sector.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, Dockrill alluded to rising equipment costs, which he mainly attributed to advancements in military technology.<sup>119</sup> Here, Dockrill stipulated that investments in equipment would have pushed defence expenditure to 11.25 per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP), if the government had not taken action.<sup>120</sup> Therefore, Dockrill concluded that the inevitable rise in equipment costs further contributed to then-Defence Secretary Roy Mason's motivation to conduct a comprehensive defence review.<sup>121</sup>

While Dockrill approached the 1975 Mason Review from a somewhat neutral angle,

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Defence in the Age of Austerity', 336, and Robert Dover, and Mark Phythian, 'Lost Over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review - An Obituary', 423.

<sup>114</sup> See, for example, Wenke Apt, 'Herausforderung für die Personalgewinnung der Bundeswehr', *APuZ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 61, No 48 (2011): 24-30, and Harald Kujat, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht'.

<sup>115</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> Wenke Apt, 'Herausforderung für die Personalgewinnung der Bundeswehr'.

<sup>117</sup> Michael Dockrill, *British Defence Since 1945* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 99 et seq.

<sup>118</sup> *ibid.*, 105.

<sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, 104.

<sup>120</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> cf. *ibid.*

Chichester and Wilkinson discussed this defence review somewhat tendentiously.<sup>122</sup> According to their estimates, Labours 'left-wing' defence approach had left Britain defenceless by the end of the decade, which they mainly attributed to the incisive cuts to expenditure, equipment and withdrawal from foreign deployments such as from the Mediterranean.<sup>123</sup> Although attesting that then-Defence Secretary Roy Mason was a realist, they explicitly blamed then-Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healy, for the disproportional decrease of the MoD's funds.<sup>124</sup>

Cary, on the other hand, approached the analysis of the 1975 Mason Review more benevolently and even called it the 'best-managed' as regards finances.<sup>125</sup> Having been involved in the review process, he alluded to two specific points to underscore his judgment;<sup>126</sup> first, compared to the other 16 major and minor defence reviews he has been part of, Cary welcomed the fact that he and his colleagues had sufficient time to conduct the review, which also allowed consulting external experts and drafting a comprehensive ten-year defence plan.<sup>127</sup> Second, Cary explicitly emphasised that the government accepted the expert's assumptions that costs can only be reduced in the long term and that these long term effects should not be jeopardised by striving for realising short-term savings goals.<sup>128</sup> However, Cary also agreed that the 1975 Mason Review's main purpose was to reduce the MoD's share of GNP.<sup>129</sup> Seconding Cary's somewhat positive evaluation of the 1975 Mason Review, *World Today* stipulated that the Labour government merely inherited an unfavourable economic and defence situation from the Conservatives.<sup>130</sup>

**The 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*.** Similar to the British discourse, authors often addressed the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform* in the context of discussing the *Bundeswehr*'s overall history.

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<sup>122</sup> Michael Chichester, and John Wilkinson, *The Uncertain Ally: British Defence Policy 1960-1990* (Aldershot: Gower-Publishing, 1982), 43 et seq.

<sup>123</sup> *ibid.*, 46-47.

<sup>124</sup> *ibid.*, 47.

<sup>125</sup> cf. Michael Cary, 'Britain's Armed Forces after the Defence Cuts (Lecture)', *RUSI*, 121, No 1 (1976): 1-6, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1305557620?accountid=11862>.

<sup>126</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

<sup>127</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> 'British Defense Review', *World Today* 37, No 4 (1975): 131-132, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1294444633?accountid=11862>, 131.

Clement and Jöris, for instance, briefly referenced the reform while elaborating on the 1970s *détente* and stipulated that the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform* was a necessity for modernising the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>131</sup> Schlaffner and Sandig chiefly agreed with this reasoning but also specified that the reform's main goal was to consolidate and structure responsibilities within the MoD.<sup>132</sup> Additionally, they allude to the *Blankeneser Erlass*,<sup>133</sup> this document was introduced by then-Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt and stressed the importance of the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr* while emphasising that s/he still remained bound by instructions of the *Bundestag*.<sup>134</sup> Moreover, they insinuated that the *Blankeneser Erlass* was the foundation that enabled the *Heeresstruktur 3*, which integrated the Command for Territorial Defence into the structures of the German Army.<sup>135</sup>

Rink also cited the *Heeresstruktur 3*, which he addressed in conjunction with implemented measures in the German Navy and Air Force.<sup>136</sup> Briefly referring to the latter, Rink merely stated that the Air Force had been subject to restructuring efforts;<sup>137</sup> however, as regards the former, Rink elaborated that the Navy received numerous new ships and that its responsibilities were expanded to guarding larger parts of the North and Baltic Sea.<sup>138</sup> Besides mentioning the structural aspects of the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*, Rink also stipulated that this reform marked a generation change for the *Bundeswehr* as the majority of former *Wehrmacht*'s soldiers entered retirement age.<sup>139</sup> According to Rink, it was due to this fact that the MoD was finally able to truly enforce the principle of parliamentary control over the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>140</sup> This attempt, so he inferred, was primarily hindered by service members adhering to the old Prussian directive of placing defence-related decisions

<sup>131</sup> Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris, *50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005* (Hamburg: Mittler, 2005), 107.

<sup>132</sup> Rudolf J. Schlaffner, and Marina Sandig, *Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2015: Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte in der Demokratie. Analysen, Bilder und Übersichten* (Berlin: Rombach, 2015), 82.

<sup>133</sup> The *Blankeneser Erlass* came into effect on 01 April 1970; cf. Rudolf J. Schlaffner, and Marina Sandig, *Die Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2015: Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkräfte in der Demokratie. Analysen, Bilder und Übersichten*, 79.

<sup>134</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> Following the *Blankeneser Erlass*, the Army consisted of two major parts, namely, the *Feldheer* and the *Territorialheer*; *ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Martin Rink, *Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 65 et seq.

<sup>137</sup> *ibid.*, 65.

<sup>138</sup> *ibid.*, 65 et seq.

<sup>139</sup> *ibid.*, 38.

<sup>140</sup> *ibid.*

in the hands of the military leadership and the aristocracy.<sup>141</sup>

Bald's analysis somewhat mirrored Rink's reasoning and further explained that in the course of the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*, the *Bundeswehr*'s composition changed significantly and started to resemble the public's profile.<sup>142</sup> In addition to the retirement of *Wehrmacht* soldiers, Rink also attributes this development to overall MoD efforts to offer opportunities for service members to acquire transferable skills.<sup>143</sup> Here, he primarily cited the establishment of *Bundeswehr* Universities, which had supposedly attracted recruits from various backgrounds.<sup>144</sup>

### 1.3.1.3 Reserve Forces

**The FR-2020.** Scholars frequently addressed the British reserve and, similar to the 2010-NSS/SDSR package, the discourse was split into a general, a pre-, and post-FR-2020 discussion. Taking a general approach, Griffith, for instance, briefly outlined common characteristics of reserve forces in seven countries, including Britain.<sup>145</sup> Arguing that these commonalities have emerged following governments' decisions to end conscription after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he outlined that all countries' reserve forces trace their origins back to local militia forces that were only mobilised during times of conflict.<sup>146</sup> He continued to elaborate that soon after the end of World War Two, reservists started to take on responsibilities that mirrored those of the regular force, which created the need to establish firm reserve forces' structures and organised training efforts.<sup>147</sup>

Dandeker, Greenberg, and Omre also alluded to the history of reserve forces by addressing the British reserve's post-Cold War development.<sup>148</sup> Moreover, having published their article shortly before the release of the FR-2020, the authors highlighted that different

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<sup>141</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 45.

<sup>142</sup> Detlef Bald, *Die Bundeswehr: Eine kritische Geschichte, 1955-2005* (Munich: Beck, 2005), 81 et. seq.

<sup>143</sup> *ibid.*, 84-85.

<sup>144</sup> cf., *ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> On two pages, Griffith discussed Israel, Switzerland, the United States, Sweden, Australia, France, and Britain; James Griffith, 'Reserve Forces After the Cold War: An International Perspective', *Armed Forces & Society* 37, No 2 (2011): 209-215, DOI:10.1177/0095327X10396027, 211-212.

<sup>146</sup> *ibid.*, 209.

<sup>147</sup> *ibid.*, 209-210.

<sup>148</sup> Christopher Dandeker, Neil Greenberg, and Geoffrey Orme, 'The UK's Reserve Forces: Retrospect and Prospect', *Armed Forces & Society* 37, No 2 (2011): 341-360, DOI:10.1177/0095327X11398332.

views as regards the future of the British reserve existed among experts.<sup>149</sup> According to Dandeker, Greenberg, and Omre, some experts expected the MoD to reduce the number of reservists as they considered them ill-prepared for overseas deployments;<sup>150</sup> this, so some experts claimed, meant that the reserve was too costly in its contemporary form.<sup>151</sup> On the other hand, the authors stipulated that other experts demanded the reserve be augmented and to mirror the structures, strength and responsibilities of the United States' National Guard.<sup>152</sup>

Besides addressing the British reserve in general terms or prior to the release of the FR-2020, scholars also specifically focused on the latter after its publication. Similar to Griffith, Keene adopted a comparative approach by treating the post-FR-2020 reserve as a springboard example to elaborate how Britain could serve as a role model for the United States' reserve forces.<sup>153</sup> In this context, Keene identified two main aspects, namely, the reserve's ability to contribute to defence more cost-efficiently than regulars and reservists' skill sets, which could be used to compensate for missing competencies.<sup>154</sup> Experts at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), on the other hand, outlined four points they deemed crucial for a successful implementation of the FR-2020.<sup>155</sup> First, so they argued, regulars needed to change their attitudes towards the reserve to ensure that 30,000 could be better integrated into the Army's structures in the course of the Whole Force Concept.<sup>156</sup> Second, RUSI scholars emphasised that the MoD had to implement measures to recruit, train and retain a sufficient number of reservists.<sup>157</sup> Third, experts highlighted that incentives for and collaboration with civilian employers should be intensified as planned.<sup>158</sup> Fourth, to increase the efficiency of overseas deployments, RUSI scholars suggested that reservists

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<sup>149</sup> *ibid.*, 342.

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> Shima D. Keene, *The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United Kingdom Reserve Model* (Marston Gate, Ridgmont: Amazon.co.uk, 2015).

<sup>154</sup> *ibid.*, ix.

<sup>155</sup> 'Future Reserves 2020', *RUSI Commentary*, accessed 13 July 2017, <https://rusi.org/commentary/future-reserves-2020>.

<sup>156</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>157</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> *ibid.*

should be deployed in pre-defined units rather than on an individual basis.<sup>159</sup>

The issue of recruiting and retaining reservists was also highlighted by Edmunds et al., who outlined that the Army had significant recruitment problems at the time the FR-2020 commenced.<sup>160</sup> However, according to the authors, this trend gradually began to reverse as of 2015.<sup>161</sup> Edmunds et al. further alluded to the FR-2020 in the context of changing security environments.<sup>162</sup> Here, they outlined that the British reserve was increasingly involved in highly complex missions, which required reservists to be trained at the same level as regulars.<sup>163</sup> Therefore, according to Edmunds et al.'s judgment, reservists were starting to face the same obstacles as regulars to balance family life and their military commitments.<sup>164</sup>

Also, Edmunds et al. addressed finances in their analysis.<sup>165</sup> Here, they pointed out that the British public was not in favour of additional defence spending, why, as argued the authors, personnel costs were identified by the MoD as a means to realise economies.<sup>166</sup> Dover largely mirrored Edmunds et al.'s judgement as regards financial constraints and the reserve;<sup>167</sup> however, he stipulated that the FR-2020 should be understood as the government's attempt to retain the British Armed Forces' current capability levels, namely, '[...] as a medium sized power, "punching above its weight", as a force able to say "yes" to the interventionist whims of its political masters and to be as "full-spectrum" as possible'.<sup>168</sup>

**The Post-Mason Reserve.** In contrast to the FR-2020, the post-Mason Review reserve must be considered a niche topic in the academic discourse. Keene, for example, only

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<sup>159</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>160</sup> Timothy Edmunds et al., 'Reserve Forces and the Transformation of British Military Organisation: Soldiers, Citizens and Society', *Defence Studies* 16, No 2 (2016): 118-136, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67611/>, 124.

<sup>161</sup> *ibid.*, 124-125.

<sup>162</sup> *ibid.*, 120-121

<sup>163</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>164</sup> *ibid.*, 121.

<sup>165</sup> *ibid.*, 122.

<sup>166</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> Robert Dover, 'Fit for the Future? The UK Government's Plan for a Reserve Army', *World Defence Systems* 1, (2013): 14-16, accessed 02 Januar 2018, <https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/13993>.

<sup>168</sup> *ibid.*, 14.



briefly referred Britain's Cold War reserve by stating that reservists were merely perceived as a tool to augment the regular force in case of a Warsaw Pact attack and were not used in any foreign deployments such to the Falklands.<sup>169</sup>

A rather comprehensive work on the reserve forces, however, was provided by Douglas-Home in 1969.<sup>170</sup> Here, the author addressed the history of the reserve in all three services and specifically commented on the Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve (TAVR)'s reform of 1967.<sup>171</sup> Emphasising that the latter did not affect the Royal Navy (RN)'s or the Royal Air Force (RAF)'s reserve forces, Douglas-Home stipulated that the TAVR underwent scrutiny to identify ways to reduce public spending.<sup>172</sup> This reform is also referred to by Peedle, who described the changing of the Territorial Army's name to TAVR in the same year.<sup>173</sup> Thompson and Nevill also alluded to this renaming process and further highlight that restructuring efforts, as well as large-scale reductions, accompanied this reform.<sup>174</sup> Moreover, the authors pointed out that by 1971, several of the envisaged measures were being reversed, which even lead to changing the name back to 'Territorial Army' in 1979.<sup>175</sup>

A more detailed account of the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) was provided by Howarth, who discussed the reserve's 20th-century history.<sup>176</sup> Here, the author pointed out that a reform was inevitable at the beginning of the 1970s as most war-experienced personnel left service during this decade.<sup>177</sup> In this context, Howarth also alluded to the 1974 Mitchell Committee, which was supposed to review the RNR's roles and potential employment in war and peacetime for the next 20 years.<sup>178</sup> As stipulated by Howarth, the outcome of the review was somewhat positive, as the Mitchell Committee report attested that the

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<sup>169</sup> Shima D. Keene, *The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United Kingdom Reserve Model*, 6.

<sup>170</sup> Charles Douglas-Home, 'Britain's Reserve Forces', *RUSI* (London: Royal United Service Institute, 1969).

<sup>171</sup> *ibid.*, 22.

<sup>172</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>173</sup> Bob Peedle, *Encyclopaedia of the Modern Territorial Army* (Wellingborough: Patrick Stephens, 1990), 31.

<sup>174</sup> Graham N. Thompson, and Teddy Nevill, *The Territorial Army* (London: Ian Allan, 1989), 13.

<sup>175</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> Stephan Howarth, *The Royal Navy's Reserves in War and Peace: 1903-2003*, (Bransley: Leo Cooper, 2003).

<sup>177</sup> *ibid.*, 136.

<sup>178</sup> *ibid.*, 138.

RNR's contribution benefitted the RN.<sup>179</sup> Nevertheless, Howarth also described that, due to economic pressures, a system of hull-sharing was introduced, which basically meant that the RNR had to share its ships.<sup>180</sup> According to Howarth's analysis, this conduct was not well received by reservists.<sup>181</sup>

**The 2012-COR Reserve.** In contrast to the British reserve, the mainstream academic discourse somewhat neglected the 2012-COR. A notable exception, however, is Stockfisch, who introduced the concept of 'vacancy management', which he briefly described as one of the 2012-COR's primary goals.<sup>182</sup> According to his analysis, the 2012-COR included the necessary tools to compensate missing personnel in the regular force.<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, Stockfisch also pointed out that the reserve would not be fully capable to fill this void as, for instance, the Navy's manpower was supposedly 45.00 per cent short of required numbers. Müller, on the other hand, only briefly mentioned the 2012-COR in the context of discussing the reserve's postwar history.<sup>184</sup> While he implied that the 2012-COR might have the potential to help strengthening the *Bundeswehr*'s connection to society, he also surmised that most MoD measures merely constituted attempts to cover up structural shortcomings.<sup>185</sup>

Other authors, namely, those writing on behalf of the Reservists' Association, have contributed more frequently to the discourse. In this context, the Regional Security and Support Units (RSSU) were one of the most commonly discussed themes. Von Bruch, for example, stipulated that by establishing RSSUs, the MoD has given reservists the opportunity to continue their service close to home, which, as he called it, gave them 'a new military home'.<sup>186</sup> To underscore the progress of the RSSU implementation process, writers also alluded to specific RSSU's achievements.<sup>187</sup> Meiszies, for instance, highlighted that

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<sup>179</sup> *ibid.*, 141.

<sup>180</sup> *ibid.*, 142.

<sup>181</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>182</sup> Translated by the author; Dieter Stockfisch, 'Reservisten: Personalressource der Bundeswehr', *Europäische Sicherheit und Technik* 4, (2015): 43-44.

<sup>183</sup> *ibid.*, 43.

<sup>184</sup> Armin Müller, 'Die Reserve der Bundeswehr', ed. Ina Wiesner, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 201.

<sup>185</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> Translated by the author; cf. Thomas von Bruch, 'Neue militärische Heimat für Reservisten', *Reserve Aktuell*, No 2 (2012): 11-13.

<sup>187</sup> See, for example, Sascha Jung, 'RSU-Ausbildungsjahr 2013 endet im Saarland mit Wachschießen und

Rhineland-Palatinate's RSSU was successfully certified to carry out guard service for sensible infrastructures.<sup>188</sup> Besides the RSSU, the reserve's collaboration with civilian employers was addressed. In this context, Dittmar emphasised the need for creating awareness among business owners that reservists do not pose a burden on the company but, due to acquired skills, were an asset to the corporation.<sup>189</sup>

**The 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*'s Reserve.** As regards *Bundeswehr* reservists in the 1970s, scholars widely addressed the topic within the context of the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve's postwar history. Brugmann, for example, examined the reserve's structures from the founding of the *Bundeswehr* in 1955 to the end of the Cold War.<sup>190</sup> In his analysis he noted that without reservists, the *Bundeswehr* would not have been capable of defending West-Germany against the aggression of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>191</sup> Nevertheless, according to his judgement, both politicians and military planners had refrained from recognising the importance of the reserve force until the 1970s.<sup>192</sup> Langer, Guth, and Stockfisch mirrored this point in their analyses of the history of reservists in the German Army, Air Force, and Navy respectively.<sup>193</sup> Especially Langer stressed that with the *Heerestruktur* 3, reservists received greater responsibilities in homeland defence.<sup>194</sup> As regards the *Bundeswehr*'s medical service, Köhnke emphasised that reservists had already assumed crucial roles from the beginning, but were subject to profound restructuring efforts as of the 1970s.<sup>195</sup> While these scholars addressed the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve in the postwar context, Schössler approached the subject more comprehensively.<sup>196</sup> Although also referring to the 1973

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Taktikausbildung', *Reserve Aktuell*, No 1 (2014): 5.

<sup>188</sup> cf. Rudi Meiszies, 'RSU-Kompanie Rheinland-Pfalz für den Wachdienst zertifiziert', *Reserve Aktuell*, No. 5 (2014): 9.

<sup>189</sup> Inga-Christien Dittmar, 'Auftaktsymposium "Die Reservisten der Bundeswehr und ihre Arbeitgeber"', *Reserve Aktuell*, No. 3 (2014): 4-5.

<sup>190</sup> Gerhard Brugmann, 'Reservisten in Planung und Einsatz', ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler, 1998), 93 et. seq.

<sup>191</sup> *ibid.*, 104.

<sup>192</sup> *ibid.*, 103.

<sup>193</sup> Wilhelm Langer, 'Reservisten des Heeres', 123 et seq., Ekkehart Guth, 'Reservisten der Luftwaffe', 207 et seq., and Dieter Stockfisch, 'Reservisten der Marine', ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler), 229 et. seq.

<sup>194</sup> Wilhelm Langer, 'Reservisten des Heeres', 153 et seq.

<sup>195</sup> Helmuth Köhnke, 'Reservisten im Sanitätsdienst', ed. Gerhard Brugmann (Hamburg: Mittler), 267 et seq.

<sup>196</sup> Dietmar Schössler, *Die Bundeswehr: Eine Gesamtdarstellung, Band 13: Bundeswehr und Reservisten*

*Wehrstrukturreform*, he embeds the topic in the broader historical setting and traces the roots of conscription and reservists to the Prussian military reforms of the late 18th-century.<sup>197</sup> Moreover, he elaborated reservists' roles and responsibilities in the light of democracy and international law.<sup>198</sup> In a previous work, Schössler, together with Steinkamm, examined the 1971 Conception of Reserve (1971-COR) on behalf of the *Bundeswehr*'s Reservists' Association.<sup>199</sup> Assessing the 1971-COR from reservists' point of view, the authors did not only address structural weaknesses of the reform but also discussed challenges that reservists faced during their service.<sup>200</sup>

#### 1.3.1.4 Anglo-German (Defence) Relationship

**Stereotypes.** Often, scholars tend to study Anglo-German relations by looking at stereotypes. Oltermann and Emig, for instance, both dedicated entire books to this topic.<sup>201</sup> Here, both authors independently agreed that the British public, presumably goaded by the tabloids, still harbour negative attitudes towards Germany.<sup>202</sup> Germans, on the other hand, are believed to cherish most of what Britain has to offer, including pop culture and humour;<sup>203</sup> according to Oltermann, the only frequently quoted negative stereotype is the presumably bad food on the island.<sup>204</sup>

**Word Wars and Cold War.** The countries' 20th-century military 'encounters', namely, the two world wars and relations during the Cold War, were also intensively addressed by scholars. The most prominent work to mention in this context is Ramsden's 'Don't Mention

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(Regensburg: Walhalla und Praetoria Verlag, 1979).

<sup>197</sup> *ibid.*, 1 et seq.

<sup>198</sup> *ibid.*, and *ibid.*, 16 et. seq.

<sup>199</sup> Dietmar Schössler, and Armin Steinkamm, *Reservisten '71/'72: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Reservistenverbandes* (Bonn: Mönch, 1972).

<sup>200</sup> In this context, Schössler and Steinkamm explicitly allude to problems when reservists are mobilised for training. Here, they describe that both employers, families' lack of support and social status often prevented mobilising specialists for training; *ibid.*, 37-38.

<sup>201</sup> Philip Oltermann, *Keeping up with the Germans: A History of Anglo-German Encounters* (London: Faber and Faber, 2012), and Rainer Emig, ed., *Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

<sup>202</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>203</sup> Rainer Emig, 'Introduction', ed. Rainer Emig (London: Macmillan, 2000), 1-3, and Philip Oltermann, *Keeping up with the Germans: A History of Anglo-German Encounters*, Google Books Online Reader, chap. 'Heinrich Heine can't bear William Cobbett's Swearing'.

<sup>204</sup> *ibid.*

the War'.<sup>205</sup> Beginning by describing initially good relations in the 19th century, his book alluded in detail to the chronology of events and (or) political decisions and attitudes that led to the deterioration of the relationship.<sup>206</sup> The Cold War era's relationship, on the other hand, was characterised by various academics as a period of ups and downs. Schaad, for instance, pointed out that the first two decades after World War Two were dominated by British attempts to influence German domestic and foreign policies.<sup>207</sup> In this context, Schaad specifically cited the example of Britain trying to use Germany as a vehicle to influence other EEC partners.<sup>208</sup>

According to Nicholls, who basically agreed with Schaad's views, relations had a small chance of turning benevolent in the early 1970 when the British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats entered offices in London and Bonn respectively.<sup>209</sup> However, Nicholls also pointed out that relations soon turned sour again after the British government tried to undermine then-Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Neue Ostpolitik*, which the government in London interpreted as a German attempt to intensify collaboration with the Soviet Union.<sup>210</sup> Although the British had acted in consultation with the United States and France, Nicholls further highlighted that German politicians and the public chiefly blamed London for the attempt of meddling in German foreign policy.<sup>211</sup> According to Macintyre, this judgement primarily stemmed from the fact that Britain had not treated Germany as equal partners for the preceding two decades;<sup>212</sup> a conduct, which, according to Macintyre, only slowly abated when Britain joined the EEC due to her ongoing economic problems.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> John Ramsden, *Don't Mention the War: The British and the Germans Since 1890* (London: Abacus, 2007).

<sup>206</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> Martin P. C. Schaad, *Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration, 1955-61* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 1 et seq.

<sup>208</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>209</sup> Nicholls based this estimate primarily on then-Chancellor Willy Brandt's policy of pushing for a fast reunification with East Germany; Anthony J. Nicholls, *Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001* (London: The German Historical Institute, 2004), 7.

<sup>210</sup> *ibid.*, 13-14.

<sup>211</sup> Nicholls notes that, due to the United States status as a global power, Germans respected American opinion more than British concerns. As regards France, Nicholls points to the fact that Germany was more inclined to accept criticism from the Parisian government as both countries closely worked as equal partners in the EEC; *ibid.*, 16-18.

<sup>212</sup> Terry Macintyre, *Anglo-German Relations during the Labour Governments 1964-70: NATO Strategy, Détente and European Integration* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), Google Books Online Reader, chap. 'Introduction'.

<sup>213</sup> *ibid.*

While Nicholls further highlighted that relations certainly did not get better under Margaret Thatcher, whose strong anti-German attitudes he emphasised, Ludwig pointed out that the foundation for warmer relations was laid after Labour's Tony Blair and the Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder assumed offices in the late 1990s.<sup>214</sup> Furthermore, Ludwig expressed optimism as regards the prospect of relations as he anticipated that the EU would work as a facilitator to strengthen collaboration.<sup>215</sup>

**Silent Alliance.** Notwithstanding the described challenges to Anglo-German relations of the 20th-century, selected authors have also tried to shed a positive light on the relationship. Kroener, for instances, emphasised the countries' historical connections by citing the British Royals' Hanoverian ancestry.<sup>216</sup> Moreover, as regards Britain's and Germany's defence relations, he referred to Prussia as England's closest ally, who fought alongside England during her wars with France.<sup>217</sup> In this context, Strachan even went a bit further and suggested that without the Prussian Army, England could not have won the battle of Waterloo.<sup>218</sup>

Other authors, most notably Forster and Schmidt, took a more contemporary approach to highlight positive aspects of the Anglo-German relationship.<sup>219</sup> Although they noted that no bilateral agreements currently align the two nations, the scholars emphasised that Britain and Germany have always cultivated a silent alliance, which was supposedly supported by their memberships in the EU and NATO.<sup>220</sup>

Forster and Schmidt further suggested a possible reason for postwar British hostility towards Germany. Contrary to other authors, who mainly cited the countries' war-history

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<sup>214</sup> Anthony J. Nicholls, *Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001*, 21, and Andreas N. Ludwig, *Auf dem Weg zu einer 'Achse Berlin-London'? Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im Rahmen der Europäischen Union unter Gerhard Schröder und Tony Blair (1998-2002)* (Hamburg: Diplomica, 2011).

<sup>215</sup> Ludwig expressed this opinion in 2011, when Brexit seemed to be a highly unlikely scenario; *ibid.*

<sup>216</sup> Bernhard R. Kroener, 'The Electorate of Hanover: A Continental Milestone, Military Alliances and the Balance of Power 1704-1758', Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional No 52 (Oxford, Rhodes House, 2004), 10-11.

<sup>217</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>218</sup> Hew Strachan, 'Anglo-German Military Relations 1815-1914', Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional No 52 (Oxford, Rhodes House, 2004), 23.

<sup>219</sup> Edward Forster, and Peter Schmidt, *Anglo-German Relations in Security and Defence: Taking Stock* (London: The Royal United Services Institute, 1996).

<sup>220</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

as the origin of negative British attitudes, Forster and Schmidt surmised that ‘there is a prickly awareness across all classes that in Britain decline has followed victory whereas in Germany defeat was followed by national resurgence’.<sup>221</sup> To overcome this quandary, Nicholls suggested that both Britain and Germany needed to tone down their quest to foster a ‘special relationship’ with the United States and turn to allies that are more close to home.<sup>222</sup>

### 1.3.1.5 Economics

**Economic and Financial Crises Theory.** To gain a better understanding of the underlying economic mechanism of financial crises, publications on economic theory were reviewed. In this context, Mankiw’s book on economic principles, which delivers a profound introduction to both microeconomics and macroeconomics, was treated as a reference book throughout the entire research process.<sup>223</sup> Gerber’s book on international economics was used in a similar way;<sup>224</sup> however, it was mostly consulted to gain insight into the theory of economic crises. Here, Gerber stipulated that economic crises usually appear in the form of financial, banking or exchange rate crises and originate from two leading causes, namely, from macroeconomic imbalances and volatile capital flows.<sup>225</sup>

**2008 Financial Crisis.** Despite frequently citing selected real-life examples, Gerber’s books is primarily theoretical;<sup>226</sup> Baumol and Blinder, on the other hand, took a more blended approach.<sup>227</sup> Second by Zandi, Baumol and Blinder identified the United State’s housing market and mortgage-backed securities as the primary cause of the 2008 financial

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<sup>221</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>222</sup> cf. Anthony J. Nicholls, *Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001*, 26-27.

<sup>223</sup> Mankiw, N. Gregory, *Principles of Economics*, 6th edn. (Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage, 2011).

<sup>224</sup> James Gerber, *International Economics*, 3rd edn. (Boston, MA: Pearson Education, 2005).

<sup>225</sup> Macroeconomic imbalances are referred to as expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, which have the potential to create a budget deficit; especially when these policies are paired with a peg exchange rate system. Volatile capital flows are discussed in conjunction with the increased interconnectivity of global markets through advanced technology; cf. *ibid.*, 268-273.

<sup>226</sup> Gerber, for instance, cites Mexico’s mid-1990s pesos crisis as an example for a crisis originating from volatile capital flows; cf. *ibid.*, 273.

<sup>227</sup> William J. Baumol, and Alan S. Blinder, *Economics: Principles and Policy*, 12th edn. (Manson, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2012).

crisis.<sup>228</sup> While Halm-Addo chiefly agreed with this statement, he took a step back and alluded to the United States 1999's Financial Services Modernisation Act as the primary enabler of the recent crisis.<sup>229</sup> According to his analysis, this deregulation of the financial markets worked as the primary facilitator for the creation of mortgage-backed securities or other related products such as default credit swaps.<sup>230</sup>

**Economic History.** Concerning the historical examples, relevant information on the 1970s economic challenges were found mainly in publications on economic history. Although, or especially because, most works are ordered by theme rather than chronology, these publications provide a detailed overview of British or German economic history.<sup>231</sup> Floud and McCloskey, for example, collected essays by numerous contributors, which discuss the British economy from 1939 through 2000 by specifically addressing developments in the various industries and economic sectors;<sup>232</sup> furthermore, economic policies are presented in the context of this period.<sup>233</sup> A similar approach was taken by Giersch, Paque, and Schmieding, who discuss Germany's postwar economic history until reunification.<sup>234</sup> Despite their different country focuses, the scholars widely agreed that the 1973 oil price shock stood at the beginning of the 1970s economic downturn.<sup>235</sup> A development which, according to Walpuski, was enabled by the West's high dependency on the import of commodities.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> *ibid.*, 190, and Mark M. Zandi, *Financial Shock: A 360° Look at the Subprime Mortgage Implosion, and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2009).

<sup>229</sup> Albert D. Halm-Addo, *The 2008 Financial Crisis: The Death of an Ideology* (Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance, 2010), 1-3.

<sup>230</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> See, for example, Roderick Floud, and Donald McCloskey, eds, *The Economic History of Britain Since 1700*, 2nd edn., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paque, and Holger Schmieding, *The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany*.

<sup>232</sup> Roderick Floud, and Donald McCloskey, eds, *The Economic History of Britain Since 1700*.

<sup>233</sup> *ibid.*, 189 et seq.

<sup>234</sup> Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paque, and Holger Schmieding, *The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany*.

<sup>235</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 185, Michael Kitson, 'Failure followed by Success or Success Followed by Failure? A Re-Examination of British Economic Growth Since 1949', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain: Volume III Structural Change and Growth, 1939-2000*, 27-56 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48, and Alexander Cairncross, 'Economic Policy and Performance, 1964-1990', 67.

<sup>236</sup> Günter Walpuski, *Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1984), 185.



**Defence Economics.** Bridging the subjects of economics and defence studies, Hartley and Sandler are the most renowned producers of literature in the field of defence economics. In their book from 1990, they provided a detailed introduction to this subject, which they defined as ‘the application of economic reasoning and methods to the study of defense-related issues’.<sup>237</sup> Besides addressing issues such as arms race and procurement, Hartley and Sandler thoroughly discussed the influence of defence spending on economic growth, which, according to their analysis, has only marginal influence on a given economy’s growth rate;<sup>238</sup> at least in developed countries.<sup>239</sup>

Hartley and Sandler further alluded to the economics of military manpower.<sup>240</sup> Historically speaking, so they argued, conscription has kept expenditure on manpower down, while advancement in military technology, which often requires handling by experts, has significantly raised these costs.<sup>241</sup> This subject is also addressed by Warner and Negrusa, who suggested that expenditure on manpower depends on the rules of supply and demand as well as on the force’s structure.<sup>242</sup> Generally speaking, Warner and Negrusa stipulated that payroll costs tend to be higher in all-volunteer forces, especially when the military’s demand for new service members exceeds the number of volunteers.<sup>243</sup> In this case, costs of all-volunteer force rise exponentially as recruitment measures need to be intensified and wages have to be increased to competitive levels.<sup>244</sup> Conversely, Warner and Negrusa surmised that a high number of applicants, e.g., due to low prospects in the private job market, not only decreases recruitment costs, it also allows governments to pay lower salaries.<sup>245</sup>

Conscription-based militaries, on the other hand, may also be a costly endeavour for governments. According to Warner and Negrusa, expenses rise when citizens’ can easily

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<sup>237</sup> Keith Hartley, and Todd Sandler, eds., *The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey* (London: Routledge, 1990), xi.

<sup>238</sup> *ibid.*, 200 et seq.

<sup>239</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>240</sup> *ibid.*, 156 et seq.

<sup>241</sup> *ibid.*, 156-158.

<sup>242</sup> John T. Warner, and Sebastian Negrusa, ‘The Economic Case for All-Volunteer Forces’, eds. Cindy Williams and, Curtis Gilroy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 126 et seq.

<sup>243</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>244</sup> *ibid.*, 126-134.

<sup>245</sup> *ibid.*

avoid draft, e.g., through legal means.<sup>246</sup> Moreover, society as a whole is burdened with additional costs in this kind of system, as conscripts cannot contribute to the workforce during their term.<sup>247</sup>

### 1.3.2 Research Gap and Contribution

Analysing the related academic discourse has revealed that discussions on defence reviews are an integral part of research in the field of defence studies. Nevertheless, while scholars also quite frequently address the British reserve, available academic analyses of the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve are somewhat limited. Besides, the discourse on Anglo-German relations, including defence matters, usually focuses on various themes but the reserve. With this thesis, the author, therefore, aspires to contribute to the literature in three ways; first, this study aims to close the gap as regards Germany's reserve force. Second, by explicitly discussing the examples' reserve forces in the context of financial constraints, the thesis strives to add to the subject of reserve forces to the discussion on financially driven defence reviews. Third, by comparing Britain and Germany, the author attempts to contribute another perspective to the field of Anglo-German defence studies.

## 1.4 Sources and Data Collection

### 1.4.1 Primary Sources: Types of Sources Used

#### 1.4.1.1 Government Publications and Commissioned Reports

**British Defence Reviews and Strategic Papers.** Government publications assumed a critical role in the discovery and analysis stages of this study. In particular, documents outlining the main goals of the respective defence review, as well as accompanying materials on reserve forces, were considered most valuable. For the contemporary British example, the 2010-NSS and the 2010-SDSR constituted the research foundation as these publications outlined the government's strategic thinking and envisaged post-reform structures.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> *ibid.*, 129-132.

<sup>247</sup> *ibid.*, 125-126.

<sup>248</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, and HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*.

To access specific information on the British reserve forces, complementary reports were evaluated; these included, among others, the Independent Commission's report and the MoD's annual manning reports.<sup>249</sup>

Analogous to the contemporary example, research regarding the 1970s commenced by analysing the main defence review, namely, the 1975 Statement on the Defence Estimates.<sup>250</sup> In addition, similar to the contemporary example, supplementary documents, most notably materials compiled in the so-called Majury Review folder, were reviewed.<sup>251</sup>

**German Defence Reviews and Strategic Papers.** Similar to the British example, publications by the German government were deemed an invaluable source of information on both the contemporary and historical example. As regards the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*, the key documents reviewed were the 2010-CSR's as well the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*'s reports.<sup>252</sup> In combination with the 2011-DPG, these publications can be considered the German counterpart to the British 2010-NSS/SDSR package.<sup>253</sup> Concerning the German reserve forces, the 2012-COR as well as accompanying MoD guidelines for the reserve were judged to be crucial for evaluating how reservists' roles and responsibilities changed.<sup>254</sup>

As regards the historical example, the five Defence White Papers published from 1970 through 1979 were analysed to access information on Germany's defence strategy, military structures and security environment.<sup>255</sup> To find more specific data on the 1970s reserve

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<sup>249</sup> The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020*, Ministry of Defence, *Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation's Security Together*, Cm 8475 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2012), Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, Cm 8655 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2013), and Ministry of Defence, *UK Armed Forces: Annual Manning Report, Analysis by Rank and Age* (National Statistics, 2011), accessed 09 February 2017, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/280426/1-april-2011.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280426/1-april-2011.pdf).

<sup>250</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*.

<sup>251</sup> See, for example, *Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*, and Roy Mason, *Our Contribution to the Price of Peace: Britain's Defence Policy and Expenditure*.

<sup>252</sup> *Bericht des Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010*, and Jürgen Weise et al., *Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010* (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2010).

<sup>253</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*.

<sup>254</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Freiwillig Dienen: Ein Wegweiser zum Freiwilligen Wehrdienst* (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2015).

<sup>255</sup> See, for example, Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*

force, reports issued by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces were evaluated as well.<sup>256</sup>

**National and Federal Finances.** While policy papers helped to frame arguments as regards defence reviews and reserve forces' reforms, consulting national (Britain) and federal (Germany) finances chiefly served the purpose of collecting numbers on overall government spending and defence expenditure in particular. Moreover, information on planned austerity measures was extracted from these documents. For the British examples, these figures were retrieved by accessing the annual Financial Statement and Budget Reports.<sup>257</sup> For the German examples, on the other hand, federal budget numbers for the contemporary example were found in the published budgets while historical figures needed to be accessed by consulting the 1970s budget acts.<sup>258</sup>

#### 1.4.1.2 Election Manifestos and Coalition Agreements

Besides government-issued documents, additional publications were considered to ascertain political attitudes toward defence and budget planning. Here, two particular kinds of documents have proved to be most valuable; namely, election manifestos and coalition agreements. The former was considered relevant to estimate the political landscape in both Britain and Germany.<sup>259</sup> On the other hand, coalition agreements, in comparison to

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*und zur Lage der Bundeswehr.*

<sup>256</sup> See, for example, Fritz-Rudolf Schulz, *Jahresbericht 1970* (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1971), Digital Archive of the *Bundestag*, Drucksache VI/1942.

<sup>257</sup> See, for example, Dick Taverne, *Financial Statement and Budget Report 1970-71*, 649 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), The National Archives, Reference T 328/436, and Stephen Timm, *Budget 2010: Securing the Recovery*, Her Majesty's Treasury, HC 451 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010).

<sup>258</sup> See, for example, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 'Haushalts- und Finanzpläne ab 2006', Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 31 March 2014, [https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche\\_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/Haushalts\\_und\\_Finanzplaene/haushalts\\_finanzplaene.html](https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/Haushalts_und_Finanzplaene/haushalts_finanzplaene.html), and Der Haushaltsausschuß, *Mündlicher Bericht des Haushaltsausschusses (7. Ausschuß) zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Feststellung des Bundeshaushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 1970 (Haushaltsgesetz 1970)* (Bonn: Hans Heger, 1970), Digital Archive of the *Bundestag*, Drucksache VI/846.

<sup>259</sup> See, for example, Alan Mabbutt, *Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010*, Conservative Party (Bellbrook Park: Pureprint, 2010), *Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010*, Liberal Democrats, accessed 01 February 2016, [http://www.manifesto.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/libdem\\_manifesto\\_2010.pdf](http://www.manifesto.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/libdem_manifesto_2010.pdf), *The Labour Party Manifesto 2010: A Future Fair for All*, Labour Party, accessed 01 February 2016, <http://www.manifesto.com/documents/labour-general-election-manifesto-2010/>, *Die Mitte stärken: Deutschlandprogramm der Freien Demokratischen Partei*, Freie Demokratische Partei (2009), Archiv des Liberalismus, Electronic Archive Signature IN5-290, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Bundestagswahlprogramm 2009*, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Leck, CPI books, 2009), CDU-

the parties election manifestos, served as a source to estimate the degree of compromise agreed on by the coalition partners as regards to defence matters. Although these kinds of publications were also interesting as regards the contemporary British example, coalition agreements were mostly reviewed for the German examples, as coalition governments tend to be the norm rather than the exception in Germany.<sup>260</sup>

#### 1.4.1.3 Economic Indicators and Statistics

To explore the British and German economies during the set assessment periods, the author gathered data on selected economic indicators and reviewed several statistical data sets and reports. As regards raw data, GDP, inflation, exports and national/federal debt numbers were processed in a secondary data analysis to estimate the respective economy's success or the lack thereof during the specified period.<sup>261</sup> Moreover, contextual analyses, such as the economic surveys provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) aided in completing the picture.<sup>262</sup>

Besides economic figures, defence statistics were consulted. Here, the composition of the armed forces, namely, total troop numbers, reservist numbers as well as the relation of regulars to reservists were most useful.<sup>263</sup> These figures were chiefly retrieved from the

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Bundesgeschäftsstelle, *Wir haben die Kraft: Gemeinsam für unser Land, Regierungsprogramm 2009-2013*, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Berlin: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 2009), and SPD-Parteivorstand, *Sozial und Demokratisch. Anpacken. Für Deutschland: Das Regierungsprogramm der SPD*, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Berlin: SPD-Parteivorstand, 2009).

<sup>260</sup> See, for example, HM Government, *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government* (London: Crown Copyright, 2010), and Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 17. Legislaturperiode, Christlich Demokratische Union-Christlich Soziale Union-Freie Demokratische Partei, 2009.

<sup>261</sup> See, for example, OECD, Quarterly GDP (indicator), accessed 12 May 2017, DOI:10.1787/b86d1fc8-en, OECD, Inflation (CPI) (indicator), accessed 04 July 2018, DOI:10.1787/eee82e6e-en, and OECD, Trade in Goods and Services (indicator), 2017, accessed 12 May 2017, DOI:10.1787/0fe445d9-en.

<sup>262</sup> See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, *United Kingdom: November 1970* (Paris: OECD Publications, 1970), and Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, *Germany: April 1970* (Paris: OECD Publications, 1970).

<sup>263</sup> See, for example, Ministry of Defence, *UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report* (National Statistics, 2012), accessed 09 February 2017, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/280407/1\\_april\\_2012.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280407/1_april_2012.pdf), and 'Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr', Die Dienststellen der Streitkräftebasis, accessed 14 November 2017, [http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/start/terraufg/kdoterraufgbw!/ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beK4KvDReiqcalidDFFKwFU1pSKvj5YpxMNJ7tPHOAQQpM866S3FVGczXwjE3Pqzk9Un\\_h-3QbjnG9OySHfRwg4hhO\\_wJssPEHIoTkliAbNmY\\_N-IAEmDAbrzjD9IY65RwhBevh5CVXF-U2JsiEgsbYFKZ\\_H090vIkLoFZcRVVWHK3g1w617RLDz3s-55IY6QSpDC1h98qpWkdpJ9JaOq0x0moOhqNnuDpIDg!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922LM510INRSRPG400G4](http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/start/terraufg/kdoterraufgbw!/ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beK4KvDReiqcalidDFFKwFU1pSKvj5YpxMNJ7tPHOAQQpM866S3FVGczXwjE3Pqzk9Un_h-3QbjnG9OySHfRwg4hhO_wJssPEHIoTkliAbNmY_N-IAEmDAbrzjD9IY65RwhBevh5CVXF-U2JsiEgsbYFKZ_H090vIkLoFZcRVVWHK3g1w617RLDz3s-55IY6QSpDC1h98qpWkdpJ9JaOq0x0moOhqNnuDpIDg!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922LM510INRSRPG400G4).

respective MoD's publications such as Britain's Annual Personnel Report.<sup>264</sup>

#### 1.4.1.4 Newspapers and Newscasts

Newspaper sources and newscast reports were sporadically used to retrieve factual information and data such as specific dates and chronological sequences concerning events that had developed over an extended period of time.<sup>265</sup> Moreover, published and (or) broadcasted unabridged interviews, political speeches or live reporting on current events served as sources for factual information.<sup>266</sup>

#### 1.4.1.5 Moving Images and Sound Recordings

**MoD 'Marketing' Channels.** Complementary to the aforementioned printed sources, this thesis further employed selected moving images and sound recordings to collect data and information. One frequently used source was the British and German Armed Forces official YouTube channels.<sup>267</sup> Here, the respective MoD provides clips on various different topics, which, among other, give insight into the militaries' marketing, recruitment and training strategies.

**Broadcasted Interviews and Panel Discussions.** To gain access to a broad range of contemporary witnesses statements and other first-hand accounts, the author consulted documentaries, television broadcasts, newscasts and podcasts. Of particular interest were those pieces featuring one-on-one interviews, speeches, embedded interviews in documentaries and panel discussions focusing on current developments in defence related matters and (or) historical themes such as the Northern Ireland Conflict and the Red Army

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<sup>264</sup> See, for example, Ministry of Defence, *UK Armed Forces Annual Personnel Report*.

<sup>265</sup> Event considered included, for instance, the sequence of terror attacks in Europe or the unfolding of the war in Syria; see, for example, 'Terror in Europa: wo Anschläge verübt wurden', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23 July 2011, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/chronologie-terroranschlaege-in-europa-1.1123846>, 10 April 2017, and 'Chronologie: Der syrische Bürgerkrieg im Überblick', *Zeit Online*, 12 April 2018, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/chronologie-der-syrische-buergerkrieg-im-ueberblick-1.2652348>, 12 April 2018.

<sup>266</sup> See, for example, 'Verteidigungsminister de Maizière hält Regierungserklärung zur Bundeswehrreform', News broadcast, reported by Christian Thiels, 01:31, posted by tagesschau.de, 16 May 2013, accessed 16 May 2013.

<sup>267</sup> The *Bundeswehr*, as well as the individual branches of the British Armed Forces, maintain official YouTube channels; see, for example, 'Bundeswehr', <https://www.youtube.com/user/Bundeswehr>, 19 October 2017, and 'Royal Navy', <https://www.youtube.com/user/RoyalNavyOfficial>, 19 October 2017.

Faction.<sup>268</sup>

#### 1.4.1.6 Interviews

**Ethical Approval.** In addition to the aforementioned broadcasted and published interviews, the author intended to gather information by interviewing individuals who, due to their professional affiliation or personal background, would be able to comment on British or German defence or related topics. Following King's College London's research policy, ethical approval from King's College London's Research Ethics Office was sought before approaching potential interviewees. First, approval for conducting serendipitous research was obtained by submitting the appropriate form to the Research Ethics Office.<sup>269</sup> Second, full ethical approval for conducting interviews was sought from the War Studies Group Research Ethics Panel (WSG REP);<sup>270</sup> the application was approved and is registered with the Research Ethics Office under REP(WSG)/12/13-47.<sup>271</sup>

**Interviewees.** In total, the author identified and spoke to five individuals, namely, a British Army reservist in training, a retired German defence lawyer, a former German 1968s activist, a retired Swiss Air Force private and a Swiss grammar school teacher of physics. The British Army reservist in training was introduced to the author by a mutual friend. In this conversation, the author aspired to understand how a reservist in the British Army perceives his service and training. As regards the retired German defence lawyer and former German 1968s activist, the author sought first-hand accounts on how conscientious objection was dealt with in the 1970s and how young adults viewed military service in this period. Both individuals are close friends of the author's family, whom the author has known since childhood. The retired Swiss Air Force private is a close personal friend of the author. By speaking to him, the author sought to gather information on the mandatory Swiss military service and substitute service. This step was deemed necessary at the early

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<sup>268</sup> 'Deutsche und Israelis: Geschichte einer besonderen Beziehung', political talk show *Forum Demokratie*, hosted by Michaela Kolster, broadcasted by Phoenix, 08 November 2015, *Kriegsgefahr in Europa: Ist Putin noch zu Stoppen?*, Political talk show *Günther Jauch*, hosted by Günther Jauch, broadcasted by ARD, 04 May 2014, and Philip Hammond, interviewed by Andrew Marr, *The Andrew Marr Show*.

<sup>269</sup> Please refer to Appendix B for further details.

<sup>270</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>271</sup> *ibid.*

stages of this project as Switzerland had previously been considered as the third example for this study. The Swiss grammar school teacher of physics is also a close personal friend of the author. She was asked to explain the physical principal of the free fall, which the author sought to use as an example to illustrate the non-laboratory nature of this thesis's research phenomenon.

**Obstacles.** Even though all interviewees spoke to the author, obtaining and using information from the interviews proved to be somewhat difficult. The British Army reservist in training, for instance, was rather reluctant to answer questions. This hesitation became most apparent when he cited security concerns even when the conversation did not touch any classified areas. Whether these concerns stemmed from the fact that the author is not a British national or from other factors could not be ascertained conclusively. The German and Swiss interviewees, on the other hand, were more straightforward in expressing specific worries as regards their privacy and data protection. Since this study was conducted under the umbrella of King's College London, interviewees voiced concerns that their personal information was not safe with a British public university. These concerns were mostly expressed by a retired German defence lawyer and a former German 1968s activist, who feared that their identities would be revealed due to a potential data leak at King's College London. While this reasoning may sound far-fetched, their arguments must be understood in the light of the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden, who claimed a high involvement of British intelligence services in the mass surveillance of European citizens.<sup>272</sup>

Although interviews with the identified individuals would probably have benefitted this study, the author had to respect the individuals' request for full anonymity. However, the latter could not be guaranteed under King's College London's ethical research guidelines as a signed consent form, which contains personal information on the interviewee, must be submitted to King's College London. Therefore, the author and interviewees agreed that their conversations would be treated as private communication, which cannot be used or cited in this thesis. Moreover, all information, e.g., notes taken during the conversations, were destroyed. Nevertheless, these conversations gave the author valuable insights, which

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<sup>272</sup> 'David Miranda Row: Seized Files "Endanger Agents"', *BBC News*, 30 August 2013, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23898580>, 01 September 2013.



she used to identify other sources, e.g., documentaries or published interviews, for this thesis.

## 1.4.2 Primary Sources: Access and Sources Collection

### 1.4.2.1 Visited Archives and Libraries

**Britain.** This thesis' topic required collecting and accessing primary sources concerning Britain and Germany. Thus, various archives and libraries were visited in both countries to examine relevant documents. As regards sources on the British examples, collections of two particular institutions were consulted often; namely, those in the National Archives in Kew and the ones in the British Library in central London. Discovery in the National Archives primarily focused on identifying policy papers, internal reports and communication regarding the Mason Review. Besides the Mason Review itself, materials gathered in the so-called 'Majury Review' folder have proved to be valuable for examining the implications of the Mason Review for the TAVR.<sup>273</sup> In the British Library, on the other hand, complementary sources such as reports discussing MoD expenditure in the context of Britain's global military commitments were accessed.<sup>274</sup> Besides, the British Library's extensive collection of magazines and newspapers was exploited.

**Germany and Switzerland.** As regards German archives, the catalogue of the *Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv* in Freiburg im Breisgau was reviewed. Being home to the German national archive's military collections, discovery focused on retrieving historical Defence White Papers and budgets.<sup>275</sup> In addition, the University of Zurich's *Zentralbibliothek*'s newspaper archives was utilised for research.

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<sup>273</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, and Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*.

<sup>274</sup> See, for example, Roy Mason, *Our Contribution to the Price of Peace: Britain's Defence Policy and Expenditure*.

<sup>275</sup> See, for example, Bundesminister des Inneren, *Weißbuch zur zivilen Verteidigung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Cologne: Drei Kronen Druck, 1972).

#### 1.4.2.2 Archives and Libraries: Digital Access

**Archival Websites.** In addition to visiting the aforementioned archives and libraries, the author made use of the institution's online resources. First and foremost, online catalogues were searched to identify and order relevant documents. However, when travelling to the respective location was not feasible, the author also used the downloading and copying services offered by the National Archives, the British Library and the *Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv* to retrieve sources.

**Parliamentary Digital Archives.** Besides accessing government publications through 'traditional' archives, documents such as Hansards, policy papers or bills were consulted in the parliamentary digital archive. To find materials on Britain, the author primarily used the database 'U.K. Parliamentary Papers' which she accessed via her home institutions' ProQuest subscription. This database has proven particularly useful for both the contemporary and historical British examples, as it holds current documents as well as materials dating back several centuries.

**Archive of the *Bundestag*.** Similarly, documents regarding Germany were accessed via the digital archive of the *Bundestag*. Again, this database was helpful in identifying and retrieving materials concerning both assessment periods, as the *Bundestag*'s digital archive contains scanned copies of parliamentary discussions, reports and bills since 1949. In contrast to 'U.K. Parliamentary Papers', the digital archive of the *Bundestag* is accessible free of charge through open pathway.

**Political Parties' Archives.** Archives maintained by political parties were chiefly consulted to retrieve historical and contemporary election manifestos and coalition agreements. While British sources could also be found in the British Library, other London based collections or online, publications by German parties are usually stored in the archives of parties' affiliated foundations. Therefore, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Conservatives), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Social Democrats) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Liberals) were consulted to access relevant documents.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> An exception to the rule were documents published by The Greens party, which were chiefly accessed online via the party's official website. In addition to the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the

**Newspaper and Magazines Digital Archives.** In addition to consulting articles in the British Library and the *Zentralbibliothek* Zurich, online archives from various newspapers and magazines were browsed for relevant information. Sources included, among others, The Guardian, *Spiegel Online* or *Zeit Online*.<sup>277</sup> All archives were accessed via the internet through open pathway (e.g., The Guardian and *Spiegel Online*) or paid memberships (e.g., *Zeit Online*).

#### 1.4.2.3 Government Ministries and Affiliated Institutions

Documents retrieved from British ministries were usually accessed securely via the UK Government Assets Publishing Service. Here, the ones most consulted were publications authored by the British MoD and HM Treasury.<sup>278</sup> As regards Germany, again the MoD and the Ministry of Finance served as the main sources. As no secure publishing service is available in Germany, websites and documents were verified by reviewing the respective websites' encryption and security certificate.<sup>279</sup>

#### 1.4.2.4 Statistical Offices and Databases

In addition to the aforementioned ministries, websites of the Office for National Statistics (Britain) and the Federal Statistical Office (Germany) were accessed to retrieve relevant statistics and economic data.<sup>280</sup> Besides, the author used data provided by the UK Data

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Liberals, and The Greens, the left-wing party 'Die Linke' is considered a major party in German political landscape. However, 'Die Linke' has never been elected into power or has participated in a coalition government on the federal level, their agenda has never met the consensus of the broader German public. Thus, their election manifestos have been neglected in this study. The same reasoning applies to the Alternative für Deutschland, why their election manifestos have been omitted as well.

<sup>277</sup> See, for example, 'The Archive', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/gnm-archive>, 01 September 2013, 'Nachrichtenarchiv', *Spiegel Online*, <http://www.spiegel.de/nachrichtenarchiv/>, 02 September 2013, and 'Archiv', *Zeit Online*, <https://www.zeit.de/thema/archiv>, 02 September 2013.

<sup>278</sup> See, for example, Mark Hoban, *Budget 2010*, Her Majesty's Treasury, HC 61 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010), Ministry of Defence, *How Defence Works*, 2014, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/360143/20140930\\_24153\\_How\\_Defence\\_Works.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/360143/20140930_24153_How_Defence_Works.pdf), 27 November 2014, and 'Fact Sheet 1: Our Approach to the National Security Strategy', accessed 19 November 2014, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/62483/Factsheet1-Our-Approach-National-Security-Strategy.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62483/Factsheet1-Our-Approach-National-Security-Strategy.pdf).

<sup>279</sup> See, for example, Peter Struck, *Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr*, (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004), accessed 13 October 2014, [http://www.rk-marine-kiel.de/files/bundeswehr/informationen/grundzuege\\_der\\_konzeption\\_der\\_bundeswehr\\_\(2004\).pdf](http://www.rk-marine-kiel.de/files/bundeswehr/informationen/grundzuege_der_konzeption_der_bundeswehr_(2004).pdf), and Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 'Die Struktur des Bundeshaushaltes', Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 15 January 2016, <https://www.bundeshaushalt-info.de>.

<sup>280</sup> See, for example, Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt, 'Arbeitsmarkt', Destatis: Statistisches Bundesamt, accessed 27 July 2014, <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Indikatoren/Konjunkturindikatoren/>

Service as well as *histat: Historische Statistik* to obtain information on national surveys and historical statistics.<sup>281</sup>

As regards global economic and defence related data, databases of OECD and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) were consulted regularly. While the latter provides an extensive collection on defence expenditure, the former was mainly used to retrieve time series economic figures such as GDP from 1950 onwards.<sup>282</sup> Moreover, since OECD publishes economic indicators' values in \$US, OECD numbers were primarily used in tables and (or) figures that compared countries with different currencies.

#### **1.4.2.5 Television Broadcasts and Media Platforms**

Moving images and sound recordings were accessed in two ways; first, the author watched and took notes during live television broadcasts. Second, media platforms were consulted. Noting that open media platforms such as YouTube bear the risk of using materials originating from dubious sources, the author only considered documentaries, newscasts, podcasts and YouTube clips from reputable providers. For instance, documentaries and newscasts were primarily accessed via public broadcasters' media centres, e.g., BBC iPlayer, ARD Mediathek and ZDF Mediathek. Podcasts were obtained via iTunes, SoundCloud or Spotify; however, they were only considered when legitimate providers such as King's College London's War Studies Department, RUSI or Chatham House were listed in the credentials. As regards YouTube, the armed forces official and verified channels were consulted via the platform.

#### **1.4.3 Secondary Sources: Types of Sources Used**

As highlighted on the previous pages, primary sources such as policy papers, statistics and national budgets have proved valuable in analysing governments' decision-making processes and economic developments; moreover, figures used in various calculations,

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Arbeitsmarkt/arb210.html.

<sup>281</sup> Lutz Köllner, (1982 [2006]), *Die langfristige Entwicklung der Militärausgaben in Deutschland*, GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, histat, Study Reference: 8232, Date File Version: 1.0.0, accessed 01 March 2015, DOI: 104232/1.8232.

<sup>282</sup> SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2015, accessed 19 June 2015, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, and OECD, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Indicator), accessed 13 June 2017, DOI10.1787/dc2f7aec-en.

tables and graphs were extracted from these documents. While secondary sources were, to some extent, used similarly, they served two additional purposes. First, as government publications may be prone to biased editing in favour of the governing party's political agenda, secondary sources were believed to aid in identifying said editing.<sup>283</sup> Second, by consulting works on related topics, the research focus was put into perspective and context. Therefore, it was possible to recognise sub-themes and research gaps.

#### **1.4.3.1 Books**

Books constituted the first set of secondary sources reviewed for this thesis and were used mainly for two purposes. First books proved to be an invaluable source to understand the underlying mechanisms and origins of financial crises.<sup>284</sup> Moreover, publications on defence economics helped in building a sound research foundation for the topic of reserve forces' reform in times of economic turmoil.<sup>285</sup> Second, works on national defence policies, as well as Anglo-German defence co-operation and security environments, provided in-depth insight into the respective subject, both as regards recent developments and the historical examples.<sup>286</sup>

#### **1.4.3.2 Journals and Think Tank Publications**

Due to the contemporary nature of events examined in Chapters Two and Four, it soon became apparent that other secondary sources in addition to books had to be considered; therefore, channels which enable scholars to publish responses to current affairs more promptly had to be employed. Here, peer-reviewed and professional journals, as well as think tank publications, were used on a large scale to fill the said information gap.

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<sup>283</sup> cf. Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 36.

<sup>284</sup> See, for example, William J. Baumol, and Alan S. Blinder, *Economics: Principles and Policy*.

<sup>285</sup> See, for example, Keith Hartley, and Todd Sandler, eds., *The Economics of Defence Spending: An International Survey*.

<sup>286</sup> See, for example, Michael Dockrill, *British Defence Since 1945*, Tom Dyson, *The Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post Cold-War Era* (New York, NY: Bergham Books, 2013), and *The Blenheim Conference Papers: The Silent Alliance, 300 Years of Anglo-German Cooperation*, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional No 52 (Oxford, Rhodes House, 2004).

**Britain.** The British example, and specifically the review process and the evaluation of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package received extensive coverage from British scholars, who submitted their works to various English-speaking journals, including ‘International Affairs’ and ‘The Political Quarterly’, or to the London-based think tank Chatham House.<sup>287</sup> Although these articles already provided sufficient information on British defence and defence reviews in general, publications from the independent think tank RUSI or ideas expressed in ‘Armed Forces & Society’ proved to be more relevant for this study as scholars used these channels to publish views on the British reserve in general, its history as well as service members’ relationship to society as a whole.<sup>288</sup>

**Germany.** While journals and think tank publications were somewhat used as a complementary source in the British case, they have proven to be an almost irreplaceable source for research on the contemporary German example. The reason being that security studies are slightly underrepresented in the mainstream academic discourse, which, regarding security-related subjects, mainly focuses on peace research.<sup>289</sup> A notable exception, how-

<sup>287</sup> See, for example, Paul Cornish, and Andrew M. Dorman, ‘Breaking the Mould: The United Kingdom Strategic Defence Review 2010’, Timothy Edmunds, ‘Complexity, Strategy and the National Interest’, *International Affairs* 90, No 3 (2014): 525-539, DOI:10.1111/1468-2346.12123, Clara Marina O’Donnell, ‘Britain’s Coalition Government and EU Defence Cooperation: Undermining British Interests’, *International Affairs* 87, No 2 (2011): 419-433, DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00980.x, Robert Dover, and Mark Phythian, ‘The Politics of the Strategic Defence and Security Review: Centralisation and Cuts’, *The Political Quarterly* 83, No 1 (2012): 163-171, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2012.02278.x, John Gearson, and James Gow, ‘Security, Not Defence, Strategic, Not Habit: Restructuring the Political Arrangements for Policy Making on Britain’s Role in the World’, *The Political Quarterly* 81, No 3 (2010): 406-419, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-923X.2010.02106.x, and Sameer Punyani, ‘The Economics of National Defence in An Age of Austerity’.

<sup>288</sup> See, for example, Mark Phillips, ‘The Future of the UK’s Reserve Forces’, *Royal United Services Institute*, Occasional Paper, accessed 22 November 2014, [https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Phillips\\_-\\_Future\\_of\\_UK\\_Reserve\\_Forces.pdf](https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Phillips_-_Future_of_UK_Reserve_Forces.pdf), Trevor Taylor, ‘What’s New? UK Defence Policy Before and After the SDSR’, *The RUSI Journal* 155, No 6 (2010): 10-14, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2010.542662, James Griffith, ‘Contradictory and Complementary Identities of U.S. Army Reservists: A Historical Perspective’, *Armed Forces & Society* 37, No 2 (2011): 261-283, DOI:10.1177/0095327X09354167, Christopher Dandeker, Neil Greenberg, and Geoffrey Orme, ‘The UK’s Reserve Forces: Retrospect and Prospect’, and Eyal Ben-Ari, and Edna Lomsky-Feder, ‘Epilogue: Theoretical and Comparative Notes on Reserve Forces’, *Armed Forces & Society*, No 2 (2011): 361-371, DOI:10.1177/0095327X10396652.

<sup>289</sup> In contrast to universities in Britain or the United States, German higher education is somewhat reluctant to host security studies departments. This observation might merely be explained by the fact that policy-makers, on the grounds of historical arguments, are unwilling to finance defence related degree programs at public universities; please refer to Chapter Three for more details. A notable exception is the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University; however, recent student body protests against the institute show that the public is neither keen to finance such research in Germany; cf. Lena Greiner, ‘Studenten gegen Uni Kiel: Nie wieder Kriegsforschung!’, *Spiegel Online*, 02 July 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/lebenundlernen/uni/militaerforschung-in-kiel-studenten-fordern-zivilklausel-a-907623.html>, 25 March 2017.

ever, is the independent think tank SWP-Berlin, which regularly publishes comprehensive articles on current developments in German defence policies and the *Bundeswehr*. Here, the study primarily made use of publications from the research division ‘International Security’.<sup>290</sup> Another frequently employed source was *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*. Although *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* is published by the Federal Agency for Civic Education and might, therefore, be subject to governmental editing, the author judged this publication to be credible and useful for this study. This estimate was primarily based on the fact that writers who submit to this journal come from a variety of backgrounds, including academics but also former or current service members and military staff, who are able to provide a unique insight into the topic of German defence policies and the reserve forces.<sup>291</sup> Building on this judgement, it was further decided to consider *Reserve Aktuell* as a source for this thesis. However, as the German Reservists’ Association publishes this journal, opinions expressed here were treated with caution; it was, therefore, mainly employed to retrieve information on reserve force structures and to ascertain reservists’ understanding of their role within the armed forces.<sup>292</sup>

#### 1.4.3.3 Newspapers and Newscasts

While newspaper publications can also be classified as primary sources, information retrieved from articles focussing on analyses and (or) editorials were grouped as secondary sources. To reflect opinions from different political camps, multiple British and German news outlets were considered. In Britain, The Guardian, The Times and The Independent

<sup>290</sup> See, for example, Wenke Apt, ‘Reform der Bundeswehr: Chancen und Risiken des Personalabbaus’, *SWP-Aktuell*, No 80 (2010), accessed 07 March 2017, [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A80\\_apw\\_ks.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2010A80_apw_ks.pdf), Alexander Bitter, ‘“Lessons Learned”: Auf dem Weg zur Armee im Einsatz’, *SWP-Studie* S 27, (2007): 61-67, accessed 07 March 2017, [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2007\\_S27\\_mrs\\_ks.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2007_S27_mrs_ks.pdf), and SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung: Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch’, accessed 26 April 2014, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt\\_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhp01\\_SWP\\_GMF\\_2013.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhp01_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf).

<sup>291</sup> See, for example, Harald Kujat, ‘Das Ende der Wehrpflicht’, Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, ‘Wehrpflicht und Zivildienst: Bestandteile der Politischen Kultur’, and Heinrich Kreft, ‘Deutschland, Europa und der Aufstieg der neuen Gestaltungsmächte’ (bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013), accessed 11 April 2014, <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/173793/deutschland-europa-und-die-neuen-gestaltungsmaechte>.

<sup>292</sup> See, for example, Ralf Berger, ‘Regionale Sicherungs- und Unterstützungskräfte: Ein wichtiger Beitrag der Reserve zum Heimatschutz’, *Reserve Aktuell*, No 1 (2012): 5-8, and Alfred Claußen, ‘Erfahrungsbericht eines Reservisten: Reservisten verbessern ihre kommunikativen Fähigkeiten’, *Reserve Aktuell*, No 2 (2014): 14-15.

have proven to be most resourceful for this study. In Germany, on the other hand, *Spiegel Online*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and *Frankfurter Rundschau* were the most consulted sources. Moreover, commentators' opinions expressed on BBC News and Germany's *Tagesschau* complemented this set of secondary sources.<sup>293</sup>

#### 1.4.3.4 Interviews and Surveys

Similar to newspaper articles, interviews and surveys were treated as both primary and secondary sources, i.e., opinions on, summaries of and interpretation of interviews and surveys were considered and processed as secondary sources.<sup>294</sup>

#### 1.4.3.5 Moving Images and Sound Recordings

**Documentaries.** Consulting documentaries served two particular purposes; first, broadcasts based on embedded journalism were watched to gain insight into an outsider's, i.e., journalists', perceptions of the armed forces.<sup>295</sup> This also helped to contrast the images conveyed in the clips provided by the verified armed forces' YouTube channels. Second, documentaries were utilised to set historical events into context. Here, broadcasts depicting the history of the Northern Ireland Conflict and the Red Army Faction were of particular interest.<sup>296</sup>

**Podcasts.** The author also considered specialised podcasts such as those provided by RUSI, Chatham Houses or King's College London's War Studies Department. These were mainly used to monitor current developments in British defence.

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<sup>293</sup> Newspapers were further sporadically used to retrieve information on other countries, e.g., Austria and Luxembourg; here, *Der Standard* and *Lëtzebuerg Tagblatt* were cited.

<sup>294</sup> cf., for example, Dominik Wüllers, 'Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?', 21 November 2013, *Zeit Online*, <http://www.zeit.de/2013/48/soldaten-deutschland/komplettansicht>, 03 July 2014.

<sup>295</sup> See, for example, 'Civilians to Soldiers', documentary, YouTube video, 31:59, posted by BBC Newsbeat, 06 December 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JadrdWiinLg>, accessed 08 December 2015, and 'Deutschland dienen: Freiwillig in der Bundeswehr', TV documentary *Vor Ort: Die Reportage*, reported by Ralph Gladitz, broadcasted by Phoenix, 14 January 2013.

<sup>296</sup> See, for example, 'Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF', TV documentary, broadcasted by ZDFinfo, 08 January 2015, and 'Blutiger Sonntag', TV documentary, broadcasted by ARTE, 20 April 2016.



## 1.4.4 Secondary Sources: Access and Sources Collection

### 1.4.4.1 Visited Libraries

In the early stages of materials' collection, it became apparent that the author's home institution, British libraries and (English-speaking) online databases only provided limited access to books and articles in German. However, to complete the chapters focusing on Germany, exploiting sources published in German was deemed essential. Consequently, the author decided to expand the gathering of resources beyond British institutions.

Various library network systems in three countries were, therefore, utilised in collecting relevant secondary sources. King's College London's libraries, as well as other London libraries, e.g., Senate House Library, the British Library and RUSI's Library of Military History, were visited to retrieve resources relevant to the study's British sections and Anglo-German relations. As regards information on the German examples, the author consulted books, articles and newspaper publications in the German National Library in Frankfurt am Main, in the University of Zurich's *Zentralbibliothek* and in the *Schweizerischem Sozialarchiv* in Zurich.

### 1.4.4.2 Digital and Broadcasted Sources

**Databases.** In addition to accessing hard-copies, the author made use of online databases to collect appropriate materials. Access to these sources was either obtained via the indicated library networks (e.g., IBSS, IHS Jane's Defence Module, JSTOR, Wiley and Taylor & Francis), open access pathways (e.g., SWP-Berlin and IREON) or through subscription memberships (e.g., RUSI and Chatham House). Sources retrieved from these databases mainly included journal articles.

**Television Broadcasts and Media Platforms.** Analogous to primary sources, moving images and sound recordings that were treated as secondary sources were accessed by watching live broadcasts, browsing media centres such as BBC iPlayer, ARD Mediathek and ZDF Mediathek or by listening to podcasts via iTunes, SoundCloud and Spotify.

## Chapter 2

### Britain's Future Reserve 2020

*We ask the military to be in a position that, if we ask them to do a task, they are absolutely able to do it for us.*<sup>297</sup>

- Philip Hammond -<sup>298</sup>

Following the elaboration on the methodological framework, this chapter is the first to discuss one of the four selected examples. Its main focus is Britain's FR-2020, which is examined in the light of the reform's implementation in the single services. However, before delving into this topic in Section 2.2, this chapter first addresses the circumstance that set the framing conditions for the FR-2020. It does so by exploring and examining the proceeding defence policy publications, the contemporary defence budget and Britain's security environment in 2010. On the one hand, this two-step approach aims to present a holistic investigation of the FR-2020. On the other hand, it is aspired to draw informed conclusions on the implications of the 2008 financial crisis on the FR-2020, which are then used in the comparative analysis in Chapter Six.

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<sup>297</sup> Oliver Wright, 'Philip Hammond: "Games Humanised the Face of Armed Forces"', 14 August 2012, *Independent*, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/philip-hammond-games-humanised-the-face-of-armed-forces-8038712.html>, 15 April 2013.

<sup>298</sup> British Defence Secretary (2011-2013).

## 2.1 The Future Reserve 2020 in Context

### 2.1.1 The 2010 Review: Key Documents

#### 2.1.1.1 Preceding Discussions and Publications

As a first step to evaluate the FR-2020's framing conditions, relevant government publications were examined. Although it can be argued that the FR-2020 is the direct result of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package, this reform is also the end product of a series of defence-related government publications and political discourse. Therefore, the thesis takes a step back and begins its analysis in 2003.

**2003-2009.** This year was chosen, as it marks the publication of the last comprehensive Defence White Paper in Britain.<sup>299</sup> Issued by Tony Blair's Labour government, its main purpose can be summarised as the government's attempt to adapt the British Armed Forces to the challenges of a changing security environment following 9/11.<sup>300</sup> Once Gordon Brown assumed the office of Prime Minister in June 2007, pressures grew to finally conduct a new and comprehensive defence review.<sup>301</sup> However, instead of catering to this demand, the Labour government resorted to publishing a National Security Strategy in 2008.<sup>302</sup> Although updating the National Security Strategy in 2009, the document did not deliver the expected outcome as it was widely regarded as a minor revision of the estimates elaborated

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<sup>299</sup> The Secretary of State for Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper*, Cm 6041-I (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2003), and Claire Taylor, *Strategic Defence Review Green Paper: Preliminary Observations*, House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence Section, SN/IA/5341 (London: House of Commons Library, 2010), 2.

<sup>300</sup> This attempt must be understood in the context of the commenced deployments of British troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the 2003 Defence White Paper was widely regarded as unsuccessful since insufficient allocation of needed resources hindered its implementation; cf. *ibid.*, 3, 'UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events', *BBC News*, 22 December 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35159951>, 09 May 2017, 'Timeline: British forces in Iraq', *Channel 4 News*, 30 April 2009, [http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/middle\\_east/timelinebritishforcesiniraq/3117317.html](http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/middle_east/timelinebritishforcesiniraq/3117317.html), 09 May 2017, and The Secretary of State for Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper*, 4 et seq.

<sup>301</sup> Claire Taylor, *Strategic Defence Review Green Paper: Preliminary Observations*, 3.

<sup>302</sup> The government's reluctance to conduct a defence review was widely regarded as a symptom of Labour's incompetence to deliver such a review; cf. *ibid.*, 4., and Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, Cm 7291 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2008).

in the 2003 Defence White Paper.<sup>303</sup>

**2010 Green Paper.** In the light of growing economic ramifications following the 2008 financial crisis, however, it became apparent that the National Security Strategy was not enough to set a new strategic and structural focus for the armed forces.<sup>304</sup> This recognition, in conjunction with the upcoming general election, led to a response from both the incumbent Labour government and the Conservatives.<sup>305</sup> While the latter promised to deliver the demanded defence review as soon as they would assume office, the former decided to publish a Green Paper on defence before the general elections, namely, in February 2010.<sup>306</sup> Its primary purpose was to raise and discuss issues that needed to be investigated in a future defence review.<sup>307</sup>

To ensure Britain's prosperity and safety, the Green Paper identified four key areas;<sup>308</sup> first, international trade needed to be enabled by guaranteeing the safe and free movement of goods and services.<sup>309</sup> Second, the Afghanistan mission had to be concluded successfully.<sup>310</sup> Third, the government and the MoD needed to better prepare the country for the imminent shift in the international power equilibrium, which was expected to move towards the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>311</sup> Fourth, collaboration with partners in international organisations and the EU were considered crucial for delivering defence on required levels.<sup>312</sup>

Besides, the Green Paper also alluded to changing conditions in the global theatre, which the government intended to tackle by implementing military structures that were more

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<sup>303</sup> Among other topics, the National Security Strategy referred to the need to adapt structures to fight terrorism or the threats emerging from failed states; cf. Claire Taylor, *Strategic Defence Review Green Paper: Preliminary Observations*, 4.

<sup>304</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>305</sup> *ibid.*, and Ministry of Defence, *Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review*, Cm 7794 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010).

<sup>306</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>307</sup> In this context, the government explicitly mentioned that they envisaged Britain to continue to play a leading role in global politics; cf. *ibid.*, 42.

<sup>308</sup> *ibid.*, 12.

<sup>309</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>310</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>311</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>312</sup> cf. *ibid.*

flexible and adaptable;<sup>313</sup> this conclusion was drawn after reviewing Britain's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>314</sup> Here, the authors referred to both the changing nature of conflict and the increased public scrutiny of military deployments through the media.<sup>315</sup> In addition to structural and operational observations, the Green Paper also frequently addressed the issues of rising costs and declining defence budgets.<sup>316</sup> For instance, it was stipulated that the MoD's funding had steadily increased by 10.00 per cent since the implementation of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.<sup>317</sup> However, due to the economic ramifications of the 2008 financial crisis, authors anticipated that the MoD could not be exempt from contributing to national consolidation efforts.<sup>318</sup> Simultaneously, the Green Paper alluded to 'rising fuel and utility costs, increases in pay and pensions, and cost growth on major equipment projects', which were expected to further exacerbate the MoD's financial situation.<sup>319</sup> As a consequence, authors highlighted that Britain would have to prioritise how and to what threats she will respond in the future.<sup>320</sup>

**Coalition Agreement.** Following Labour's defeat in the general election on 06 May 2010, the first post-war coalition government, consisting of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, was formed.<sup>321</sup> Keeping their promise, the coalition partners announced in their coalition agreement that they intended to conduct a comprehensive defence review.<sup>322</sup> Here, the parties outlined that establishing measures to strengthen the military covenant was central to their plans.<sup>323</sup>

Despite this well-intended aspiration, financial issues were also discussed;<sup>324</sup> first, the

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<sup>313</sup> *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>314</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 18.

<sup>315</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>316</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 5, 12, and 15.

<sup>317</sup> *ibid.*, 12.

<sup>318</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>319</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>320</sup> *ibid.*, 15.

<sup>321</sup> cf. 'Election 2010', *BBC*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/>, 09 May 2017.

<sup>322</sup> cf. HM Government, *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government*, 15.

<sup>323</sup> These measures included increased support for service members and their families, extended rest and recuperation periods, educational support for service members' children and ex-regulars, higher operational allowance for deployed service members and improving to mental and general health services for veterans; cf. *ibid.*

<sup>324</sup> *ibid.*

coalition partners stipulated that the MoD's running costs had to be reduced by 25.00 per cent.<sup>325</sup> Second, economic recovery and a fair distribution of national consolidation efforts were deemed the most important issues for the new government.<sup>326</sup> To tackle this problem, the coalition agreement outlined the parties' intention to conduct a comprehensive spending review and to establish the Office for Budget Responsibility.<sup>327</sup> With these steps, the new government hoped to contain negative economic implications and develop strategies to decrease deficits not by increasing taxes but by lowering government expenditure.<sup>328</sup>

#### **2.1.1.2 The 2010 National Security Strategy**

The promised defence review was delivered in a two-document package; the first part published was the 2010-NSS, which was released 18 October 2010.<sup>329</sup> In the context of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package, the 2010-NSS set the strategic framework for Britain's envisaged future defence posture. Right at the beginning, the government alluded to the dichotomy of Britain's contemporary security situation by declaring that 'Britain today is both more secure and more vulnerable than in most of her long history'.<sup>330</sup> In the subsequent chapters, this statement was further described and specified by referring to Britain's contemporary strategic context and her self-perceived distinctive role in the world.<sup>331</sup>

As regards the former, the 2010-NSS explicitly highlighted that Britain did not face an imminent territorial threat; however, the Afghanistan mission, terrorism, failed states and natural catastrophes were identified as major hazards to British security.<sup>332</sup> Described as volatile and unpredictable, the government outlined that its response to these threats must be highly flexible.<sup>333</sup> Therefore, the government introduced the so-called National Security Risk Assessment, which aimed to prepare the government by estimating threats' likelihood

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<sup>325</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>326</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>327</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>328</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>329</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 3.

<sup>330</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>331</sup> Britain's distinctive role in the world is defined as the result of her global interconnectedness and London's status as an international financial and educational centre; cf. *ibid.*, 13, and 21.

<sup>332</sup> *ibid.*, 13 et seq.

<sup>333</sup> *ibid.*, 37.

and degree of impact.<sup>334</sup> A key point raised in this context was Britain's aspiration to mitigate dangers by actively shaping the world through political, diplomatic and military means.<sup>335</sup> Nevertheless, the government also emphasised that Britain was not able to navigate and tackle the complex challenges of an ever-changing security environment on her own. Hence, the importance of international co-operation in political and defensive alliances such as the EU and NATO was explicitly stressed.<sup>336</sup>

Although nestled into the government's strategic elaborations, financial pressures were also addressed in the 2010-NSS.<sup>337</sup> For instance, authors emphasised that '[returning] our nation's finances to a sustainable footing' was paramount as the national deficit '[affected] both national security and all other areas of public policy'.<sup>338</sup> More explicitly, the government judged that economic stability and Britain's defence posture were highly intertwined concepts as the government could not guarantee one without the other.<sup>339</sup> Therefore, the 2010-NSS underscored that making hard and unpopular choices was inevitable to reduce the national deficit.<sup>340</sup> The implications for the MoD, however, were not specified; yet, it was noted that a reform of the armed forces was believed to aid the MoD in realising the required savings.<sup>341</sup> Details were to be described in the 2010-SDSR.<sup>342</sup>

### **2.1.1.3 The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review**

One day after the 2010-NSS was published, the government released the 2010-SDSR on 19 October 2010.<sup>343</sup> In contrast to its strategic counterpart, the 2010-NSS made frequent and detailed references to financial constraints.<sup>344</sup> Again, the government emphasised their judgement that the economy can only flourish in a stable security environment and vice

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<sup>334</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>335</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 25 et seq.

<sup>336</sup> *ibid.*, 18.

<sup>337</sup> *ibid.*, 4, 5, and 14.

<sup>338</sup> *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>339</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>340</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>341</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>342</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>343</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*.

<sup>344</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 3, and 31-32.

versa.<sup>345</sup> Therefore, it was highlighted that the MoD would have to contribute to national consolidation efforts;<sup>346</sup> however, due to the armed forces' engagement in Afghanistan and the government's pledge to uphold NATO's stipulated spending goal of two per cent of GDP, the 2010-SDSR mentioned that the defence budget would not be burdened as much as other ministries.<sup>347</sup>

At first, this statement sounds quite promising; however, a closer analysis of the 2010-SDSR revealed that the armed forces were destined to suffer incisive restructuring measures. In total, the government estimated that it was necessary and possible to save approximately £4.30 billion.<sup>348</sup> To achieve this goal, the 2010-SDSR described a combination of redundancies and rationalisation, which were summarised under the umbrella of the Future Force 2020 (FF-2020). One unexpected victim of these plans was the military covenant, whose strengthening the coalition agreement had underscored as one of the most important aims of the upcoming defence review.<sup>349</sup> Although outlining specific measures such as increasing operational allowances for deployed service members and educational support for former soldiers and their families, authors described that the government was forced to balance between people and equipment.<sup>350</sup> In total, the 2010-SDSR envisaged a cut in manpower of 17,000, the scrapping of ships and helicopters, as well as the renegotiation of procurement contracts.<sup>351</sup>

Strategically speaking, the FF-2020 was envisaged to enable the armed forces to conduct one of three types of mission.<sup>352</sup> First, a one-off, short intervention.<sup>353</sup> Second, three simultaneous non-enduring operations.<sup>354</sup> Third, three simultaneous deployments of different character.<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>346</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>347</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>348</sup> *ibid.*, 31.

<sup>349</sup> *ibid.*, 28, and HM Government, *The Coalition: Our Programme for Government*, 15.

<sup>350</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 28.

<sup>351</sup> Measures are discussed in further detail in Sub-subsection 2.1.2.; cf. *ibid.*, 31.

<sup>352</sup> 'Fact Sheet 5: Future Force 2020 - Summary of Size, Shape and Structure', accessed 21 November 2014, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf).

<sup>353</sup> Maximum troop numbers: 30,000; cf. *ibid.*

<sup>354</sup> Maximum troop numbers: 2,000; cf. *ibid.*

<sup>355</sup> One enduring stabilisation operation with up to 6,500 deployed service members, one non-enduring



## 2.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure

The 2010-SDSR outlined specific measures, which were intended to reduce defence expenditure by £4.30 billion as of 2010. As briefly mentioned, these aspirations did also affect the military covenant; however, implications were much more severe for the single services. To gain a better understanding for the impact of the aforementioned economization plans, the following pages elaborate how the Army, the RN, and the RAF were affected. However, to assess the government's plans' ramifications for the defence budget, savings goals and defence expenditure from 2010 through 2015 are examined first.

### 2.1.2.1 Defence Expenditure in Context

**Savings Goals and Envisaged Measures.** While the 2010-NSS did not mention specific numbers, the 2010-SDSR stipulated that the MoD was required to contribute £4.30 billion to national consolidation efforts as of 2010.<sup>356</sup> Nevertheless, the government also emphasised that economization measures could neither jeopardise NATO's two per cent goal nor Britain's operation in Afghanistan.<sup>357</sup> Hence, the 2010-SDSR explicitly stated that rationalisation efforts should not affect frontline operations.<sup>358</sup>

Generally speaking, the government aimed to reduce non-frontline expenditure by 25.00 per cent through a combination of selling surplus real estate and land, savings in commodities, renegotiation of contracts, and redundancies of non-frontline service members (17,000) and civilian staff (25,000).<sup>359</sup> For the Army, this strategy meant that it was about to lose 7,000 troops, 40 per cent of its tanks, and 35 per cent of its heavy artillery;<sup>360</sup> the latter two were mainly thought to be realised in the course of the complete withdrawal from Germany.<sup>361</sup>

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complex intervention with up to 2,000 involved troops, and one non-enduring simple intervention with a maximum of 1,000 deployed soldiers; cf. *ibid.*

<sup>356</sup> *ibid.*, 31.

<sup>357</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Annual Report and Accounts: 2010-2011*, HC 992 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2011), 30.

<sup>358</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 31-32.

<sup>359</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>360</sup> *ibid.*, 32, and 'Fact Sheet 7: Future Force 2020 - British Army', accessed 21 November 2014, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/62489/Factsheet7-British-Army.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62489/Factsheet7-British-Army.pdf).

<sup>361</sup> This decision also meant that 20,000 troops would return to Britain from Germany; HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 4, and 28.

Similar to the Army, the RN faced both a loss in personnel and equipment.<sup>362</sup> Although the government only planned to make 5,000 redundant, the reduction in equipment was rather incisive as one aircraft carrier, numerous helicopters and four frigates were about to be decommissioned.<sup>363</sup> As regards the RAF, the 2010-SDSR highlighted that the government intended to maintain the nuclear deterrent;<sup>364</sup> however, submarine launch tubes and warheads were planned to be reduced from 12 to eight and 48 to 40 respectively.<sup>365</sup> In doing so, the government hoped to retain the required deterrence levels but to realise £3.20 billion in savings over ten years.<sup>366</sup> Moreover, a reduction in personnel of 5,000, not bringing the Nimrod MRA4 patrol and attack aircraft into service, and withdrawing from procurement contracts were believed to contributing to consolidation efforts.<sup>367</sup>

**Defence Expenditure and Realised Savings.** As mentioned, the MoD was supposed to save £4.30 billion in expenditure to contribute to overall government savings.<sup>368</sup> When consulting Table 2.1, which outlines defence spending after the 2008 financial crisis had hit the British economy, it appears as if the MoD had not been able to meet the stipulated savings goal as expenditure did only decrease by £2.53 billion. However, relative numbers paint a different picture. In the 2010 Spending Review, the government stipulated that the defence budget was to fall by 7.5 over a five year period or 1.5 per cent annually.<sup>369</sup> Given the latter, Table 2.1 suggests that the MoD did almost realise the required savings in the stipulated period as it reduced its costs by an annual average of 1.38 per cent. Moreover, when factoring in inflation, which was 2.18 per cent on average during this period, it can be argued that the MoD indeed exceeded the savings goal.

<sup>362</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 5, and ‘Fact Sheet 6: Future Force 2020 - Royal Navy’, accessed 21 November 2014, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/62488/Factsheet6-Royal-Navy.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62488/Factsheet6-Royal-Navy.pdf).

<sup>363</sup> cf. *ibid.*, and HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 32.

<sup>364</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>365</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>366</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>367</sup> *ibid.*, and ‘Fact Sheet 8: Future Force 2020 - Royal Air Forces’, accessed 21 November 2014, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/62490/Factsheet8-RoyalAirForce.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62490/Factsheet8-RoyalAirForce.pdf).

<sup>368</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 31.

<sup>369</sup> HM Treasury, *Spending Review 2010*, HM Treasury, Cm 7942 (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010), 10, including own calculations.

Table 2.1: Defence Expenditure (2010-2015)

	2010- 2011	2011- 2012	2012- 2013	2013- 2014	2014- 2015	2015- 2016	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>National Expenditure*</b>								
In £ billions	696.80	699.80	711.00	722.00	737.50	757.50	4285	714.17
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	1.87	-3.8	5.42	1.67	1.5	n/a	1.33
<b>Inflation Rate</b>								
In per cent	2.5	3.84	2.58	2.31	1.45	0.37	n/a	2.18
<b>Defence Expenditure*</b>								
In £ billion	37.59	37.62	37.03	36.37	35.94	35.06	219.61	36.6
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	0.07	-1.56	-1.78	-1.18	-2.46	n/a	-1.38
Annual $\Delta$ in £ billion	n/a**	0.03	-0.59	-0.66	-0.43	-0.88	-2.53	-0.51
In per cent of National Expenditure	5.39	5.38	5.21	5.04	4.87	4.63	n/a	5.09
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	-1.76	2.33	-6.83	-2.8	-3.91	n/a	-2.59
*Financial Year.								
**Baseline = 2010.								

Sources: SIPRI, HM Treasury, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.

### 2.1.2.2 Personnel Costs and Redundancies

Keeping in mind the above mentioned factors, it can be inferred that the MoD made satisfactory progress in reducing its costs from 2010 through 2015. To achieve this goal, the 2010-SDSR had suggested implementing a variety of measures, including the scrapping of existing equipment and adaptations to procurement acquisition plans;<sup>370</sup> besides, the government listed redundancies as a tool to generate savings.

Initially, the government planned to enforce a total reduction of 17,000 troops and 25,000 civilian employees;<sup>371</sup> however, already in July 2011, this estimate was adjusted to 33,000 and 32,000 respectively.<sup>372</sup> When considering personnel costs, which accounted for more than one-third of MoD expenditure in 2010, it appears plausible that the government tried

<sup>370</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 31-32.

<sup>371</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 31-32.

<sup>372</sup> Adjusted redundancy numbers: 19,500 (Army), 5,500 (RN), 8,000 (RAF) by 2020; Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, *Armed Forces Redundancies*, House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence Section, Business and Transport, SN05951 (London: House of Commons Library, 2014), 3.

to strive for higher redundancies.<sup>373</sup> To meet the aspired numbers, the MoD went for a combination of natural turnover, reduced hiring and volunteer early release schemes.<sup>374</sup> The latter turned out to be particularly popular with the armed forces, as comprehensive resettlement packages accompanied the schemes;<sup>375</sup> on average, more than 50 per cent of redundancies were realised on a voluntary basis.<sup>376</sup> Moreover, as seen in Table 2.2, the MoD exceeded the armed forces redundancies' goal by 2,460 as a total of 35,460 service members retired by 2015. However, as regards civilian staff, government measures were not as successful; during the same period, only 22,320 left the MoD by 2015.<sup>377</sup> Nevertheless, despite falling staff numbers, personnel costs still accounted for 33.29 per cent of MoD expenditure in 2015.<sup>378</sup> A possible explanation for this observation is hidden in the numbers displayed in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. For instance, while staff numbers in the armed forces decreased by an annual average of 3.93 per cent, the average annual costs fell only by 0.69 per cent. Similarly, civilian staff numbers were reduced by an annual average of 6.78 per cent, while costs decreased by an annual average of 5.07 per cent. This direct comparison allows concluding that military personnel is more costly for the MoD than civilian staff. Moreover, when recalling that inflation was 2.18 per cent on average during this period, it can be argued that the overall increase in prices has partially torpedoed government efforts. Also, Table 2.2 shows that redundancy payments, which in total accounted for £1.07 billion between 2010 and 2015, constituted an additional burden for the defence budget.

## 2.1.3 The Security Environment

### 2.1.3.1 Territorial and Ideological Security Environments

In addition to evaluating whether the 2008 financial crisis influenced British defence planning, this thesis' research design defined the contemporary security environment as a framing factor for the FR-2020. Recalling from Chapter One, the security environment is

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<sup>373</sup> cf. Table 2.2.

<sup>374</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>375</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>377</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>378</sup> cf. *ibid.*

Table 2.2: MoD Staff and Military Staff Costs (2010-2015)

	2010- 2011	2011- 2012	2012- 2013	2013- 2014	2014- 2015	2015- 2016	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Armed Forces</b>								
Total numbers	194,690	189,650	181,470	171,540	162,800	159,230	1,059,380	176,563
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	-2.59	-4.31	-5.47	-5.10	-2.19	n/a	-3.93
Personnel costs in £ billion*	9.89	10.12	9.62	9.17	8.64	9.47	56.90	9.48
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	2.31	-4.95	-4.59	-5.83	9.64	n/a	-0.69
<b>Civilian Staff</b>								
Total numbers	74,858	69,658	60,868	56,998	54,858	52,538	369,778	61,630
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	-6.95	-12.62	-6.36	-3.75	-4.23	n/a	-6.78
Personnel costs in £ billion*	2.88	2.72	2.32	2.31	2.31	2.20	14.75	2.46
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	-5.35	-14.77	-0.41	-0.06	-4.78	n/a	-5.07
<b>Total personnel costs</b>								
In £ billion*	12.77	12.84	11.94	11.49	10.95	11.67	71.65	11.94
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	0.58	-7.04	-3.78	-4.67	6.60	n/a	-1.66
In per cent of defence exp.	33.96	34.13	32.24	31.58	30.47	33.29	n/a	32.61
<b>Redundancy payments</b>								
In £ billion*	0.19	0.29	0.18	0.22	0.14	0.04	1.07	0.18
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	55.26	-38.45	220.96	-35.22	-68.85	n/a	26.74
*Financial Year.								
**Baseline = 2010.								

Source: SIPRI, and The British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations

composed of multiple components. First, the territorial security environment was described as the absence of an imminent threat to a given country's territorial integrity, e.g., by an adversarial power's military aggression. In this context, the 2010-NSS emphasised that Britain does not face any '[...] major state threat at present and no existential threat to our security, freedom or prosperity', which authors mainly attributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.<sup>379</sup> Besides, geography is key to the territorial security environment. Due to her location close to continental Europe and her memberships in both the EU and NATO, Britain was surrounded and shielded by allied and (or) friendly nations in 2010.<sup>380</sup> Combined, these factors suggest that Britain's territorial security environment was stable when the 2010-NSS/SDSR package was published.

Nevertheless, due to Britain's 14 overseas territories, the geographical component appears to be slightly more complex.<sup>381</sup> Referring specifically to these territories, the government emphasised that it was Britain's responsibility to protect these regions, its citizens and flagged vessels.<sup>382</sup> While these statements indicate that the British overseas territories are an integral part of British defence planning, reality paints a different picture. First, the MoD stipulated that its engagement in the region is limited to four major responsibilities; namely, search and rescue, disaster relief, the evacuation of British nationals, and the freedom of navigation.<sup>383</sup> Second, troop presence is rather small; according to the MoD, only 5'510 service members are posted in the overseas territories.<sup>384</sup> Moreover, the majority, 3,600 troops, is not even stationed in distant regions but on two sovereign military bases that Britain maintains in Cyprus.<sup>385</sup> This limited engagement and low troop numbers, therefore, suggest that the overseas territories play a minor role in British defence thinking and only marginally influence the territorial security environment.

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<sup>379</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 3, and 15.

<sup>380</sup> Status: 2018; cf. *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>381</sup> The MoD lists the following territories alphabetically: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, the Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (including Gough Island Dependency), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) Akrotiri and Dhekelia (on Cyprus), the Turks and Caicos Islands; cf. Ministry of Defence, *Overseas Territories: The Ministry of Defence's Contribution*, accessed 13 April 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-territories>.

<sup>382</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>383</sup> *ibid.*, 10-11.

<sup>384</sup> cf. *ibid.*, including own calculations.

<sup>385</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

As regards Britain's ideological security environment, the previously mentioned memberships in the EU and NATO are key points to consider. Here, the 2010-NSS/SDSR package stressed that political and military co-operation with international partners was paramount for British defence as Britain hardly ever acted alone in the global theatre anymore.<sup>386</sup> Despite this acknowledgement, however, the government expressed that multinational or bilateral relations must be placed on a practical footing;<sup>387</sup> i.e., the government intended to concentrate and increase collaboration with partners that exhibited similar characteristics such as a comparable sizes of the armed forces or technological standards.<sup>388</sup> In this context, the 2010-SDSR explicitly highlighted the United States and France.<sup>389</sup> Especially the former was described as Britain's most important ally;<sup>390</sup> both as regards economic and military relations.<sup>391</sup> Nonetheless, the 2010-SDSR also referred to emerging powers and key regional states, with which the government aspired to work more closely by establishing stronger bilateral relations.<sup>392</sup>

#### 2.1.3.2 Perceived and Anticipated Threats

**Britain's Self-Perceived Distinctive Role.** The government's estimate that Britain was capable of building new or strengthening existing relationships was mainly derived from the judgement that Britain played a distinctive role in world affairs.<sup>393</sup> Enabled by the English language, historical links to countries on all continents and the Commonwealth, authors were convinced that a strong network existed that would allow Britain to exercise influence on a global scale.<sup>394</sup> Moreover, the 2010-NSS emphasised that Britain, being a leading economy as well as a cultural and educational hub, had a lot to offer to other countries.<sup>395</sup>

<sup>386</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 15, and HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 59.

<sup>387</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>388</sup> *ibid.*, 59-60.

<sup>389</sup> *ibid.*, 60.

<sup>390</sup> *ibid.*, 59, and HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 15.

<sup>391</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>392</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>393</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 21 et seq.

<sup>394</sup> *ibid.*, 21-22.

<sup>395</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 21.

In the government's opinion, this combination of factors obliged and permitted Britain to actively shape world affairs. Thus, the 2010-SDSR outlined that Britain intended not only to benefit from international organisations but wished to reform and influence institutions such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council.<sup>396</sup>

**National Security Risk Assessment.** With the aforementioned political associations and the envisaged active role in world affairs, Britain strongly aligned herself with what is perceived by adversaries as the 'Western Alliance'. This, in conjunction with Britain's somewhat open society and markets, makes the country vulnerable to asymmetrical threats such as terrorism.<sup>397</sup> Aware of this problem, and noting that Britain's security situation has become increasingly complex, the government attempted to develop a system that would allow preparing for threats more effectively.<sup>398</sup> Coining this approach National Security Risk Assessment in the 2010-NSS, the government consulted experts, who evaluated Britain's contemporary security environment.<sup>399</sup> Noting that not all threats could be anticipated, the government emphasised that this assessment was supposed to deliver sufficient data to prioritise threats by considering the likelihood and degree of impact on citizens, infrastructure, industries or the country in general.<sup>400</sup> After concluding the assessment, experts grouped anticipated threats into three tiers;<sup>401</sup> however, as only Tier One threats were considered imminent and were thought to cause the most significant damage; therefore, Tiers Two and Three were not discussed in detail.<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 61-62.

<sup>397</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*, 22.

<sup>398</sup> *ibid.*, 22.

<sup>399</sup> *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>400</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>401</sup> *ibid.*, 27 et seq.

<sup>402</sup> Tiers Two and Three listed four and five threats, respectively. Tier Two: Attacks on the mainland or overseas territories with weapons of mass destruction, increasing political instability in non-dependent regions, organised crime and espionage, disruption or attacks on Britain's satellite system. Tier Three: attacks on the mainland or overseas territories with conventional weapons, increased terrorist activity or organised crime or illegal immigration, disruptions to oil and gas supplies, accidents in nuclear facilities in Britain or abroad, attacks on EU or NATO members that would require Britain to contribute to militarily; cf. *ibid.*, 27 et seq.



**Terrorism and Cybersecurity.** The first threat discussed in the context of the National Security Risk Assessment's Tier One was terrorism.<sup>403</sup> Although also mentioning domestic terrorism, which was estimated as originating from 'the activities of residual terrorist groups' in Northern Ireland, the 2010-NSS concentrated more on discussing international terrorism.<sup>404</sup> In 2010, Al Qaeda was judged to be the principal 'provider' and 'exporter' of Islamic terrorism.<sup>405</sup> Therefore, beating insurgents in Afghanistan was deemed crucial and the most effective strategy to contain this threat.<sup>406</sup> Nevertheless, the 2010-NSS also alluded to '[f]ragile, failing and failed states around the world' as the actual origin of terrorism as terrorists 'look to exploit ungoverned or ill-governed space';<sup>407</sup> in other words, the government estimated that power vacuums were a hazard to Britain's security as they enabled terrorist activities.<sup>408</sup>

Related to the terrorist threat, the 2010-NSS further referred to cybersecurity.<sup>409</sup> Although highlighting that the government perceived advancements in technology as an opportunity, the authors also emphasised that increased usage of the internet had made Britain more vulnerable;<sup>410</sup> the reason mentioned for this judgment was that the public, the private sector, and the government had become more reliant on the internet in everyday life and for doing business.<sup>411</sup> Noting that terrorists, hostile states or criminals might exploit this vulnerability, the 2010-NSS stipulated that improving Britain's cybersecurity posture was crucial to delivering public safety.<sup>412</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> *ibid.*, 28-29.

<sup>404</sup> Although only briefly referring to terrorism in Northern Ireland, the government highlighted that terror attacks were still a persisting problem. Nevertheless, the threat was deemed not as severe as international terrorism since Northern Irish terrorists were not as organised and not joint by a common agenda or supported by the public; cf. *ibid.*, and 14.

<sup>405</sup> *ibid.* 28.

<sup>406</sup> *ibid.*, 13.

<sup>407</sup> Here, the 2010-NSS explicitly mentioned Yemen and Somalia. Moreover, the government briefly addressed the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. In this context, the authors specifically referred to Iran, whose acquisition of nuclear weapons Britain intended to prevent; cf. *ibid.*, and 13-14.

<sup>408</sup> From the 2018 perspective, the government's estimates are missing references to the Arab Spring or the Syrian civil war, which commenced after the 2010-NSS/SDSR package was released. Noting that experts cannot anticipate all prospective threats accurately, the 2010-NSS stipulated that the National Security Risk Assessment was to be repeated every two years; cf. *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>409</sup> *ibid.*, 29-30.

<sup>410</sup> *ibid.*, 29.

<sup>411</sup> *ibid.*, 29-30.

<sup>412</sup> *ibid.*

**Military Interventions and Civil Emergencies.** Even though emphasising that '[n]o state currently has the combination of capability and intent needed to pose a conventional military threat to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom', the 2010-NSS further mentioned that preparing for such an attack was a priority for Britain's military planners.<sup>413</sup> Nevertheless, this estimate was not expressed in conjunction with her neighbouring states but rather referred to Britain's obligation to intervene globally.<sup>414</sup> While also no specific examples are mentioned in this context, the government underscored that circumstances might change rapidly, why Britain needed to be prepared to encounter any unfavourable developments.<sup>415</sup>

The last threat classified as a Tier One threat was accidents and natural hazards.<sup>416</sup> Referring back to historical events such as the Spanish Flu or the 2009 Cumbria flood, pandemics and natural catastrophes were cited as a likely threat to British security.<sup>417</sup> Moreover, industrial accidents, as well as disruptions to water and energy supplies, were mentioned in this context.

### **2.1.3.3 Major Military Commitments**

At the time when pressures increased to conduct a new and comprehensive defence review, Britain was involved in two major overseas deployments, namely, in Afghanistan and Iraq; however, before the 2010-NSS/SDSR package was published, Operation Telic in Iraq officially concluded on 30 April 2009.<sup>418</sup> Hence, references to Iraq were sparse in the 2010 defence review, which mainly mentioned Britain's responsibilities in Afghanistan.<sup>419</sup> Besides the fact that operations in Afghanistan were ongoing in 2010, this mission constituted a major commitment and was, therefore, defined key in protecting Britain from further terror attacks.<sup>420</sup>

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<sup>413</sup> *ibid.*, 30.

<sup>414</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>415</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>416</sup> *ibid.*, 30-31.

<sup>417</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>418</sup> 'UK Combat Operations End in Iraq', *BBC News*, 30 April 2009, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/8026136.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8026136.stm), 10 April 2014.

<sup>419</sup> See, for instance, *ibid.*, 4, and HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 9.

<sup>420</sup> *ibid.*, 13, and 'UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events'.

Commencing in 2001 with Operation Enduring Freedom, Britain's engagement in the country was bound to last for more than 13 years.<sup>421</sup> Starting with a rather small troop commitment to support the United States' and her allies' efforts to fight the architects of 9/11, the Taliban, Britain had assumed a leading role by 2006 when Camp Bastion was installed in Helmand province.<sup>422</sup> In this environment, British troops were not passive bystanders but actively involved in tactical operations and subject to frequent attacks, which were met by appropriate counterstrikes.<sup>423</sup> During the peak of the mission, namely, in 2009, about 9,500 troops were stationed in Afghanistan, of which 456 had lost their lives by 2014.<sup>424</sup> In addition to this loss of life, the Afghanistan mission had cost Britain about £3.07 billion annually.<sup>425</sup> Nevertheless, in 2015, Britain, alongside her partners, had to withdraw from their 2014 withdrawal and again had to send troops to further stabilise Afghanistan.<sup>426</sup>

## **2.2 The Future Reserve 2020**

### **2.2.1 Identified Issues and Proposed Solutions**

In the 2010-SDSR the government stipulated that the MoD needed to conduct a separate and detailed review of the reserve force.<sup>427</sup> Following an evaluation by independent experts and the consultation of key stakeholders, the MoD completed its evaluation of the reserve forces in 2013. On the following pages, the identified problems and envisaged measures to eradicate them are discussed mainly at the example of volunteer reserves.

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<sup>421</sup> *ibid.*, and *The UK's Work in Afghanistan: Timeline* (London: Cabinet Office, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Ministry of Defence, 2014), accessed 18 January 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uks-work-in-afghanistan/the-uks-work-in-afghanistan-timeline>.

<sup>422</sup> 'UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events'.

<sup>423</sup> *The UK's Work in Afghanistan: Timeline*.

<sup>424</sup> 'UK Troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of Key Events'.

<sup>425</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>426</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>427</sup> HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review*, 5.

### 2.2.1.1 The Independent Commission's Recommendations

**Identified Issues.** In July 2011, the Independent Commission submitted its report on the reserve forces.<sup>428</sup> Here, experts had evaluated the current state of the latter and identified four major problems, which, in their opinion, hindered the successful employment of the reserve to tackle contemporary security challenges.<sup>429</sup> First, it was stipulated that the reserve have been in decline since the early 1990s, which the experts mainly attributed to low applications and retainment numbers.<sup>430</sup> These, in turn, were deemed the result of having offered insufficient incentives.<sup>431</sup> Second, the Independent Commission judged that the MoD had neglected to modernise the reserve's structures as those were still geared toward Cold War requirements, namely, deterring and countering the Soviet threat.<sup>432</sup> Consequently, and due to existing legislation, the bulk of reservists, namely, non-specialists, were not used in standard operations such as overseas deployment but cost the taxpayer money without a discernible contribution to Britain's defence posture.<sup>433</sup> Third, it was stipulated that the reserve did not reflect the same scope of talent that society as a whole had to offer;<sup>434</sup> i.e., reservists did not possess the same range or depth of skills as the public at a sufficient level.<sup>435</sup> Fourth, due to the previous three points, the MoD was not able to employ the reserve as needed.<sup>436</sup> This, according to the Independent Commission's calculations was particularly unwise, as reserve units were thought to deliver the same capabilities at 80 to 90 per cent of a regular unit's costs.<sup>437</sup>

**Proposed Solutions and Aspired Numbers.** In light of the contemporary financial pressures and the envisaged reductions in regulars, the reserve's ability to deliver a cost-

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<sup>428</sup> The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020*.

<sup>429</sup> *ibid.*, 6.

<sup>430</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>431</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>432</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>433</sup> *cf. ibid.*, 7, and 9.

<sup>434</sup> *cf. ibid.*, 6.

<sup>435</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>436</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>437</sup> The Independent Commission calculated that costs were 20 per cent lower when not mobilised and ten to 15 per cent lower when mobilised; *cf. ibid.*, 11.

efficient contribution to defence was key to the Independent Commission's report.<sup>438</sup> Therefore, the experts recommended increasing the ratio of mobilised reserves to regulars to 1:8.<sup>439</sup> To recruit more individuals for the reserve, the Independent Commission deemed formalising and revising reservists' roles and responsibilities paramount for the success of a reform.<sup>440</sup> Here, the experts explicitly mentioned that serving must become more attractive by expanding opportunities to serve in leadership positions and specialists roles, e.g., in cybersecurity.<sup>441</sup> Moreover, responsibilities in homeland defence should increase.<sup>442</sup>

For these expanded responsibilities, and to meet the intended ratio, the report judged that all three services needed to recruit and train more individuals for their respective reserve forces.<sup>443</sup> For the Army, the experts estimated that 30,000 troops were required to support Britain's defence posture;<sup>444</sup> for the RN and the RAF it was assumed that 3,100 and 1,500 troops respectively were needed.<sup>445</sup> Unfortunately, available government publications are somewhat incomplete; hence, consecutive and reliable reserve numbers are only available for the volunteer reserve.<sup>446</sup> Nevertheless, Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 intend to give a broad overview of the post-FR-2020 reserve forces' strength by highlighting volunteer reserve numbers in total and in the single services in comparison to the previous decade. Beginning with Table 2.3, which alludes to total numbers, it becomes apparent that the MoD was able to limit the shrinking of the reserve following the FR-2020. While total numbers decreased by an annual average of 4.11 per cent from 2000 through 2005, Table 2.3 shows that this trend was reduced to an annual average of -0.76 per cent ten years later. Moreover, only 426 reservists, on average, and not 1,886, left service annually from 2010 through 2015. Interestingly, however, following the Independent Commission's

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<sup>438</sup> cf., for example, *ibid.*

<sup>439</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>440</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>441</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>442</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>443</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>444</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>445</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>446</sup> Ministry of Defence, *UK Reserve Forces Strengths at 1 April 2010* (National Statistics, 2010), accessed 09 February 2017, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/280389/2010-revised.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/280389/2010-revised.pdf), 1.

report in 2011, all three services show a sharp decrease in reservists' numbers.<sup>447</sup> While both the RN and the RAF were able to reverse this trend in the following year, the Army experienced yet another incisive decline 2014.<sup>448</sup>

Table 2.3: Total Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total Volunteer Reserves</b>	33,390	37,070	30,570	30,650	28,860	31,260	191800	31967
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	3,680	-6,500	80	-1,790	2,400	-2,130	-426
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	11.02	-17.53	0.26	-5.84	8.32	n/a	-0.76
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in numbers	-13,670	-12,230	-17,900	-9,770	-10,090	-6,370	-70,030	-11,672
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in per cent	-40.94	-24.81	-36.93	-24.17	-25.91	-16.93	n/a	-33.94
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total Volunteer Reserves</b>	47,060	49,300	48,470	40,420	38,950	37,630	26,1830	43,638
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a**	2,240	-830	-8,050	-1,470	-1,320	-9,430	-1,886
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	4.76	-1.68	-16.61	-3.64	-3.39	n/a	-4.11
*Baseline = 2010.								
**Baseline = 2000.								

Source: DASA.

### 2.2.1.2 Recruitment, Retainment and Incentives

**The Consultation Paper.** The aforementioned negative trend in Army reservists' numbers suggests that the Independent Commission's proposed measures were insufficient for retaining enough reservists. Aware of this issue, the MoD decided to expand the review of the reserve forces and provide room for key stakeholders such as reservists and their employers to raise concerns.<sup>449</sup> Building on the Independent Commission's report, the MoD, therefore, released a Green Paper in 2012.<sup>450</sup> This consultation paper chiefly focused on subjects such as reservists' retainment, the need to redefine legislation and reservists' employers and their relationships to reservists and the MoD.<sup>451</sup>

<sup>447</sup> Please refer to Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6.

<sup>448</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>449</sup> cf. Ministry of Defence, *Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation's Security Together*, 12.

<sup>450</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>451</sup> The 2012 Green Paper further focused on defining the reserve's relationship with society and the support of their families; cf. *ibid.*

Table 2.4: Army Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total Army Volunteer Reserves</b>	28,960	31,400	26,640	26,500	24,290	25,880	163,670	27,278
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	2,440	-4,760	-140	-2,210	1,590	-3,080	-616
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	8.43	-15.16	-0.53	-8.34	6.55	n/a	-1.81
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in numbers	-10,540	-10,500	-14,260	-8,230	-9,330	-6,660	-59,520	-9,920
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in per cent	-36.40	-25.06	-34.87	-23.70	-27.75	-20.47	n/a	-33.65
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total Army Volunteer Reserves</b>	39,500	41,900	40,900	34,730	33,620	32,540	223,190	37,198
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a**	2,400	-1,000	-6,170	-1,110	-1,080	-6,960	-1,392
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	6.08	-2.39	-15.09	-3.20	-3.21	n/a	-3.56
*Baseline = 2010.								
*Baseline = 2000.								

Source: DASA.

Table 2.5: Maritime Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total Maritime Volunteer Reserves</b>	2930	3230	2570	2620	2850	3160	17360	2893
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	300	-660	50	230	310	230	46
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	10.24	-20.43	1.95	8.78	10.88	n/a	2.28
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in numbers	-1890	-1600	-2410	-1480	-920	-450	-8750	-1458
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in per cent	-64.51	-33.13	-48.39	-36.10	-24.40	-12.47	n/a	-43.80
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total Maritime Volunteer Reserves</b>	4820	4830	4980	4100	3770	3610	26110	4352
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a**	10	150	-880	-330	-160	-1210	-242
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	0.21	3.11	-17.67	-8.05	-4.24	n/a	-5.33
*Baseline = 2010.								
*Baseline = 2000.								

Source: DASA.

Table 2.6: RAF Volunteer Reserves in Numbers (2010-2015/2000-2005)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total RAF Volunteer Reserves</b>	1,560	2,450	1,360	1,540	1,720	2,220	10,850	1,808
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	890	-1,090	180	180	500	660	132
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	57.05	-44.49	13.24	11.69	29.07	n/a	13.31
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in numbers	-1,180	-120	-1,230	-60	170	740	-1,680	-280
Annual $\Delta$ (10 yrs) in per cent	-75.64	-4.67	-47.49	-3.75	10.97	50.00	n/a	-14.12
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Total RAF Volunteer Reserves</b>	2,740	2,570	2,590	1,600	1,550	1,480	12,530	2,088
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a**	-170	20	-990	-50	-70	-1260	-252
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	-6.20	0.78	-38.22	-3.13	-4.52	n/a	-10.26
*Baseline = 2010.								
*Baseline = 2000.								

Source: DASA.

**Training.** Based on the stakeholders' input, the MoD developed a wide range of instruments that were thought to cater to the needs of all parties involved, namely, reservists, their families and employers, as well as Britain's defence posture. Presented in 2013 in a White Paper on reservists, the MoD, for instance, pointed out that reservists' training needed to be reformed to make serving more attractive.<sup>452</sup> Furthermore, for defence purposes, training had to be structured more efficiently and effectively.<sup>453</sup> To achieve both goals, the MoD aspired to make training more challenging and rewarding for reservists by also pledging to make modern equipment and vehicles more accessible to reservists.<sup>454</sup> For this, training structures should be reformed;<sup>455</sup> here, the MoD intended to allocate £240.00 million of additional funds to training and £200.00 million to reserve units' equipment.<sup>456</sup> Besides these somewhat general measures, the MoD hoped to increase the degree of integration of reservists in regular units by pairing reserve units with their regular coun-

<sup>452</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts*, accessed 01 January 2014, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/211270/FR20\\_WP\\_measures\\_key\\_facts\\_v2\\_1.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211270/FR20_WP_measures_key_facts_v2_1.pdf), 5.

<sup>453</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>454</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>455</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>456</sup> *ibid.*



terpart.<sup>457</sup> By doing so, it was hoped to acquaint reservists with the use of the same equipment and strategies.<sup>458</sup> Moreover, readiness cycles were thought to be synced more effectively through pairing, which, in turn, would allow the MoD to deploy reservists alongside regulars at the same time if needed.<sup>459</sup>

**Incentives for Reservists.** While reservists had cited unchallenging training as a reason to leave service, the MoD also noted that there was a significant discrepancy as regards pay and benefits between regulars and reservists.<sup>460</sup> In order to decrease this disparity, the MoD decided to adjust pay and benefits packages to levels similar to those of regulars.<sup>461</sup> This included expanding the accessibility of health care, including mental, dental, occupational, general practitioner and rehabilitation.<sup>462</sup> Moreover, reservists and their families were thought to be supported by making welfare benefits promptly available through assigning designated welfare officers to reserve units.<sup>463</sup>

In order to decrease the number of reservists skipping annual training requirements, the MoD agreed to pay a training bounty.<sup>464</sup> Moreover, reviewing the Reservist Award was believed to aid in making training and mobilisation fairer.<sup>465</sup> The Reservist Award had been paid to compensate any financial losses that a reservist might suffer if her/his civilian salary was higher than her/his military salary.<sup>466</sup> While this conduct presumably motivated highly paid individuals to serve in any capacity, it did not take into account the scope of responsibilities s/he fulfilled while on duty.<sup>467</sup> Therefore, reservists with lower-paid civilian jobs, who, for instance, performed specialised tasks in the armed forces were financially worse off.<sup>468</sup> In an attempt to remove this unfair procedure, the MoD decided

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<sup>457</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>458</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>459</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>460</sup> *ibid.*, 8 et seq.

<sup>461</sup> *ibid.*, 8.

<sup>462</sup> *ibid.*, 14.

<sup>463</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>464</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>465</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>466</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>467</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>468</sup> *cf. ibid.*

to introduce a payment cap for the Reservist Award.<sup>469</sup>

While these measures served both retainment and recruitment, the MoD also intended to introduce a signing bonus to increase application numbers.<sup>470</sup> For recruits without prior military experience, the MoD was prepared to pay an initial bonus of £2,000 and an additional bounty of £3,000, which was to be paid in three instalments over three years.<sup>471</sup> In order to recruit more ex-regulars directly after having processed out of service, a transfer bonus of £5,000 was to be paid.<sup>472</sup>

**Incentives for Employers.** In the 2012 Green Paper, both employers and reservists had voiced concerns that military duties were somewhat of a burden to both parties.<sup>473</sup> For instance, while reservists obtained valuable skills during their service, these were not transferable to civilian jobs as they were not officially accredited.<sup>474</sup> The government, therefore, intended to work closely with civilian accreditation boards, higher education institutes and trade organisations to enable an official transfer.<sup>475</sup>

While this issue mostly affected reservists' civilian career progress, employers pointed out that absent staff had to be replaced, which involved costly hiring and training processes.<sup>476</sup> Moreover, upon reservists return, these often had to be retrained for their civilian job, which meant that companies suffered additional financial burdens.<sup>477</sup> Even though the financial implications were worse for small and medium-sized companies, the government acknowledged that larger corporations needed to be compensated for reservists' absences as well to make sure that employing military personnel was an asset rather than a burden.<sup>478</sup> As regards small and medium-sized companies, the MoD proposed to pay £500.00 per months to mitigate financial losses.<sup>479</sup> While this payment was limited to these enterprises,

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<sup>469</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>470</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>471</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>472</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>473</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 9 et seq.

<sup>474</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>475</sup> Specifically, the MoD wanted reservists to earn Standard Learning Credits during their service, which then would be transferable to non-military qualifications and degrees; *ibid.*

<sup>476</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>477</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>478</sup> *ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>479</sup> *ibid.*

the government intended to establish a corporate covenant, which also allowed larger corporations to publicly announce their support of the armed forces on websites and business letterheads.<sup>480</sup>

In addition to these incentives, the government intended to build better and stronger relationships with reservists' employers by intensifying communication and providing more detailed information on the reserve.<sup>481</sup> For employers, the most crucial component of this strategy was the increased notification period of reservists' mobilisation orders.<sup>482</sup> For enduring operations, the MoD, therefore, depending on the service, aimed for three to nine months notification notices, while short mobilisations should be announced at least 28 days prior to deployment.<sup>483</sup>

### 2.2.1.3 Changing Responsibilities

**Reservists in Regular Units.** Before the FR-2020 commenced, the government's leeway to mobilise reservists was somewhat limited.<sup>484</sup> Primarily, reservists were planned to be used in national emergencies;<sup>485</sup> most notably, when Britain's territorial integrity was threatened or to combat the ramifications of natural catastrophes such as floods.<sup>486</sup> Moreover, the reserve was called to protect the lives of British nationals at home and abroad.<sup>487</sup> In the course of the FR-2020, however, reservists' scope of duties was enlarged and entailed the same responsibilities regular troops would fulfil.<sup>488</sup> This change in policy specifically included operations outside of Britain;<sup>489</sup> for instance, the MoD was now able to mobilise reservists for support in the evacuation of Britons in foreign countries and stabilisation operations overseas.<sup>490</sup> Moreover, the government explicitly wanted to increasingly use reservists in standing commitments abroad as well as in peacekeeping

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<sup>480</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>481</sup> *ibid.*, 15, and 17.

<sup>482</sup> *ibid.*, 15.

<sup>483</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>484</sup> *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>485</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>486</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>487</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>488</sup> *cf. Ministry of Defence, Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 17.

<sup>489</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>490</sup> *ibid.*

missions, conflict prevention and security sector reforms.<sup>491</sup>

While selected reservists, namely, specialist, had already contributed to these kinds of missions before the FR-2020, the MoD aimed to integrate the reserve better into regular units by not deploying individual reservists but reserve units;<sup>492</sup> preferably, the MoD intended to deploy the latter with the regular unit that reservists had been paired with in training.<sup>493</sup>

**Homeland Defence.** Besides expanding responsibilities in overseas deployments, where reservists were supposed to work equally alongside their regular counterparts, the Independent Commission already recommended making further use of the reserve in homeland defence and British resilience.<sup>494</sup> In this context, the experts referred explicitly to the militia-like ethos, which increasingly manifested in the American public following 9/11.<sup>495</sup> According to their judgement, this mentality was also present in Britain, why the MoD should try to harvest talent for British homeland resilience.<sup>496</sup> Building on the Independent Commission's suggestions, the MoD stipulated in the 2013 White Paper that it intended to use reservists more for general and supporting homeland defence task such as safeguarding major public events (e.g, Olympics), crisis management as well as coastal and airspace surveillance.<sup>497</sup>

**Mobilisation.** To fulfil their expanded responsibilities, the government decided that reservists could be mobilised for an extended period.<sup>498</sup> For Army duties, reservists could now be mobilised for up to 12 months once every five years.<sup>499</sup> The serving period was divided into three phases, namely, a specific pre-deployment training, a six-month deployment and post-deployment duties.<sup>500</sup> Rather than to call up individual reservists,

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<sup>491</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>492</sup> *ibid.*, 22 et seq.

<sup>493</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts*, 5.

<sup>494</sup> The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020*, 7, 27, and 62.

<sup>495</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>496</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>497</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 17.

<sup>498</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts*, 3.

<sup>499</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>500</sup> *ibid.*

deployments were to be undertaken by reserve units.<sup>501</sup> As regards the RN and the RAF, the MoD decided to adhere to their individual or small team deployment strategy.<sup>502</sup>

#### 2.2.1.4 Changing Legislation

As seen above, a major component of the FR-2020 was to expand the reserve's roles and to improve reservists' integration in the British Armed Forces' regular structures.<sup>503</sup> While this undertaking appears plausible from a financial, structural and strategic standpoint, the government noted that implementing these aspirations required expanding and amending existing legislation.<sup>504</sup>

This process was concluded in 2014, when the Defence Reform Act (DRA) was enacted;<sup>505</sup> it consisted of three parts, of which the last one was concerned with the reserve forces.<sup>506</sup> A crucial point was addressed right at the beginning in Art. 44, which changed the Army Reserve's name to Regular Reserve and the Territorial Army's name to Army Reserve.<sup>507</sup> Although this provision might appear insignificant at first, the MoD stressed that renaming the Territorial Army was thought to reflect reservists changing roles and to remove the negative image attached to the name 'Territorial Army'.<sup>508</sup>

On balance, a large percentage of the DRA discussed amendments to the 1996 Reserve Forces Act (1996-RFA); especially as regards reservists' obligation to serve after mobilisation, which, for most operations, was expended from nine to twelve months.<sup>509</sup> After being called for duty, the DRA explicitly stated that reservists must fulfil any duties a regular service member would be asked to do, including overseas deployments.<sup>510</sup>

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<sup>501</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>502</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>503</sup> cf. Louisa Brooke-Holland. *In Brief: Future Reserves 2020*, House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence Section, SN06635 (London: House of Commons Library, 2013).

<sup>504</sup> The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020*, 31.

<sup>505</sup> cf. GOV.UK, Collection: Defence Reform Act 2014', accessed 02 December 2015, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/defence-reform-act-2014>.

<sup>506</sup> The first one outlines regulations to improve equipment acquisition and logistics' supply. The second discussed the establishment of a new framework for single source procurements; cf. *ibid.*

<sup>507</sup> See also Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts*, 4.

<sup>508</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>509</sup> cf. DRA Art. 45., and RFA Art. 28, 56, and 57.

<sup>510</sup> *ibid.*

## 2.2.2 The Future Reserve 2020 in the Single Services

Although the FR-2020 concerned all three services, it was the Army that underwent the most severe restructuring. Therefore, the Army Reserve was also most affected by this reform. In order to provide a comprehensive discussion on the FR-2020, however, the following pages briefly allude to envisaged changes that specifically concerned the Army, RN, and the RAF. Moreover, to complete the picture, the different categories of the British reserve are introduced first.

### 2.2.2.1 Categories of Reservists

**Regular Reserves.** As previously stated, elaborations on the reserve in this Chapter, and in the government's publications for that matter, mainly focused on volunteer reserves.<sup>511</sup> The main reason for this choice was that the MoD usually mobilises only a small percentage of regular reserves for routine operations.<sup>512</sup>

Regular reserves are former regular service members;<sup>513</sup> for a limited time following the completion of their term, ex-regulars are liable for recall.<sup>514</sup> If mobilised during this period, reservists serve in either the Army's Regular Reserve, the Royal Air Force Reserve or the Fleet Reserve, depending on their previous affiliation.<sup>515</sup> Moreover, regular reserves may enter a Additional Duties Commitment, where reservists work on a part-time basis for regular or reserve units.<sup>516</sup> Moreover, they can serve in the High Readiness Reserves, which, however, requires additional training commitments.<sup>517</sup> After the recall liability has passed, regular reservists become members of the long-term reserve, which may be called up in the event of serious emergencies or attacks on Britain.<sup>518</sup> Reservists obligation to serve under these circumstances end when turning 55 or after having served for a total of

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<sup>511</sup> cf. Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 16.

<sup>512</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>513</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>514</sup> Louisa Brooke-Holland, *Future Reserves 2020*, House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence Section, SN06733 (London: House of Commons Library, 2013), 6.

<sup>515</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>516</sup> *ibid.*, and Shima D. Keene, *The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United Kingdom Reserve Model*, 7-8.

<sup>517</sup> *ibid.*, 8.

<sup>518</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 16.

18 years.<sup>519</sup>

**Volunteer Reserves.** Ordinary citizens, who have voluntarily signed up for reserve duty are called volunteer reserves.<sup>520</sup> By entering this commitment, individuals accept that they are liable for annual training and mobilisation for routine operations.<sup>521</sup> Training is conducted on a part-time basis and is complemented with an annual training camp, which lasts approximately two weeks.<sup>522</sup> Volunteers may choose to be part of the Army Reserve, the RNR, the Royal Marine Volunteer Reserve (RMVR) or the Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF).<sup>523</sup>

Due to the annual training cycle, the MoD has detailed knowledge of the volunteer reserves' readiness levels and capabilities.<sup>524</sup> Hence, they are mobilised more frequently than regular reserves.<sup>525</sup> Similar to the ex-regulars, volunteer reserves can also be part of the High Readiness Reserves or accept an Additional Duties Commitment.<sup>526</sup>

**Full-Time Reservists and Sponsored Reserves.** Besides being mobilised for duty, reservists may opt to work full-time in the armed forces.<sup>527</sup> When doing so, individuals are neither considered regulars nor mobilised reservists and usually work in jobs that require a high degree of specialisation.<sup>528</sup> Sponsored reserves, on the other hand, are quasi-volunteer reservists.<sup>529</sup> They become members of the reserve due to their employers' contract with the MoD, which requires the company to nominate staff for reserve duty.<sup>530</sup>

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<sup>519</sup> Shima D. Keene, *The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United Kingdom Reserve Model*, 8.

<sup>520</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 16.

<sup>521</sup> Shima D. Keene, *The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United Kingdom Reserve Model*, 7.

<sup>522</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>523</sup> Louisa Brooke-Holland, *Future Reserves 2020*, 5-6.

<sup>524</sup> cf. Shima D. Keene, *The Effective Use of Reserve Personnel in the U.S. Military: Lessons from the United Kingdom Reserve Model*, 7.

<sup>525</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>526</sup> *ibid.*, 8, and Louisa Brooke-Holland. *Future Reserves 2020*, 6.

<sup>527</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>528</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>529</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>530</sup> *ibid.*

### 2.2.2.2 Army Reserve

Of all the three services, the Army's reserve was most affected by the 2010-NSS/SDSR package and the FR-2020. Reasons for this were fourfold; first, in the course of the 2010-SDSR, it was decided to make 19,500 regular service members redundant.<sup>531</sup> At the same time, the Army's overall troop strength was to be retained at 120,000.<sup>532</sup> To make up for these redundancies and natural turnover, the MoD stipulated that 30,000 trained reservists should fill vacant posts;<sup>533</sup> moreover, 8,000 additional reservists should be in training.<sup>534</sup>

Second, instead of merely substituting for regulars, the MoD envisaged that reservists would become an integral part of the Army.<sup>535</sup> In their opinion, changing the reserve's name from Territorial Army to Army Reserve would aid in underscoring this step.<sup>536</sup> Moreover, integration was believed to be facilitated by adapting training, which was now conducted in firm units that trained alongside a paired regular unit.<sup>537</sup>

Third, amending the 1996-RFA and introducing the DRA in 2014 not only enabled the renaming process but also allowed the MoD to expand the Army Reserve's scope of responsibilities.<sup>538</sup> Following the passing of the DRA, the government was now able to allocate any kinds of duties to reservists, which, in turn, meant that reservists could be sent overseas in any kind of operations.<sup>539</sup> However, reservists' roles were still thought to remain complementary in nature and limited to lower readiness missions;<sup>540</sup> high readiness capabilities remained in the hands of regular troops.<sup>541</sup>

Fourth, the MoD attempted to develop better homeland defence capabilities by increasingly using the Army Reserve for this task.<sup>542</sup> Simultaneously, however, the MoD decided to

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<sup>531</sup> Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, *Armed Forces Redundancies*, 3.

<sup>532</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 22.

<sup>533</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>534</sup> *ibid.*, 23.

<sup>535</sup> *ibid.*, 22.

<sup>536</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>537</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>538</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>539</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>540</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>541</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>542</sup> *ibid.*, 23.



consolidate smaller units and close approximately 40 bases, which limited the Army Reserve's presence throughout Britain.<sup>543</sup>

### 2.2.2.3 The Maritime Reserve and Royal Auxiliary Air Force

**The Maritime Reserve.** Even though the FR-2020 mostly impacted the Army Reserve, both the Maritime Reserve (RNR and RMVR) and the RAuxAF faced some changes;<sup>544</sup> mostly as regards their troop strengths.<sup>545</sup> Similar to the Army Reserve, the Maritime Reserve had to compensate for redundancies in the RN, which accounted for 5,500 in total.<sup>546</sup> For the Maritime Reserve to make a meaningful contribution, the MoD aspired to hold 3,100 trained reservists at its disposal.<sup>547</sup> In contrast to their Army counterparts, however, RNR and RMVR reservists were not thought to be trained and deployed in units alongside regulars but were supposed to support and augment the RN if needed and serve in specialist roles on an individual basis.<sup>548</sup> Moreover, due to proven expertise in the matter, the MoD decided that media operations would remain in the hands of reservists.<sup>549</sup> Notwithstanding the limited adaptations to the Maritime Reserve following the FR-2020, the MoD presumed that the Maritime Reserve could make a more significant contribution to the High Readiness Reserve in the near future.<sup>550</sup>

**Royal Auxiliary Air Force.** Similar to the Maritime Reserve, the MoD envisaged the RAuxAF's post-FR-2020 structures, roles and deployment characteristics to remain largely unchanged.<sup>551</sup> Moreover, redundancies were also to be implemented; in total, the MoD aimed to reduce the RAF by 8,000 troops but simultaneously strived to augment the RAuxAF to 1,800.<sup>552</sup> Also, the RAuxAF's potential for increased employment in the High Readiness Reserve was discussed, as it was expected that Air Force capabilities would

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<sup>543</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>544</sup> *ibid.*, 22, and 24.

<sup>545</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>546</sup> Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, *Armed Forces Redundancies*, 3.

<sup>547</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 22.

<sup>548</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>549</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>550</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>551</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 24.

<sup>552</sup> *ibid.*, and Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, *Armed Forces Redundancies*, 3.

assume a more prominent role in future conflicts.<sup>553</sup>

#### 2.2.2.4 Additional Recruitment Strategies

**Target Groups and Strategies.** Due to the implemented manpower cuts in the regular force and the intent to substantially augment the reserve's troop strength, the MoD needed to recruit more volunteers for and retain more ex-regulars in the reserve.<sup>554</sup> As discussed above, the MoD tried to achieve this goal by making training more attractive, offering greater financial incentives, and support reservists in obtaining civilian accredited skills.<sup>555</sup> In addition to these measures, the single services use quite similar recruitment strategies, which consist of a combination of dynamic web presences, social media, as well as television and radio advertisements.

Although it has been stipulated that reservists should also assume greater responsibilities in specialised roles, these tools suggest that the single services are increasingly targeting youngsters rather than mature specialists.<sup>556</sup> Today's go-to medium further underscores this judgement, namely, the services' reserve recruitment websites.<sup>557</sup> Here, all services present themselves in a colourful and dynamic manner by favouring visual aids, e.g., pictures and videos, over detailed content.<sup>558</sup> Especially the Army uses pictures to relate to prospective applicants as all portrayed reservists are about 20 years of age and from diverse ethnic backgrounds.<sup>559</sup>

Videos, on the other hand, are employed by all three services.<sup>560</sup> Again, featured reservists

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<sup>553</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>554</sup> Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Dunja Thurley, *Armed Forces Redundancies*, 4.

<sup>555</sup> Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued, Key Facts*, 8 et seq.

<sup>556</sup> The Independent Commission's 2011 report further supports this reasoning; here, experts outlined that reservists, on average, were ten years older than their regular counterparts; see Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces, *Future Reserves 2020*, 7, and 12.

<sup>557</sup> Army: Be the Best, 'Army Reserve Soldier', Crown Copyright, accessed 21 September 2016, [https://apply.army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/reserve-soldier?c3apid=20340251588&gclid=Cj0KCQjw6rXeBRD3ARIsAD9ni9DFZeXxLQhDQJzCoG-Ib0EJx71YShlxfpnh58UR-9PFNe-hkWY96FIaAtxrEALw\\_wcB&gclid=aw.ds](https://apply.army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/reserve-soldier?c3apid=20340251588&gclid=Cj0KCQjw6rXeBRD3ARIsAD9ni9DFZeXxLQhDQJzCoG-Ib0EJx71YShlxfpnh58UR-9PFNe-hkWY96FIaAtxrEALw_wcB&gclid=aw.ds), Royal Air Force: Regular and Reserve, 'Life as a Reserve', Crown Copyright, accessed 19 September 2018, <https://www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/lifestyle-benefits/life-as-a-reserve/>, and Royal Navy, 'Royal Naval Reserve', Crown Copyright, accessed 19 September 2018, <https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/maritime-reserves/royal-naval-reserve>.

<sup>558</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>559</sup> cf. Army: Be the Best, 'Army Reserve Soldier'.

<sup>560</sup> *ibid.*, Royal Air Force: Regular and Reserve, 'Life as a Reserve', and Royal Navy, 'Royal Naval Reserve'.

are rather young and elaborate that reserve service was an opportunity to break free from their regular lives.<sup>561</sup> Furthermore, the messages portrayed in the videos are embedded in a dynamic environment and highlight subjects such as adventures, sports, travelling the world, and patriotism.<sup>562</sup>

Besides these marketing strategies, the websites also provide information on how to join the reserve, prerequisite and what the service may entail.<sup>563</sup> Moreover, applications can be submitted electronically, and the RN even offers a live chat option to prospective applicants.<sup>564</sup>

## 2.3 Key Findings

1. The examination of government publications suggests that finances assumed a central role in composing the 2010-NSS/SDSR package. This, in turn, indicates that the 2008 financial crisis and its implications on government finances exercised a palpable influence on British defence planning in 2010.
2. Additional support for the empirical conclusions was discovered by evaluating British defence budgets after the 2008 financial crisis. Here, the analysis demonstrated that the government planned to reduce defence spending by a total of £4.30 billion. These economies were primarily to be realised through redundancies, scrapping of equipment, renegotiations of contracts and the selling of surplus land and real estate.
3. Due to Britain's location in Europe and her memberships in the EU and NATO, both her territorial and ideological security environment was judged to be stable. However, the examination of the 2010-NSS/SDSR package also revealed that the British government acknowledged that threats such as (cyber) terrorism, failed states and civil emergencies needed to be addressed by national defence policies. Moreover, the Afghanistan mission was a prevailing issue, which was perceived as a way to combat terrorism but also posed a burden on the British Armed Forces.

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<sup>561</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>562</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>563</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>564</sup> *ibid.*

4. The discussion on the FR-2020 revealed that the army was mostly affected by envisaged restructuring efforts. However, the FR-2020 forced all three services to reduce the number of regular service members. It was stipulated that regular forces are ten to twenty per cent more expensive than the reserve; this suggests that the MoD aspired to secure large economies through redundancies in the regular force.
5. The analysis also showed that the MoD attempted to keep capability levels stable despite the overall reduction of regular troops. The simultaneous manpower cuts in the regular force and expansion of roles of responsibilities of the reserve force, therefore, suggests that the MoD aspired to fill the capability gap with reservists. In addition to being entrusted with 'classical' homeland defence, e.g., increasing resilience in case of an attack on Britain, reservists' responsibilities also were to include the safeguarding of large public events, crisis management as well as coastal and aerial surveillance. Moreover, reservists were to be deployed in overseas and peacekeeping missions.
6. To enable reserve forces' units to assume these new responsibilities, the MoD needed to recruit more reservists. However, the analysis of personnel statistics has revealed that only the RAF and RN were able to increase recruitment and retainment, while the Army fell short of aspired numbers as of 2011. Moreover, due to the consolidation and closing of reservists' bases, the presence of reservists in Britain was weakened. This conduct suggests that reservists recruitment and fulfilling of their duties became more difficult in the course of the FR-2020.

## Chapter 3

# Britain's Post-Mason Review Reserve Force

*The main essentials of a successful prime minister are sleep and a sense of history.*<sup>565</sup>

- Harold Wilson -<sup>566</sup>

In Chapter Two, the contemporary British example was discussed by examining the implications of financial constraints on defence planning. In particular, the FR-2020 was analysed in general and in the context of the single services. This chapter constitutes the historical counterpart to Chapter Two and investigates the ramifications of the 1975 Mason Review. It does so by evaluating the reform's significance for the reserve forces. Following a similar structure as the previous chapter, both empirical and statistical evidence for the influence of economic turmoil on British defence planning is sought first. Again, government publications, the defence budget and personnel statistics are used in this context. Furthermore, Britain's Cold War security environment is investigated to assess in what circumstances reservists operated and how the government envisaged their contribution to Britain's defence. In this context, the Soviet threat and the Northern Ireland Conflict are specifically addressed. Reservists' roles and responsibilities are examined in detail by exploring the TAVR's reform and the RN's Mitchell Committee's suggestions.

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<sup>565</sup> Kate Proctor, 'Harold Wilson's Greatest Moments', 28 October 2015, *Yorkshire Post*, <https://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/harold-wilson-s-greatest-moments-1-7540437>, 17 April 2016.

<sup>566</sup> British Prime Minister (1964-1970/1974-1976).

## 3.1 The Post-Mason Reserve Force in Context

### 3.1.1 The 1975 Mason Review: Key Issues and Envisaged Measures

In order to investigate the impact of the 1975 Mason Review on the reserve forces, the review itself is examined first. On the following pages, the discussion begins by taking a closer look at the preceding defence-related political discourse and elaborate on the 1975 Mason Review's key findings and the envisaged savings goals.

#### 3.1.1.1 The Review Process and Strategic Considerations

**Preceding Political and Defence-Related Developments.** Except for a one-term Conservative interlude between 1970 and 1974, Britain's defence policy has largely been defined by Labour from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s.<sup>567</sup> Already in 1964, the Labour government engaged in a defence review, which was concluded in 1966 and complemented by additional reports in 1967 and 1967.<sup>569</sup> Known as the Healey Review, this reform was believed to have been chiefly driven by the sterling crisis and the government's subsequent plans to ask the MoD to contribute to national consolidation efforts.<sup>570</sup> To deliver the required savings, the MoD, therefore, planned to implement a combination of measures, namely, equipment purchase cancellations, reorganisations, and by cutting the TAVR's, then still called the Territorial Army, manpower by almost 50 per cent.<sup>571</sup> Moreover, to reduce the armed forces' overstretch, the government further decided to withdraw from most of Britain's overseas commitments and to shift her defence focus to Europe;<sup>572</sup> this

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<sup>567</sup> cf. <sup>568</sup>

<sup>569</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965', *Secretary of State for Defence*, Cmnd. 2592 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965), and 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966: Part I The Defence Review', *Secretary of State for Defence*, Cmnd. 2901 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1966).

<sup>570</sup> cf. Claire Mills, Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Nigel Walker, *A Brief Guide to Previous British Defence Reviews*, Briefing Paper 07313 (London: House of Commons Library, 2018), accessed 13 July 2018, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwiT-dSjj6LeAhWymIsKHWiqBzoQFjABegQICBAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fresearchbriefings.files.parliament.uk%2Fdocuments%2FCBP-7313%2FCBP-7313.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3LgnESSXqRCc6LThu0n0D,9>.

<sup>571</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>572</sup> *ibid.*

included the withdrawal from East of Suez as of 1968.<sup>573</sup>

On 8 June 1970, the Labour government was replaced by a Conservative administration.<sup>574</sup>

By the time the Conservatives assumed office again, Britain's strategic environment had substantially changed.<sup>575</sup> First, based on the previous government's withdrawal from foreign commitments, Britain had moved from a global to a regional power and concentrated most of her efforts on European security.<sup>576</sup> Second, Britain's defence posture had completely shifted towards NATO's demands, which almost entirely eradicated options to act unilaterally in the international theatre.<sup>577</sup> Third, the 'special relationship' with the United States had gradually been weakened and merely consisted of collaboration in intelligence gathering and nuclear research by 1974.<sup>578</sup>

Although having promised their constituency to restore most of Britain's international engagements, the Conservatives only partially kept their promise.<sup>579</sup> One implemented measure was contributing troops from all three services to the so-called ANZUK defence coalition, which Britain formed with Australian and New Zealand to protect their interests in Malaysia and Singapore.<sup>580</sup> Moreover, the reduction of the Territorial Army was reversed, and defence expenditure increased from 5.00 per cent of GNP in 1968 to 5.75 per cent of GNP in 1973.<sup>581</sup> Nevertheless, the Conservatives, under pro-European then-Prime Minister Edward Heath, moved even further towards European integration.<sup>582</sup> First, the government's December 1970 pledge entailed to further bolster Britain's contribution to European defence as it decided to spend an additional £400.00 billion on the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) from 1971 to 1974.<sup>583</sup> Second, the government completed negotiations to join the EEC in 1972, which was followed by her entry on 01 January

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<sup>573</sup> The term 'East of Suez' is used by British military planners to refer to British commitments in South-East Asia; in particular to Britain's military base in Singapore; *ibid.*, 82.

<sup>574</sup> Michael Dockrill, *British Defence Since 1945*, 99.

<sup>575</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>576</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>577</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>578</sup> *ibid.*, 102.

<sup>579</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>580</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>581</sup> *ibid.*, 104, and Claire Mills, Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Nigel Walker, *A Brief Guide to Previous British Defence Reviews*, 9.

<sup>582</sup> Michael Dockrill, *British Defence Since 1945*, 101.

<sup>583</sup> *ibid.*, 103.

1973.<sup>584</sup>

**The Review Process and Financial Objectives.** After yet another change in government in 1974, which put Labour back in office, the government again engaged in a comprehensive defence review.<sup>585</sup> Commencing in March 1974, the so-called Mason Review was conducted in 12 months and was published on 19 March 1975 as Part One of the 1975 Defence Estimates.<sup>586</sup> It was the second Labour defence review in one decade and was intended to set Britain's structural and strategic goals for the next ten years.<sup>587</sup> Generally speaking, the 1975 Mason Review largely mirrored the Healey Review's characteristics; again, the 1975 Defence Estimates addressed issues such as the armed forces' overstretch, e.g., their disproportional contribution to NATO, and financial constraints.<sup>588</sup> As regards the latter, the government had first proclaimed that it had not to set 'arbitrary financial limits' for the defence review;<sup>589</sup> nevertheless, the 1975 Defence Estimates outlined large savings goals that were to be realised within a decade.<sup>590</sup> In total, the government aspired to gradually reduce defence expenditure to 4.5 per cent of GNP over ten years, which accounted for total economies of £4.70 billion.<sup>591</sup> Due to these incisive financial plans, the government, therefore, not only informed the British parliament prior to the 1975 Mason Review's publication but also entered consultations with Britain's NATO partners in December 1974.<sup>592</sup> Although most allies expressed sympathies for Britain's economic situation and the resulting defence budget cuts, they admonished the government to ensure that envisaged measures should not to jeopardise the alliance's combined combat strength.<sup>593</sup> In particular, the United States reminded governments that Europe had to

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<sup>584</sup> *ibid.*, and 'Brexit: A Timeline of Britain's EU Membership in Guardian Reporting', *The Guardian*, 25 June 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/a-timeline-of-britains-eu-membership-in-guardian-reporting>, 09 April 2017.

<sup>585</sup> Michael Dockrill, *British Defence Since 1945*, 104.

<sup>586</sup> Michael Cary, 'Britain's Armed Forces after the Defence Cuts (Lecture)', 1, and 'British Defense Review', 131, and *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*.

<sup>587</sup> *ibid.*, 2.

<sup>588</sup> *ibid.*, 1-2.

<sup>589</sup> *ibid.*, 2.

<sup>590</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>591</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>592</sup> *ibid.*, 4 et seq.

<sup>593</sup> *ibid.*, and Michael Dockrill, *British Defence Since 1945*, 102.



invest more in her own safety as the administration in Washington, D.C. was busy with their engagement in Vietnam and in the *détente* negotiations with the Soviet Unions.<sup>594</sup>

### 3.1.1.2 Implications of the 1975 Mason Review

**Strategic Considerations.** As previously mentioned, the MoD was confronted with substantial savings goals, which were to be realised between 1974 and 1983/84.<sup>595</sup> Moreover, due to the Conservative government's restored engagements in ANZUK operations, the 1975 Mason Review attested that Britain's Armed Forces were overstretched.<sup>596</sup> In order to reduce the latter and to fulfil the financial directive, the MoD, therefore, listed numerous measures, including strategical adaptations, in the 1975 Mason Review.<sup>597</sup> First, it was stipulated that British defence expenditure needed to be brought to the same levels her allies spend on defence.<sup>598</sup> According to the government's estimated, this could only be achieved by shifting Britain's defence focus even more to the regional scale.<sup>599</sup> To determine the prospective defence scope, the government referred to three specific points;<sup>600</sup> first, Britain's defence had to concentrate on areas directly connected to the British Isles' security.<sup>601</sup> Second, British deployment to the identified regions should be to the benefit of NATO's collective defence.<sup>602</sup> Third, the defence posture was supposed to be reorganised by taking the imminent threat origination from the Warsaw Pact into account.<sup>603</sup>

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<sup>594</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>595</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 4.

<sup>596</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>597</sup> *ibid.*, 7 et seq.

<sup>598</sup> In this context, the 1975 Defence Estimates explicitly referred to France and Germany, who only spend 3.8 per cent and 4.1 per cent of GNP on defence respectively in 1974. Britain's defence expenditure accounted for approximately 5.8 per cent of GNP in the same year; *ibid.*, 2.

<sup>599</sup> In the 1976 Defence Estimates, the government pointed out that most non-NATO overseas commitments had ended or where about to end. These included the removal of all troops from Brunei, Gan, Mauritius, Singapore, Oman and the West Indies. Moreover, the Simonstown Agreement was dissolved based on an agreement between Britain and South Africa. Hence, the British Armed Forces also withdrew from their base in South Africa. Besides, personnel and equipment in Hong Kong were substantially reduced. Here, an agreement with the government of Hong Kong could be reached where the local administration pledged to increase its share of the cost burden; cf. *ibid.*, 7-8, and 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976', *Secretary of State for Defence*, Cmnd. 6432 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), 20.

<sup>600</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 7-8.

<sup>601</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>602</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>603</sup> *ibid.*, 8.

The latter was observed quite closely by the government;<sup>604</sup> in particular, Britain anxiously monitored the Soviet Union's investment in her Navy and other conventional weapons.<sup>605</sup> Therefore, the government concluded that Britain needed to increasingly contribute maritime forces to NATO's Eastern Atlantic and Channel Area.<sup>606</sup> By again taking financial constraints into account, the government believed that this step could only be facilitated by completely withdrawing all warships from the Mediterranean by 1976.<sup>607</sup> Moreover, the government noted that Britain should continue to provide tactical and strategical nuclear weapons to NATO.<sup>608</sup> Hence, it was decided to maintain *Polaris*.<sup>609</sup>

**General Reductions.** Besides, the 1975 Defence Estimates further elaborated measures to balance defence budgets.<sup>610</sup> One was the reduction in the Specialist Reinforcement Forces.<sup>611</sup> According to the government, the latter had primarily been earmarked for operations in Britain's overseas territories.<sup>612</sup> Arguing that this responsibility had become obsolete, the government decided to implement reductions here.<sup>613</sup> Nevertheless, those Specialist Reinforcement Forces pledged to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) were not supposed to be affected by this step.<sup>614</sup> Yet, the government aspired to implement cuts in three other non-NATO forces;<sup>615</sup> first, the British Mobile Force's air-portable brigades were supposed to be reduced from three to one.<sup>616</sup> Second, the government decided to disband the UK Joint Airborne Task Force, while only maintaining small parachute capabilities.<sup>617</sup> Third, in the Amphibious Forces, the Royal Marine Bridge Headquarters were reduced by one from four to three and the RN's squadrons were cut

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<sup>604</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>605</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>606</sup> *ibid.*, 9, and 13.

<sup>607</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>608</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>609</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>610</sup> *ibid.*, 10 et. seq.

<sup>611</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>612</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>613</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>614</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>615</sup> *ibid.*, 12.

<sup>616</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>617</sup> *ibid.*

back from two to one.<sup>618</sup>

**Personnel Reductions.** In addition to strategical considerations and general reductions, the MoD was to reduce both its military and civilian personnel.<sup>619</sup> In total, MoD estimated that 38,000 service members and 30,000 civilian employees needed to leave service to ensure that financial goals could be met.<sup>620</sup> Planned to be implemented over a five year period, most reductions in personnel were envisaged to be imposed on non-frontline staff.<sup>621</sup> Here, civilian personnel employed on Britain's overseas bases were to experience the most incisive reductions; namely, 15,000 jobs were about to be lost, which equalled a cutback of 25 per cent.<sup>622</sup> Moreover, an additional 15,000 civilians in Britain, which constituted about 6 per cent of the MoD's civilian workforce, were required to leave their employer.<sup>623</sup> Although the government estimated that the majority of reductions could be implemented through natural turnover and reduced hiring, the 1975 Mason Review also insinuated that some employees would have to be made redundant.<sup>624</sup>

**Army.** As regards the armed forces, envisaged personnel reductions meant that eleven per cent of service members would lose their jobs.<sup>625</sup> Although describing the Army as 'manpower-intensive', this service was only moderately affected;<sup>626</sup> in total, the Army's troop strength was to be reduced by 8 per cent or by 15,000 service members.<sup>627</sup> Of the latter, 6,000 troops, including 1,500 officers were to be made redundant while the remainder was planned to be cut by natural turnover and reduced recruitment.<sup>628</sup> Again, it was intended to predominantly reduce non-frontline troops, namely, by cutting back personnel

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<sup>618</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>619</sup> *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>620</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>621</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>622</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>623</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>624</sup> In this context, the government emphasised that a redundancy scheme would protect former employees' interests; cf. *ibid.*, 22.

<sup>625</sup> *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>626</sup> *ibid.*, 16.

<sup>627</sup> At the same time, MoD emphasised that recruitment had to continue to ensure that the Army would still be staffed with the most talented recruits; cf. *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>628</sup> *ibid.*, 21.

in the supporting services and by disbanding numerous Army units' headquarters.<sup>629</sup> When consulting the Army's regular numbers from 1970 through 1979, it becomes apparent that, strictly speaking, the MoD did not achieve the envisaged manpower cut; at least, not in the stipulated time-frame.<sup>630</sup> As illustrated in Table 3.1, a total of 8,100 troops already left in 1974, namely, shortly before the 1975 Mason Review was published.<sup>631</sup> Considering that the government used the 1974's troop numbers as a basis for calculations, only the decrease between 1975 and 1979 should be consulted to estimate the MoD's success.<sup>632</sup> Although Table 3.1 shows that the negative trend of 1974 continued throughout the second half of the 1970s, only 10,200 troops left service during the relevant period. Hence, the MoD fell 4,800 short of the stipulated goal.

Table 3.1: Army Regulars in Numbers (1970-1979)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regulars</b>	170,400	173,400	178,300	179,800	171,700	873,600	174,720
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	3,000	4,900	1,500	-8,100	1,300	325
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	1.76	2.83	0.84	-4.51	n/a	0.23
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regulars</b>	167,100	169,800	167,300	161,800	161,500	827,500	165,500
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	-4,600	2,700	-2,500	-5,500	-300	-10,200	-2,040
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-2.68	1.62	-1.47	-3.29	-0.19	n/a	-1.20
*Baseline = 1970.							

Source: British Ministry of Defence.

Besides the cost-saving effects of manpower cuts, the 1975 Mason Review further alluded to restructuring efforts and adaptations to the Army's equipment.<sup>633</sup> Here, it was outlined that, despite the intension to strengthen BAOR, structures had to be streamlined and simplified by consolidating units and headquarters.<sup>634</sup> Moreover, even though underscoring that the Army's equipment mainly consisted of low-cost items, the government planned

<sup>629</sup> *ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>630</sup> See Table 3.1.

<sup>631</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*.

<sup>632</sup> *cf. ibid.*, 20.

<sup>633</sup> *ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>634</sup> *ibid.*

to realise savings by reducing existing equipment as well as by postponing or cancelling purchases.<sup>635</sup> This conduct was believed to deliver a better ‘men-to-weapons ration’.<sup>636</sup>

**Royal Navy.** In comparison to the Army, the RN was less affected by envisaged manpower cuts. In total, the government calculated that only 5,000 service members, namely, six per cent of overall RN troops needed to leave service by 1979.<sup>637</sup> The reason for this benign treatment was that the RN was already slightly understaffed in 1974.<sup>638</sup> Therefore, only 1,000 troops were planned to be made redundant, while 4,000 were supposed to leave through natural turnover and reduced recruitment.<sup>639</sup> Similar to the development in the Army’s regular numbers, however, the RN also did not meet the set goal by 1979. As highlighted in Table 3.2, only 3,000 left service in the relevant period.

Table 3.2: Royal Navy Regulars in Numbers (1970-1979)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Σ	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regulars</b>	86,000	82,500	82,400	81,200	78,300	410,400	82,080
Annual Δ in numbers	n/a*	-3,500	-100	-1,200	-2,900	-7,700	-1,925
Annual Δ in per cent	n/a*	-4.07	-0.12	-1.46	-3.57	n/a	-2.30
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Σ	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regulars</b>	76,200	76,100	76,200	75,500	75,300	379,300	75,860
Annual Δ in numbers	-2,100	-100	100	-700	-200	-3,000	-600
Annual Δ in per cent	-2.68	-0.13	0.13	-0.92	-0.26	n/a	-0.77
*Baseline = 1970.							

Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.

Nevertheless, the RN heavily contributed to national consolidation efforts by losing a large percentage of its equipment.<sup>640</sup> Due to the Britain’s shifting strategical focus and the planned withdrawals from the Mediterranean, Singapore, and the West Indies, the RN lost about 15 per cent of its warships and 25 per cent of its conventional-powered

<sup>635</sup> *ibid.*, 16.

<sup>636</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>637</sup> *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>638</sup> *ibid.*, 21.

<sup>639</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>640</sup> *ibid.*, 15.

submarines.<sup>641</sup>

**Royal Air Force.** As regards both personnel and equipment cuts, the 1975 Mason Review affected the RAF the most. In total, 18 per cent or 18,000 troops were to leave service by 1979;<sup>642</sup> of these, 4,000, including 800 officers, were put on the shortlist for redundancies.<sup>643</sup> As highlighted in Table 3.3, however, the MoD was not able to meet the required reductions in the stipulated period and only managed to reduce the RAF by 13,500. This constitutes a surplus of 4,500 troops by 1979.

Table 3.3: Royal Air Force Regulars (1970-1979)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regulars</b>	113,000	112,100	110,700	105,900	99,200	540,900	108,180
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	-900	-1,400	-4,800	-6,700	-13,800	-3,450
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	-0.80	-1.25	-4.34	-6.33	n/a	-3.18
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regulars</b>	95,000	90,700	86,900	84,700	85,700	443,000	88,600
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	-4,200	-4,300	-3,800	-2,200	1,000	-13,500	-2,700
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-4.23	-4.53	-4.19	-2.53	1.18	n/a	-2.86
*Baseline = 1970.							

Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.

Similar to the RN, the RAF also experienced incisive cuts to its equipment.<sup>644</sup> Again, this conduct needs to be understood in the context of shifting strategies.<sup>645</sup> Although underscoring that frontline aircraft combat levels for NATO purposes and those stationed in Germany would be maintained, the government used its strategic decisions to justify a significant reduction in the RAF's aircraft and helicopters.<sup>646</sup> In total, the government

<sup>641</sup> In the course of the 1975 Mason Review, the government concentrated the RN's efforts in NATO operations in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel Areas as of 1976. It was thought that British ships, during peacetime, would only occasionally leave these areas for patrol purposes. Moreover, the government planned to focus on nuclear-powered submarine capabilities, why conventional-powered submarines capabilities were planned to be reduced; cf *ibid.*

<sup>642</sup> *ibid.*, 20.

<sup>643</sup> *ibid.*, 21.

<sup>644</sup> *ibid.*, 18.

<sup>645</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>646</sup> *ibid.*

decided to reduce the ‘fixed-wing element of the Royal Air Force transport fleet’ by 50 per cent, the ‘helicopter tactical transport fleet’ by 25 per cent, the ‘Nimrod maritime patrol force’ by 25 per cent, and the ‘VC10 and Hercules aircraft’ by approximately 30 per cent.<sup>647</sup> This undertaking was supposed to be supported by cutting equipment in Cyprus, by disbanding the helicopter squadron in Singapore, and by cancelling placed orders.<sup>648</sup>

### 3.1.2 Defence Spending in Context

The discussion on the previous pages has revealed that the government aspired to realise £4.70 billion in savings until 1983/84.<sup>649</sup> In order to estimate whether the envisaged measures have helped in achieving this goal, defence expenditure during this period was consulted. As highlighted in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, absolute spending did not decrease but rose by 16.96 per cent and 16.83 per cent on average between 1975 through 1978 and 1979 through 1983 respectively.

Table 3.4: Defence Expenditure (1974-1978)

	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>National Expenditure*</b>							
In £ billions	43.70	55.70	63.60	69.50	78.60	311.10	62.22
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	27.46	14.18	9.28	13.09	n/a	16.00
<b>Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	15.99	24.11	16.77	15.89	8.28	n/a	16.21
<b>Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In £ billion	4.00	5.22	5.99	6.64	7.41	29.26	5.85
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	30.52	14.82	10.83	11.66	n/a	16.96
In per cent of National Expenditure	9.15	9.37	9.42	9.55	9.43	n/a	9.39
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	2.40	0.56	1.42	-1.27	n/a	0.78
*Financial Year.							
**Baseline = 1974.							

Sources: SIPRI, HM Treasury, including own calculations, and OECD.

Yet, this development must be judged with caution. As illustrated in Table 3.4, the average

<sup>647</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>648</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>649</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

inflation rate between 1974 and 1978 was almost as high as the increase in defence expenditure. Hence, a rise in defence spending in real terms can only slightly be confirmed. Between 1979 and 1983, on the other hand, defence expenditure did indeed increase, as inflation was lower than the additional annual funding for the MoD.<sup>650</sup> Therefore, declining finances cannot be confirmed for this period.

Combined, these calculations suggest that the MoD was not able to realise the required economies. Nevertheless, both tables also show that relative MoD expenditure, namely, the MoD's share of overall national spending decreased in 1978, 1979 and 1981.

Table 3.5: Defence Expenditure (1979-1983)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>National Expenditure*</b>							
In £ billions	93.60	112.40	125.50	138.30	149.70	619.50	123.90
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	19.08	20.09	11.65	10.20	8.24	n/a	13.85
<b>Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	13.35	18.00	11.90	8.60	4.6	n/a	11.29
<b>Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In £ billion	8.68	11.54	12.14	14.87	15.83	63.06	12.61
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	17.01	33.01	5.20	22.49	6.46	n/a	16.83
In per cent of National Expenditure	9.27	10.27	9.67	10.75	10.57	n/a	10.11
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-1.74	10.77	-5.78	11.15	-1.65	n/a	2.55
*Financial Year.							

Sources: SIPRI, HM Treasury, including own calculations, and OECD.

### 3.1.3 The Security Environment

As stipulated in Chapter One, this thesis should evaluate countries' security environments from the territorial and ideological angle. Primarily, the analysis focuses on the government's estimates of Britain's security situation in the mid-1970s. References to relevant international agreements are made; however, the treaties are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, as these have been deemed more significant to evaluate Germany's 1970s

<sup>650</sup> See Table 3.5.



security environment.

### 3.1.3.1 Territorial and Ideological Security Environment

**Parameters.** During the 1970s, the territorial and ideological security environments were highly intertwined concepts as a country's political allegiance not only determined nation's potential adversaries in an armed conflict, but also because the enemy was located right at Western Europe's doorstep; i.e., the Soviet Union and her satellite states, which combined were known as the Warsaw Pact. Being a member of NATO and the EEC (as of 1973), this constellation meant that Britain was part of the 'Western Alliance' why the government specifically had to consider the Soviet threat in their defence planning.<sup>651</sup>

**The Soviet Threat.** In the Defence Estimates of 1975 and 1976, the latter was, therefore, discussed in great detail.<sup>652</sup> By examining the MoD's assessment of the contemporary situation, it becomes apparent that the government anxiously observed developments in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in general.<sup>653</sup> Here, the government stipulated that the Eastern Alliance rapidly advanced the augmentation of its defence posture from 1970 through 1975, despite simultaneously engaging in *détente* negotiations.<sup>654</sup> In particular, the government was worried about the imbalance of combat strength, which started to shift in favour of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>655</sup> According to experts' analysis, the East's troop strength outnumbered NATO's by approximately 20 per cent;<sup>656</sup> the same was stipulated for conventional weapons.<sup>657</sup> Moreover, the Soviet Union had reached parity with the United States in nuclear weapons.<sup>658</sup> As regards surface fleets and submarine capabilities, estimates were not as grim, because NATO had approximately the same amount of vessels at its disposal.<sup>659</sup> Nevertheless, the government emphasised that NATO's fleet was older

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<sup>651</sup> Brexit: A Timeline of Britain's EU Membership in Guardian Reporting', and *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 26 et seq.

<sup>652</sup> *ibid.*, and *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976*', 179 et seq.

<sup>653</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 26.

<sup>654</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976', 179.

<sup>655</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 26-27.

<sup>656</sup> *ibid.*, 27.

<sup>657</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>658</sup> *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>659</sup> *ibid.*, 27.

and was equipped with fewer defensive and offensive missile systems.<sup>660</sup> Therefore, the MoD advocated not to use mere numbers in defence planning but to consider actual combat strength.<sup>661</sup>

**Détente.** Due to the Warsaw Pact's conduct to increase its capabilities, the government was not convinced that *détente* would serve any purpose but to improve interstate relations between East and West.<sup>662</sup> Nevertheless, Britain also engaged in international talks aiming to mutually reduce troop numbers and to improve the Blocs' relationship in general.<sup>663</sup> Known as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, the government aspired to used negotiations to bring the relationship on a practical footing.<sup>664</sup> However, Britain also admonished her allies to stay vigilant to ensure that the Eastern Alliance could not use the talks as an instrument to divide the West.<sup>665</sup> Even after the Helsinki Accords' Final Act was signed on 01 August 1975, the government adhered to its estimate of the situation and reminded Britain's partners that the security situation itself had not changed because of this agreement as the underlying attitudes and agendas had not changed.<sup>666</sup>

### 3.1.3.2 Northern Ireland NATO Commitments

**NATO Commitments.** Despite having proposed severe cuts to equipment and manpower in the 1975 Mason Review, the government strongly affirmed British commitments to NATO.<sup>667</sup> Moreover, by adjusting Britain's strategical focus to the regional level, the government argued that Britain was capable of delivering the best possible contribution to the alliance.<sup>668</sup> When considering Britain's engagement in NATO in the mid-1970s, the government's estimates were confirmed.<sup>669</sup> By the time the 1975 Mason Review

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<sup>660</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>661</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>662</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976', 179.

<sup>663</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 30-31.

<sup>664</sup> *ibid.*, 31.

<sup>665</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>666</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976', 175.

<sup>667</sup> *ibid.*, 190-191.

<sup>668</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>669</sup> *ibid.*

was concluded and implemented, Britain had assigned most of her military efforts to NATO.<sup>670</sup> This became most pronounced in the RN's scope of duties;<sup>671</sup> here, Britain provided approximately 70 per cent of the alliances' immediate available naval strength.<sup>672</sup> Concentrated mainly in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel Areas, Britain's contribution, therefore, safeguarded the sea-born reinforcement and supply from the United States and Canada to Europe.<sup>673</sup> Moreover, by maintaining Polaris, the government provided the only European based nuclear deterrence.<sup>674</sup> Nevertheless, Britain's engagement did not end there; with the stationing of 55,000 troops in Germany, Britain significantly contributed to the defence of NATO's central front and provided a large percentage of the alliances' forward defence.<sup>675</sup>

**Northern Ireland.** Besides its contribution to NATO operations, the government also needed to consider terrorism within Britain's borders.<sup>676</sup> Despite making progress to contain terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, the security situation in this part of Britain was still somewhat volatile.<sup>677</sup> Bombing, shootings and rocket attacks were described as frequent occasions, why the government affirmed its commitment to maintaining troops in Northern Ireland.<sup>678</sup> According to the government, this estimate was further supported by the success of the armed forces' 1974 anti-terrorism campaign, which led to 1,367 arrests in connection with terrorist activities and murder.<sup>679</sup> Moreover, the government was convinced that troop presence, surveillance and intelligence gathering would ultimately be the basis for a political solution of the conflict.<sup>680</sup>

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<sup>670</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>671</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>672</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>673</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>674</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>675</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>676</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 34-34.

<sup>677</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>678</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>679</sup> *ibid.*, 35.

<sup>680</sup> *ibid.*

## 3.2 The Post-Mason Reserve Force

### 3.2.1 Army

In March 1974, a separate review of the TAVR had been concluded.<sup>681</sup> Named after Major General Majury, the so-called Majury Review highlighted numerous recommendations on improving the TAVR.<sup>682</sup> Although findings of the Majury Review were already available when the review process of the Mason Review began, the government did not fully integrate its results in the 1975 Defence Estimates.<sup>683</sup> Therefore, the following pages address the post-Mason Review Army reserve forces in two steps; first, reservists' obligations and reserve forces' structures as envisaged by the 1975 Mason Review are outlined. Second, the Majury Review's key aspects, as well as government statements on the TAVR in 1976 and 1977, are elaborated to identify whether and which adaptations to the TAVR were implemented.<sup>684</sup>

#### 3.2.1.1 Reserve Numbers

**Development in Reserve Numbers.** As previously described, the 1975 Mason Review envisaged cutting the Army's regular force by 15,000 until 1979. For the Army's reserve, on the other hand, the government had different plans as it was stated that the TAVR was to be largely exempt from redundancies and that its troop strength should remain stable or increase marginally.<sup>685</sup>

To confirm whether the government's promise was upheld, the development of the Army's reservists' numbers from 1970 through 1979 was examined. As seen in Table 3.6, reserve numbers dropped by 189,400 in 1975. Although significant, this sharp decline must be disregarded in this evaluation; before 1975, total reserve numbers included troops assigned

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<sup>681</sup> *Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*.

<sup>682</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>683</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 16.

<sup>684</sup> Cadet Forces were deliberately committed in this analysis in order to focus the discussion on the main reserve components.

<sup>685</sup> Despite this statement, the government mentioned that some TAVR employees would lose their jobs by 1979. However, reductions should be limited to TAVR-related MoD, training and logistics staff; cf. *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 16-17.

Table 3.6: Army Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regular Reserve</b>	287,200	292,600	296,300	293,100	293,500	14,62,700	292,540
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	5,400	3,700	-3,200	400	6,300	1575
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	1.88	1.26	-1.08	0.14	n/a	0.55
<b>TAVR and Ulster Defence</b>	47,100	51,400	64,600	64,600	65,900	293,600	58,720
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	4,300	13,200	0	1,300	18,800	4,700
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	9.13	25.68	0.00	2.01	n/a	9.21
<b>Total Reserves</b>	334,300	344,000	360,900	357,700	359,400	1,756,300	351,260
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	9,700	16,900	-3,200	1,700	25,100	6,275
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	2.90	4.91	-0.89	0.48	n/a	1.85
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regular Reserve</b>	108,200	107,200	111,200	116,800	ns.	443,400	110,850
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	-185,300	-1,000	4,000	5,600	n/a	-176,700	-44,175
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-63.13	-0.92	3.73	5.04	n/a	n/a	-13.82
<b>TAVR and Ulster Defence</b>	61,800	63,500	67,900	68,500	n.s	261,700	65,425
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	-4,100	1,700	4,400	600	n/a	2,600	650
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-6.22	2.75	6.93	0.88	n/a	n/a	1.09
<b>Total Reserves</b>	170,000	170,700	179,100	185,300	n/a	705,100	176,275
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	-189,400	700	8,400	6,200	n/a	-174,100	-43,525
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-52.70	0.41	4.92	3.46	n/a	n/a	-10.98
*Baseline = 1970.							

Source: British Ministry of Defence.

to the General Reserve.<sup>686</sup> Yet, with the latter's disbandment on 30 June 1974, the General Reserve disappeared from the statistics, which lead to the mentioned overall decline.<sup>687</sup> When factoring out this one-time impact, Table 3.6 shows that total reserve numbers, continuously increased between 1974 and 1979, namely, by 2.32 per cent on average annually.<sup>688</sup> As regards the TAVR's and the Ulster Defence Regiment's troop levels, a similar conclusion can be drawn; i.e., numbers increased by an annual average of 3.14 per cent when factoring out 1975.<sup>689</sup> Hence, the aspired marginal increase in reservists can be confirmed for the stipulated period.

### 3.2.1.2 Categories and Obligations of Army Reservists Post-1975

**Regular Reserve.** Similar to the situation in 2010, the British Army maintained two categories of reservists in the 1970s, namely, a mandatory and a volunteer element.<sup>690</sup> The former was comprised of ex-regulars and was called the Individual Reserve.<sup>691</sup> Its primary purpose was to augment regular structures in the event of an imminent territorial threat or during severe emergencies.<sup>692</sup> Moreover, reservists were liable for recall in warlike operations and, following the Queen's orders, required to serve in Britain and abroad.<sup>693</sup> The Individual Reserve was further subdivided into five sections labelled from A to G.<sup>694</sup> Depending on the date someone joined the regular force, s/he was assigned to either section upon completion of her/his term.<sup>695</sup> Generally, all ex-regulars were first grouped in Section A;<sup>696</sup> however, only those individuals who had joined after 01 April 1967 remained in this section until their liability to serve expired when turning 45.<sup>697</sup> Service members who had signed up for duty in the regular forces before 28 February 1964 or between 28 February

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<sup>686</sup> *ibid.*, 58.

<sup>687</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>688</sup> Table 3.6, including additional calculations.

<sup>689</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>690</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 58.

<sup>691</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>692</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>693</sup> *ibid.*, 114.

<sup>694</sup> *ibid.*, 114-115.

<sup>695</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>696</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>697</sup> *ibid.*, 58, and 114.

1964 and 31 March 1967 were obliged to serve in the Individual Reserve's Section A for one and two years respectively following the completion of their term.<sup>698</sup> Under Section B, the MoD listed all reservists who were not obliged to serve in Section A.<sup>699</sup> Furthermore, Sections D, F, and G grouped all reservists who did not have any obligation to serve, as well as all female ex-regulars from the Queen Alexandra's Royal Nursing Corps and the Women's Royal Army Corps respectively.<sup>700</sup>

**TAVR.** The largest volunteer element of the Army was the TAVR, which, in contrast to the Individual Reserve, was organised in two kinds of units.<sup>701</sup> One was referred to as Independent Units, which, on average consisted of combat troops, as well as engineer, signal and logistics units;<sup>702</sup> here, the ratio was approximately 1:2.<sup>703</sup> Besides, civilian staff and regular troops were assigned to the Independent Units.<sup>704</sup> Stationed in several national training centres, recruitment for the Independent Units was done locally.<sup>705</sup> Training obligations accounted for 15 and 12 days annually in camp and out-of-camp settings respectively.<sup>706</sup>

The second category of TAVR units was the Sponsored Units, which were chiefly comprised of specialists.<sup>707</sup> In order to find the best talent for these units, recruitment was conducted on a nationwide basis, while training and the administration was centralised in the Central Volunteer Headquarters.<sup>708</sup> Noting that specialists needed less training than combat forces, the Sponsored Units' reservists were only required to dedicate 15 and four days annually

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<sup>698</sup> Upon completion of their liability to serve in Section A, these reservists were transferred to the Long Term Reserve. Established in 1964, this service required reservists to deliver unpaid reserve duties when mobilised until turning 45. However, reservists in the Long Term Reserve were not required to participate in annual training and could only be mobilised by the Queen's orders; cf. *ibid.*

<sup>699</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>700</sup> Please note that no Section C was listed in the 1975 Defence Estimates; cf. *ibid.*, 115.

<sup>701</sup> *ibid.*, 58, and Irving Heymont, *Analysis of the Army Reserve Systems of Israel, Canada, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands*, Office of the Director for Planning and Evaluation, and Department of Defense, 1977, accessed 15 April 2017, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a042654.pdf>, 23.

<sup>702</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>703</sup> *ibid.*, including own calculations.

<sup>704</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>705</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 115.

<sup>706</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>707</sup> Irving Heymont, *Analysis of the Army Reserve Systems of Israel, Canada, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands*, 23.

<sup>708</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 115.

to camp and out-of-camp exercises respectively.<sup>709</sup>

The TAVR's main areas of employment were in the BAOR and the United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF), where reservists assumed critical and specialised duties in a supplementary role to the regular forces;<sup>710</sup> therefore, a reservist could be stationed either at home or abroad, while the latter usually meant a transfer to the European continent, e.g., Germany.<sup>711</sup> Moreover, TAVR reservists were also sent to support NATO headquarters in Brussels or assigned to NATO commitments.<sup>712</sup> In general, the TAVR could be mobilised worldwide by the Queen's order to combat an imminent threat to Britain or during national emergencies.<sup>713</sup> For warlike operations, on the other hand, the MoD planned to call up the TAVR only if Section A of the Individual Reserve was fighting at full capacity.<sup>714</sup>

**Ulster Defence Regiment.** Besides the TAVR, the MoD maintained an additional volunteer reserve element, namely, the Ulster Defence Regiment.<sup>715</sup> Stationed in Northern Ireland, these reservists assumed great responsibilities in anti-terrorism operations, where they supported their regular counterparts by safeguarding key infrastructures, serving at checkpoints and participating in mobile patrols.<sup>716</sup> As of August 1973, the Ulster Defence Regiment also accepted applications from women.<sup>717</sup> In line with the pre-#metoo sentiments, the government stipulated that women should be employed in two capacities;<sup>718</sup> first, women were supposed to search other women for explosives.<sup>719</sup> Second, they were thought to relieve men from administrative work to ensure that more men could be used for operational duties.<sup>720</sup>

Reservists of the Ulster Defence Regiment were required to engage in training exercises

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<sup>709</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>710</sup> *ibid.*, 58, and 114.

<sup>711</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>712</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>713</sup> *ibid.*, 115.

<sup>714</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>715</sup> *ibid.*, 59.

<sup>716</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>717</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>718</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>719</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>720</sup> *ibid.*



on 12 days per year and to participate in twelve two hour training courses annually.<sup>721</sup> Moreover, voluntary training opportunities were provided.<sup>722</sup> Reservists could be mobilised by the Queen's order to serve in Northern Ireland or for defending the British mainland in the event of an imminent territorial threat or severe emergencies.<sup>723</sup> Whether these training and mobilisation obligations included female reservists was not specified.<sup>724</sup>

### 3.2.1.3 Majury Review Recommendations

The so-called Majury Review commenced in March 1973 and was concluded exactly one year later.<sup>725</sup> Its primary purpose was to 'tidy up' the TAVR's organisation following its 'rapid expansion' in 1971 by determining if and where structural adjustments were necessary.<sup>726</sup> In this context, experts highlighted that especially the TAVR's infantry units needed reorganisation, which was thought to be best achieved through disbandment and consolidation of units.<sup>727</sup> Besides, the Majury Review recommended to improve the TAVR's integration with the regular force by adjusting training and recruitment.<sup>728</sup> The latter two were supposed to be synced with the regular units to ensure that the TAVR would truly become a complementary force.<sup>729</sup> Moreover, the experts recommended increasing the TAVR's training obligations from 27 days to 40 annually.<sup>730</sup>

Besides, the Majury Review also alluded to potential strategical adaptations.<sup>731</sup> Experts, for example, suggested that the TAVR's reservists could be increasingly used in operations in BAOR or Gibraltar to support and (or) relief regular forces.<sup>732</sup> Generally speaking, however, the Majury Review did not recommend changing the TAVR's roles and responsibilities.<sup>733</sup>

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<sup>721</sup> *ibid.*, 116.

<sup>722</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>723</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>724</sup> cf. *ibid.*, and 59.

<sup>725</sup> *Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*.

<sup>726</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>727</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>728</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>729</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>730</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>731</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>732</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>733</sup> *ibid.*

Although these findings were already put together in a final report in March 1974, they were not announced until 03 December 1974, namely, the same day the government informed the parliament of the key findings of the Mason Review.<sup>734</sup> Moreover, numerous Majury Review suggestions were disregarded in the 1975 Mason Review.<sup>735</sup> In retrospect, one can only speculate as to why the incumbent Labour government proceeded in this manner. Yet, when recalling that the Majury Review already commenced under the previous Conservative administration, it is somewhat safe to conclude that Labour deliberately refrained from using the Majury Review's results as those might have resembled the Conservative's defence strategy. Although speculative, this reasoning is somewhat supported by a letter written by Major General Strawson to District Commanders on 31 October 1974.<sup>736</sup> Here, Strawson insinuated that the government planned to keep a lid on the results until the Mason Review's key measures were announced in parliament.<sup>737</sup>

In the final version of the 1975 Mason Review, however, the government did mention one crucial Majury Review point;<sup>738</sup> namely, their intention to advance the TAVR's integration in regular units.<sup>739</sup> Nevertheless, specific measures to facilitate this step were not elaborated.<sup>740</sup> In the 1976 Defence Estimates, the government again alluded to the issue of integration and further claimed that the TAVR's morale had to be reviewed.<sup>741</sup> As regards the latter, the Majury Review had attested that reservists were highly dedicated and that the morale among the troops was good.<sup>742</sup> Nevertheless, experts recommended to introduce a training bounty in the TAVR to keep motivation high.<sup>743</sup> Finally, the 1977 Defence Estimates discussed the implementation of some of the Majury Review's recommendations a bit more in detail.<sup>744</sup> Here, the government stated that each TAVR

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<sup>734</sup> *ibid.*, and *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 4.

<sup>735</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>736</sup> *Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*.

<sup>737</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>738</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 16.

<sup>739</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>740</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>741</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976', *Secretary of State for Defence*, 60.

<sup>742</sup> *Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) Review 1973-1974 (the Majury Review)*.

<sup>743</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>744</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1977', *Secretary of State for Defence*, 47.

unit had been examined and some adjustments to their commitments had been made.<sup>745</sup> One example mentioned in this context was the disbandment of the '44 Parachute Brigade (V)', whose attached service members had been assigned new roles.<sup>746</sup> Moreover, it was decided to assign two TAVR battalions and numerous subunits to regular counterparts.<sup>747</sup> As regards the TAVR's strategical focus, the Majury Review's suggestion to increase reservists' commitments in BAOR was implemented by earmarking three TAVR battalions to this operation.<sup>748</sup>

### 3.2.2 Royal Navy

Similar to the TAVR, the RN's RNR underwent separate scrutiny, which was conducted at the same time the government prepared the 1975 Mason Review.<sup>749</sup> Coined the 'Mitchell Committee', the Royal Naval Review Committee was instructed to examine the RNR's current roles and submit suggestions on how the RNR could be used in peacetime and war;<sup>750</sup> these estimates were supposed to deliver the basis for RNR planning for the next 20 years.<sup>751</sup> On the following pages, the Mitchell Committee's key findings are discussed alongside the examination of reserve numbers. Moreover, the 1975 Mason Review and subsequent Defence Estimates are processed to determine whether the government accepted the Mitchell Committee's recommendations.

#### 3.2.2.1 Reserve Numbers

**Development in Reserve Numbers.** Previously, it was stated that the government aspired to let go of 5,000 RN troops until 1979.<sup>752</sup> As seen Table 3.7, this conduct again resulted in an increase of reservist numbers in the RN's regular reserve, whose troop levels slightly grew on average from 1975 through 1979. Coinciding with the mentioned troop reductions, however, this development is hardly surprising as more ex-regulars entered the

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<sup>745</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>746</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>747</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>748</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>749</sup> Stephan Howarth, *The Royal Navy's Reserves in War and Peace: 1903-2003*, 137.

<sup>750</sup> The Committee was named 'after its chairman Rear Admiral G.C. Mitchell; *ibid.*, 137-138.

<sup>751</sup> *ibid.*, 138.

<sup>752</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 16.

reserve in this period.<sup>753</sup>

The volunteer reserve element, on the other hand, shows a moderate and steady decline as of 1975.<sup>754</sup> A reason to explain this observation can be inferred from the government's statement that RN's overall troop levels were too low.<sup>755</sup> Based on this information, it can be concluded that recruitment and (or) retaining strategies were insufficient, which, in turn, suggests that fewer numbers of civilians could be motivated to serve voluntarily.<sup>756</sup>

Table 3.7: Royal Navy Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	Σ	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regular Reserve</b>	23,400	25,000	26,800	27,700	28,000	130,900	26,180
Annual Δ in numbers	n/a*	1,600	1,800	900	300	4,600	1,150
Annual Δ in per cent	n/a*	6.84	7.20	3.36	1.08	n/a	4.62
<b>Volunteer Reserve</b>	7,700	7,500	7,100	7,200	7,400	36,900	7,380
Annual Δ in numbers	n/a*	-200	-400	100	200	-300	-75
Annual Δ in per cent	n/a*	-2.60	-5.33	1.41	2.78	n/a	-0.94
<b>Total Reserves</b>	31,100	32,500	33,900	34,900	35,400	167,800	33,560
Annual Δ in numbers	n/a*	1,400	1,400	1,000	500	4,300	1,075
Annual Δ in per cent	n/a*	4.50	4.31	2.95	1.43	n/a	3.30
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Σ	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regular Reserve</b>	30,100	29,700	30,300	29,100	ns.	119,200	29,800
Annual Δ in numbers	2,100	-400	600	-1,200	n/a	1,100	275
Annual Δ in per cent	7.50	-1.33	2.02	-3.96	n/a	n/a	1.06
<b>Volunteer Reserve</b>	7,000	6,800	6,300	6,500	n.s	26,600	6,650
Annual Δ in numbers	-400	-200	-500	200	n/a	-900	-225
Annual Δ in per cent	-5.41	-2.86	-7.35	3.17	n/a	n/a	-3.11
<b>Total Reserves</b>	37,100	36,500	36,600	35,600	n/a	14,5800	36,450
Annual Δ in numbers	1,700	-600	100	-1,000	n/a	200	50
Annual Δ in per cent	4.80	-1.62	0.27	-2.73	n/a	n/a	0.18

\*Baseline = 1970.

Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.

<sup>753</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>754</sup> cf. Table 3.7.

<sup>755</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 21.

<sup>756</sup> Again, the Cadet Forces were deliberately committed in this analysis in order to focus the discussion on the main reserve components.

### 3.2.2.2 The Mitchell Committee's Recommendations

Simultaneously to the overall defence review, the Mitchell Committee began its work on 01 March 1974.<sup>757</sup> Consisting of two representatives from the RN and two from the RNR, the committee was supposed to conduct a balanced review, which respected both the regulars' and the volunteers' demands.<sup>758</sup> Based on the directive to realise the highest levels of savings possible, dissolving the RNR was treated as a viable option.<sup>759</sup> For two reasons, however, the experts refrained from undertaking this step.<sup>760</sup> First, the review revealed that the RNR's costs were lower than expected why a disbandment would not have created significant economies.<sup>761</sup> Second, the RNR's value for the RN was believed to outweigh the small cost-advantage dissolving the RNR would have delivered.<sup>762</sup>

It was, therefore, recommended to increase the employability of reservists in the regular structures by strengthening reservists' standing in the RN as a part-time component of the force.<sup>763</sup> To achieve this, the committee suggested three points; first, the RN was supposed to assume direct command of the RNR by abolishing the post of the Second Sea Lord.<sup>764</sup> Second, reservists' training needed to be adapted to ensure that the reserve was prepared to support its regular counterpart both in peacetime and warlike operations.<sup>765</sup> Third, reservists were supposed to occasionally substitute in regular units,<sup>766</sup> preferably in specialised roles such as medical care.<sup>767</sup> Moreover, cost-advantages were thought to be realised as of 1977 by hull-sharing of ships with the RN.<sup>768</sup> This decision meant that the RNR was about to lose some of its own ships, as they were transferred to the RN or simply scrapped.<sup>769</sup>

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<sup>757</sup> Stephan Howarth, *The Royal Navy's Reserves in War and Peace: 1903-2003*, 138.

<sup>758</sup> *ibid.*, 142.

<sup>759</sup> *ibid.*, 141.

<sup>760</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>761</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>762</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>763</sup> *ibid.*, 140.

<sup>764</sup> *ibid.*, 142.

<sup>765</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>766</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>767</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>768</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>769</sup> *ibid.*

Considering the Mitchell Committee submitted its recommendations on 01 December 1974, it is not surprising that the 1975 Mason Review, whose results were presented only two days later, did not reference the Mitchell Committee's conclusions in detail.<sup>770</sup> Nevertheless, it was stated that a thorough review of the RNR was underway, which aimed to ensure that the RN had sufficient numbers of reservists at its disposal for supporting and specialised tasks.<sup>771</sup>

In the 1976 Defence Estimates, the government again briefly alluded to the RNR reform by announcing that the RNR 'will continue to have a sea-going role, primarily for mine-countermeasures, but its size will be reduced [...]'.<sup>772</sup> In the subsequent 1977 Defence Estimates, the latter was marked as largely completed.<sup>773</sup> Besides, the government announced that the transfer of command to the RN had been fully implemented and that training had been adapted by 1977.<sup>774</sup> The latter was described as having been redesigned 'to provide support for commando forces including reinforcement of NATO's northern flank in mountain and arctic warfare'.<sup>775</sup>

### **3.2.2.3 Categories and Obligations of RN Reservists Post-1975**

The RN's regular reserve component was the Royal Fleet Reserve.<sup>776</sup> It was about 5,000 troops strong in 1975 and consisted of individuals that had not reached age 45 and met either of three characteristic;<sup>777</sup> i.e., ex-regulars, who were transferred to the reserve upon completion of their term, former regular troops who left service prematurely, and a limited number of volunteers.<sup>778</sup> Although the government did not stipulate a fixed liability, reservists usually remained members of the reserve for three years.<sup>779</sup> Moreover, if an attack in Britain was imminent or happening, reservists could be mobilised for permanent

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<sup>770</sup> *ibid.*, 138, and cf. *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 59, and 109 et seq.

<sup>771</sup> Areas of employment listed by the 1975 Mason Review included support in minesweeping activities, supplementing in maritime headquarters and specialist roles such as in linguistics; *ibid.*, 110.

<sup>772</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976', *Secretary of State for Defence*, 60.

<sup>773</sup> 'Statement on the Defence Estimates 1977', 46.

<sup>774</sup> *ibid.*, and 47.

<sup>775</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>776</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 59, and 109.

<sup>777</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>778</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>779</sup> *ibid.*

duty by the Queen's or the Secretary of Defence's orders respectively.<sup>780</sup>

The RN's volunteer reserve element was composed of two main categories;<sup>781</sup> namely, the RNR and the Royal Marine Reserve (RMR).<sup>782</sup> The former consisted of formed units assigned to selected NATO headquarters and eleven divisions that were stationed throughout Britain and Northern Ireland.<sup>783</sup> There was no minimum period of service required, but the maximum serving period was limited to five years.<sup>784</sup> In order to prepare reservists for both peacetime and warlike operations, training was conducted on 14 consecutive days annually.<sup>785</sup> In addition to land-based exercises in the Sea Training Centres, reservists received practical lessons on coastal minesweepers that were specifically attached to the divisions' centres.<sup>786</sup> Reservists could be mobilised under two circumstances;<sup>787</sup> either by the Queen's order in case of an imminent threat to Britain or by the Secretary of Defence when an actual attack was underway.<sup>788</sup>

The RMR, on the other hand, was subdivided into five units, which recruited their staff from ex-regular and civilian volunteers.<sup>789</sup> Hence, in contrast to the RNR, the RMR was only a semi-volunteer force. Again, no general fixed term commitment was required, but reservists initially signed up for four years with an optional extension.<sup>790</sup> The RMR offered two options to fulfil training obligations;<sup>791</sup> therefore, reservists could either participate in evening and weekend classes or meet requirements in a two week long training course.<sup>792</sup>

Mobilisation followed the same procedures as the RNR's.<sup>793</sup>

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<sup>780</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>781</sup> In addition, there were non-seagoing volunteers of the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service and the Marchant Navy. The latter consisted of civilian volunteers and civilian vessels; their training obligation was 28 per year. Moreover, the female counterpart of the RN was the Women's Royal Naval Reserve; although non-statutory in nature, characteristics mainly mirrored those of the RNR. Furthermore, civilian nurses were recruited for the Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service Reserve; *ibid.*, 59, and 111-112.

<sup>782</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>783</sup> The eleven divisions are (in alphabetical order): Clyde, Forth, London, Mersey, Severn, Solent, Sussex, South Wales, Tay, Tyne, and Ulster; *ibid.*, 111.

<sup>784</sup> *ibid.*, 110.

<sup>785</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>786</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>787</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>788</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>789</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>790</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>791</sup> *cf. ibid.*, 112.

<sup>792</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>793</sup> *ibid.*

### 3.2.3 Royal Air Force

In contrast to the TAVR and the RNR, the RAF's reservists were not subject to restructuring efforts. However, for the sake of completeness, the RAF's 1975 reservists are also discussed briefly in the following pages.<sup>794</sup>

#### 3.2.3.1 Reserve Numbers, Categories and Obligations

To get a better overview of the RAF's reserve forces, Table 3.8 again highlights the development of reservists' numbers between 1970 and 1979. Here, the figures show that total troop strength decreased significantly in 1973 and again in 1978. However, when considering that the government stipulated that the RAF had run a slight manpower surplus for many years, it can be concluded that these two decreases did not hurt the RAF's combat strength.<sup>795</sup>

This estimate is further supported when taking a closer look at the RAF's regular reserve, whose obligations to serve, according to the government, were 'exceptionally low' in 1975.<sup>796</sup> Hence, only a small number of ex-regulars, namely, 450 on average, were mobilised for duty.<sup>797</sup> Generally speaking, the MoD grouped regular reservists in three categories;<sup>798</sup> these were, the Royal Air Force Reserve of Officers (which included the Women's Royal Air Force Reserve of Officers), the Princess Mary's Royal Air Force Nursing Service Reserve, and retired RAF service members.<sup>799</sup> Except for the latter, all of the above were exempt from annual training obligations.<sup>800</sup> Ex-regulars, on the other hand, were supposed to participate in training for more than 15 days per year.<sup>801</sup>

As regards reservists' liability to serve, all categories were earmarked for homeland defence and worldwide deployments by the Queen's order or in warlike operations if they had

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<sup>794</sup> Again, the Cadet Forces were deliberately committed in this analysis in order to focus the discussion on the main reserve components.

<sup>795</sup> *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975*, 59.

<sup>796</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>797</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>798</sup> *ibid.*, 116-117.

<sup>799</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>800</sup> *ibid.*, 117.

<sup>801</sup> *ibid.*



Table 3.8: Royal Air Force Reservists in Numbers (1970-1979)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regular and Volunteer Reserve</b>	32,600	31,600	32,400	30,700	30,800	158,100	31,620
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	-1,000	800	-1,700	100	-1,800	-450
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	-3.07	2.53	-5.25	0.33	n/a	-1.36
<b>RAuxAF</b>	300	300	200	200	200	1,200	240
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	0	-100	0	0	-100	-25
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	0.00	-33.33	0.00	0.00	n/a	-8.33
<b>Total Reserves</b>	32,900	31,900	32,600	30,900	31,000	159,300	31,860
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	n/a*	-1,000	700	-1700	100	-1,900	-475
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	-3.04	2.19	-5.21	0.32	n/a	-1.43
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Regular and Volunteer Reserve</b>	31,700	33,100	33,400	30,300	ns.	128,500	32,125
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	900	1,400	300	-3,100	n/a	-500	-125
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	2.92	4.42	0.91	-9.28	n/a	n/a	-0.26
<b>RAuxAF</b>	300	300	300	300	n.s	1,200	300
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	100	0	0	0	n/a	100	25
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	n/a	n/a	12.50
<b>Total Reserves</b>	32,000	33,400	33,700	30,600	n/a	129,700	32,425
Annual $\Delta$ in numbers	1,000	1,400	300	-3,100	n/a	-400	-100
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	3.23	4.38	0.90	-9.20	n/a	n/a	-0.17
*Baseline = 1970.							

Source: British Ministry of Defence, including own calculations.

joined service before 01 April 1967.<sup>802</sup>

The RAF's volunteer reserve elements, consisted of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, the Women's Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, and the RAuxAF.<sup>803</sup> Moreover, volunteer reservists also served as officers in the training branch.<sup>804</sup> Generally speaking, the majority of RAF volunteer reservists worked as specialists and were supposed to support their regular counterparts in emergencies.<sup>805</sup> However, in the event of an attack on Britain or in warlike operations, reservists were liable for permanent service both at home and abroad.<sup>806</sup> Therefore, similar to the regular reserve, allotted annual training periods were supposed to last more than 15 days.<sup>807</sup>

### 3.3 Key Findings

1. The analysis of the 1975 Mason Review and the subsequent Defence Estimates confirmed that the 1970s economic turmoil exercised significant influence on British defence planning. In total, the MoD was burdened with economies that accounted for £4.70 billion or 4.5 per cent of GNP.
2. Although empirical evidence was found for the impact of economic turmoil on British defence planning, the estimation of Britain's 1970s defence budgets is somewhat more complicated. On the one hand, the analysis demonstrated that defence expenditure rose throughout the decade. On the other hand, most of the additional funding was consumed by soaring inflation rates. Therefore, despite rising expenditure in real terms, defence expenditure can be considered falling or stagnating on relative terms.
3. The chapter demonstrated that Britain's security environment was somewhat complex in the 1970s. Although Britain was fully engaged in the *détente* negotiations, the

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<sup>802</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>803</sup> The RAuxAF's recruitment was conducted by the Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Associations; *ibid.*, 116-117.

<sup>804</sup> *ibid.*, 59.

<sup>805</sup> *ibid.*, 117.

<sup>806</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>807</sup> *ibid.*

government did not trust Soviet promises. Therefore, military planners were not prepared to let down Britain's guard and anxiously monitored developments in the Soviet Union and her satellite states. Moreover, the chapter's discussion showed that Britain's defence posture was overstretched as Britain was the major contributor to European defence in the naval sphere and needed to address domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland.

4. Although the TAVR (Majury Review) and the RNR (Mitchell Committee) were subject to a reviewing process, neither these reviews nor the 1975 Mason Review and subsequent Defence Estimates entailed plans to substantially change reservists' roles and responsibilities. The only recommendation expressed was improving the integration of the reserve components with their regular counterparts. As regards the RAF, no reform attempts could be found in relevant government publications.

## Chapter 4

# Germany's 2012 Conception of Reserve

*Die Bundeswehr versteht sich als Teil der Friedensbewegung.*<sup>808</sup>

- Thomas de Maizière -<sup>809</sup>

The previous two chapters presented an evaluation of two British examples of reserve forces reform in times of economic turmoil. In Chapter Two, the contemporary British example was examined by considering the implications of the FR-2020 in the single services. In this chapter, the FR-2020 German counterpart is evaluated. Here, the exploration is not focused on the individual branches of the *Bundeswehr* but investigates the 2012-COR in light of the suspension of conscription. Similar to the previous two chapters, this part of the thesis also refers to government publications, defence budgets and personnel statistics to evaluate whether the 2008 financial crisis exercised any influence on German defence planning. Furthermore, Germany's 2010 security environment is examined to highlight the circumstance under which reservists operated and defence planning was conducted.

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<sup>808</sup> 'The *Bundeswehr* considers itself to be a part of the peace movement'. Translated by the author; "Die Bundeswehr versteht sich als Teil der Friedensbewegung", *Handelsblatt*, 08 February 2013 <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/zitate-der-woche-die-bundeswehr-versteht-sich-als-teil-der-friedensbewegung/7755482.html?ticket=ST-5729580-bt5dlJ7ZoViOFLg4ZAYB-ap4>, 15 March 2013.

<sup>809</sup> German Defence Minister (2011-2013).

## 4.1 The 2012 Conception of Reserve in Context

### 4.1.1 Envisaged Measures and Financial Considerations

#### 4.1.1.1 The Review Process and Initial Recommendations

As of late 2010, the *Bundeswehr* entered a transformation process that would later become known as the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*.<sup>810</sup> In the course of the review process, the MoD, the 2010-CSR and the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr* articulated recommendations that would aid in making the *Bundeswehr* both more proficient in military terms and more efficient financially.

**The 2009 General Election.** The decision to embark on a new military reform was first specified following the 2009 general election. After completing negotiations, the Conservatives and the Liberals signed a coalition agreement in October 2009, which included the intention to appoint an independent commission to review the *Bundeswehr*'s organisational and administrative structures as regards their streamlining potential.<sup>811</sup> Following these initial demands, the cabinet further substantiated their plans in June 2010 by instructing then-Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg to have the implications for Germany's operational capabilities evaluated if the total number of *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten* was to be reduced by 40.000.<sup>812</sup> To cater to both the coalition agreement's mandate and the cabinet's decision, zu Guttenberg commissioned two independent reviewing boards to examine the *Bundeswehr*.

**The Commission on Structural Reform.** The first commission he appointed was the so-called 2010-CSR, which began their review in April 2010.<sup>813</sup> Initially, the MoD did

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<sup>810</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 'Chronologie der Neuausrichtung', Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, accessed 04 March 2014, <http://www.bmvg.de/portal/poc/bmvg?uri=ci%3Abw.bmvg.sicherheitspolitik.bundeswehr.neuausrichtung.chronologie>.

<sup>811</sup> Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 17. Legislaturperiode, Christlich Demokratische Union-Christlich Soziale Union-Freie Demokratische Partei, 2009, 124.

<sup>812</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2013), accessed 18 December 2013, <http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/themen/Bundeswehr/neuausrichtung-bericht.pdf>, 6.

<sup>813</sup> Jürgen Weise et al., *Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010*, 3.

not provide detailed instructions as regards the review's aims other than stating that the *Bundeswehr's* structures needed to be adapted to fit the demands of overseas deployments better while taking into account that financial resources were limited.<sup>814</sup> Moreover, based on the coalition agreement, the 2010-CSR was indirectly informed that the government wished to adhere to conscription.<sup>815</sup> Later in the review, the cabinet's June 2010 decision to aim for reducing the number of *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten* by 40,000 was also added to the analysis.<sup>816</sup>

The review was conducted between April and October 2010 and included recommendations on how to streamline both the *Bundeswehr's* structures as well as the MoD's organisation.<sup>817</sup> By suggesting these measures, the 2010-CSR hoped that resources and responsibilities would eventually be allocated more efficiently.<sup>818</sup> In addition, the 2010-CSR focused on analysing the changing demands imposed on the *Bundeswehr* and its relationship with society.<sup>819</sup> By establishing a voluntary *Wehrdienst* and *Zivildienst* in lieu of forcing young people into serving, the 2010-CSR expressed the hope to create a more proficient force and to attract motivated volunteers.<sup>820</sup> As regard reservists, the 2010-CSR recommended conducting a separate review, which should focus on shifting responsibilities to regional commands.<sup>821</sup>

**The Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*.** Although the 2010-CSR had already begun conducting their review in April 2010, the government decided to instruct the Inspector General to develop further recommendations for reforming the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>822</sup> In contrast to the 2010-CSR, the given orders were rather specific. Based on the cabinet's June 2010 decision, he was instructed to investigate if it was possible to reduce the total number of

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<sup>814</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 3, 22, and 26.

<sup>815</sup> *ibid.*, and Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 124.

<sup>816</sup> Jürgen Weise et al., *Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010*, 22.

<sup>817</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 31 et seq.

<sup>818</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>819</sup> *ibid.*, 27-28.

<sup>820</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>821</sup> Other areas reviewed included procurement and IT; however, as these areas are less relevant to this study, the detailed mentioning has been omitted; cf. *ibid.*, 43.

<sup>822</sup> *Bericht des Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr zum Prüfungsauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010*.

*Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten* by 40,000 without jeopardising the *Bundeswehr*'s capabilities.<sup>823</sup> In his final report, the Inspector General emphasised that the intentions behind this number were motivated by financial constraints.<sup>824</sup> Although elaborating that Germany's security environment, international responsibilities and the *Bundeswehr*'s constitutional duty to protect the citizens of Germany first and foremost determined the scope of the *Bundeswehr*'s capabilities, he specifically pointed out that '[t]he implications of the economic and financial crisis will not be without consequences for the *Bundeswehr*'.<sup>825</sup> He explained this statement by highlighting that the defence budget was tied to the federal budget, which had come under severe pressure following the 2008 financial crisis.<sup>826</sup> Consequently, so he argued, it was also the *Bundeswehr*'s responsibility to contribute federal economization measures by realising economies and to remain affordable in the long term.<sup>827</sup>

To promote the demanded reduction of troops, and, therefore, to achieve the aspired savings contributions, the Inspector General suggested five different strategy models.<sup>828</sup> The starting number for each was 250,000, which represented the total number of troops in 2010.<sup>829</sup> This number included 195,000 *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten*, 25,000 voluntary conscripts and 30,000 draftees;<sup>830</sup> reservists were deliberately omitted in this analysis as the Inspector General intended to leave the number of 2,500 mobilised reservist unchanged.<sup>831</sup> From the proposed models, the Inspector General only recommended two, namely, the fourth and the fifth.<sup>832</sup> Both aimed at reducing the total number of troops, however, by different means.<sup>833</sup> Model Four, for instance, advocated the suspension of conscription and constituted the more radical choice as it aspired to cut manpower by 86,500 in total.<sup>834</sup> Model Five, on the other hand, suggested to adhere to the 40,000 reductions goal and

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<sup>823</sup> *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>824</sup> *ibid.*, 16.

<sup>825</sup> *ibid.*, emphasis added. Translated by the author.

<sup>826</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>827</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>828</sup> *ibid.*, 27 et seq.

<sup>829</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>830</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>831</sup> *ibid.*, 55.

<sup>832</sup> While the Inspector General discussed all five models, he did not recommend the other three as he was convinced that implementation was not feasible and (or) productive; *ibid.*, 33 et seq.

<sup>833</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 29.

<sup>834</sup> *ibid.*

proposed to adhere to the *Wehrpflicht* while abolishing the opportunity to serve as voluntary conscripts.<sup>835</sup>

With these two recommendations, the Inspector General gave the government the chance to choose between two strategies that would serve the desired outcome. More importantly, however, by proposing two viable models, he abstained from advocating the suspension of conscription and, therefore, left this decision to elected members of parliament.

#### 4.1.1.2 Envisaged and Implemented Measures

**The Suspension of Conscription.** Although the coalition partners had agreed to adhere to the *Wehrpflicht* and the Inspector General had provided the government with a viable alternative, the *Bundestag* decided on 24 March 2011 to officially suspend conscription as of 01 June 2011;<sup>836</sup> effectively, draft had already been discontinued as of 01 March 2011.<sup>837</sup>

Even though it seems that it took little effort to end the *Wehrpflicht*, this decision stood at the end of a fierce debate spanning several decades.<sup>838</sup> Since reunification, and shortly before 24 March 2011, the Conservatives, as well as the Social Democrats, affirmed their commitment to draft.<sup>839</sup> The Greens' stances, on the other hand, were usually on the other end of the political spectrum; in the early 1990s, they even demanded the disbandment of the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>840</sup> Finally, the Liberals traditionally demanded to stick to the *Wehrpflicht*

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<sup>835</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>836</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, 'Aussetzung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht beschlossen', Deutscher Bundestag, accessed 29 January 2014, [http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/33831649\\_kw12\\_de\\_wehrdienst/](http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/33831649_kw12_de_wehrdienst/).

<sup>837</sup> Although parties from all political camps generally welcomed the suspension of conscription, opposition parties regarded discontinuing of the draft as an arbitrary violation of GG Art. 12a(1) and accused the cabinet accordingly; cf. *ibid.*, and Ulf von Krause, *Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Aussenpolitik* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2013), 331.

<sup>838</sup> This debate has been analysed by consulting the election manifestos of all governing parties from 1990 through 2009.

<sup>839</sup> For instance, in 1998, the Conservatives even proclaimed that a mixed force structure composed of draftees, *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten* was the most suitable structure for the *Bundeswehr* in the years to come; CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, *1998-2002 Wahlplattform*, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Bonn: CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, 1998), 31.

<sup>840</sup> Although remaining critical of the *Bundeswehr*, since 1998 demands were limited to terminating conscription and the downsizing of manpower. Interestingly, after being elected as a junior coalition partner into government in 1998, the party even dropped the conviction that the *Bundeswehr* should not participate in collective military missions and eventually supported transformation efforts in the early 2000s; see, for example, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Grün wirkt! Unser Wahlprogramm 2002-2006*, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Berlin: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2002).



until they suddenly sided with The Greens in 2002.<sup>841</sup>

Considering this controversy, two opposing opinions on conscription had to be balanced during the coalition negotiations of 2009. Keeping the upper hand, the Conservatives successfully made their opinion prevail, and it was agreed to adhere to draft for the simple reason that conscription had been useful in past decades.<sup>842</sup> It is, therefore, hardly surprising that this weak argument did not survive the 2010-CSR's and the Inspector General's suggestions to terminate draft. However, presumably because of the political controversies surrounding the subject, the government managed to end conscription without genuinely eliminating the *Wehrpflicht* from the constitution. Instead of abolishing GG Art. 12a, it has merely been limited by Art. 2 of the German Compulsory Military Service Act, which states that the *Wehrpflicht* is suspended but may be reinstated.<sup>843</sup>

**The 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines.** Based on the experts' reports, and the following suspension of conscription, the newly appointed Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière published the 2011-DPG in May 2011.<sup>844</sup> This document was intended to set the level of ambition for the *Bundeswehr* and was, therefore, thought to also determine the *Bundeswehr*'s new structures and size.<sup>845</sup> However, despite outlining that all of the above were defined by Germany's security environment and her responsibilities in defensive alliances, finances again assumed a pivotal role here.<sup>846</sup> For instance, it was stated that '[...] [d]efence expenditure must be in keeping with the mission of the *Bundeswehr* and with all other government commitments',<sup>847</sup> a statement, which was immediately relativised in

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<sup>841</sup> Even at times when the FDP did not oppose draft, they were the only party to explicitly acknowledge that conscription represented the state's intervention on the decision-making freedom of the individual; cf., F.D.P. Bundesgeschäftsstelle, *Es ist Ihre Wahl: Das Programm der Liberalen zur Bundestagswahl 1998*, Freie Demokratische Partei (Sankt Augustin: liberal-Verlag, 1998), Archiv des Liberalismus, Electronic Archive Signature IN5-40, 101, and FDP Bundesgeschäftsstelle, *Bürgerprogramm 2002: Programm der FDP zur Bundestagswahl 2002*, Freie Demokratische Partei (2002), Archiv des Liberalismus, Electronic Archive Signature IN5-110, 87.

<sup>842</sup> cf. Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 124, and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr*, 10.

<sup>843</sup> In the government's opinion, eliminating conscription from the legislature was not justifiable, as politicians still considered draft an indispensable instrument to augment the force's size on short notice; see, for example, Der Bundesminister, *Eckpunkte für die Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2011), 1.

<sup>844</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*.

<sup>845</sup> *ibid.*, 1.

<sup>846</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>847</sup> *ibid.*, 9, emphasis added.

the same paragraph as authors continued to point out that ‘[...] the defence budget also contributes to the national task of consolidating the federal budget, thus reducing the debt burden of future generations’.<sup>848</sup>

**Planned Redundancies.** Other than merely stating its willingness to contribute to consolidation efforts of the federal budget, the MoD did not specify how it intended to uphold this promise. However, when examining the proposed structural changes, one can infer that economizations were supposed to be achieved primarily through redundancies.<sup>849</sup> As illustrated in Table 4.1, both service members as well as civilian staff were subject to these plans. As regards the former, the *Bundeswehr* was given some leeway as envisaged reductions varied between 65,000 and 90,000. Here, the MoD hoped to achieve the majority of cuts by ceasing draft and by recruiting fewer voluntary conscripts. This measure alone was believed to reduce the total number of troops by 42,500. Moreover, in contrast to civilian staff, which is usually laid-off in costly redundancy schemes, the reduction in troops was planned to be achieved at lower costs by merely terminating draft.

Table 4.1: Total Numbers of MoD Personnel (2010 and Aspired)

	Status (2010)	Aspired Numbers (Maximum)	Aspired Numbers (Preferred)
<b>Total Number of Troops</b>	250,000	185,000	160,000
<b>Total Number of Civilian Employees</b>	104,000	55,000	55,000
<i>Zeit- &amp; Berufssoldaten</i>	195,000	170,000	145,000
<b>Conscripts</b>	30,000	0	0
<b>Volunteer Conscripts</b>	25,000	15,500	12,500
<b>Mobilised Reservists*</b>	2,500	2,500	2,500
*Not included in total.			

Sources: The German Ministry of Defence and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr.

<sup>848</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>849</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Bericht zum Stand der Neuausrichtung der Bundeswehr*, 47-48.

## 4.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure in Context

### 4.1.2.1 Personnel Costs

On the previous pages, it was demonstrated that the MoD intended to realise required economies by implementing redundancies. Considering that personnel costs accounted for approximately 30 per cent of the defence budget, it should be expected that the envisaged cuts in troops and civilian staff would serve the purpose of reducing defence expenditure.<sup>850</sup> As highlighted in Table 4.2, expenditure on salaries fluctuated between 2007 and 2010; however, the general trend shows that these costs tended to increase rather than decrease during this period. At this time, inflation was 1.5 per cent, which partially explains the rise in costs.<sup>851</sup> However, as illustrated in Table 4.3, salaries rose exponentially by 8.8 per cent in 2012 ; a development, which cannot be blamed on inflation. Interestingly, the year after, costs dropped by the same percentage and further declined by a stunning 35.6 per cent in 2014. Thereafter, the increase in salary expenditure stabilised at the contemporary inflation rate.<sup>852</sup>

Table 4.2: Annual Service Members Salaries in Million Euros (2006-2010)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Conscripts &amp; Volunteer Conscripts</b>	427.80	420.50	466.80	466.80	473.70
<b>Reservists</b>	18.40	16.50	18.10	20.30	22.0
<b><i>Zeit- &amp; Berufssoldaten</i></b>	5,353.10	5,492.70	5,616.70	5,835.30	5,818.6
<b>Civilian Employees</b>	4,038.00	3,837.00	3,978.20	3,942.50	3,831.00
<b>Σ</b>	9,837.20	9,766.70	10,079.80	10,264.90	10,145.30
<b>Annual Δ in per cent</b>	n/a*	-0.70	3.20	1.80	-1.20
*Baseline = 2006.					

Source: The German Federal Ministry of Finance, including own calculations.

Although this sudden increase and subsequent substantial decrease appear profound, these developments can be explained by the implementation of the envisaged redundancies.

<sup>850</sup> cf. Stefan Bayer, 'Der Einzelplan 14: Theoretische Bestimmungsgründe und praktische Ausgestaltung des Verteidigungshaushaltes', ed. Ina Wiesner (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), 253 et seq.

<sup>851</sup> OECD, Inflation (CPI) (Indicator).

<sup>852</sup> *ibid.*

Table 4.3: Annual Service Members Salaries in Million Euros (2011-2015)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Volunteer Conscripts</b>	326.60	215.90	128.10	119.30	124.60
<b>Reservists</b>	22.60	22.30	21.10	20.20	21.60
<b>Zeit- &amp; Berufssoldaten</b>	5,910.40	6,084.40	6,147.20	6,201.30	6,297.80
<b>Civilian Employees</b>	3,800.50	4,626.20	3,693.30	95.10	89.90
<b>Σ</b>	10,060.00	10,948.80	9,989.80	6,435.90	6,533.80
<b>Annual Δ in per cent</b>	-0.80	8.80	-8.80	-35.60	1.50

Source: The German Federal Ministry of Finance, including own calculations.

For instance, civilian staff was reduced from 104,000 to 96,600 in 2013;<sup>853</sup> here, the accompanying redundancy scheme first drove up costs, while it subsequently resulted in lower overall costs. Furthermore, salaries for draftees and volunteer conscripts fell by 70 per cent between 2006 and 2015; a development, which must mainly be attributed to the suspension of conscription and the lower hiring numbers of volunteer conscripts.

#### 4.1.2.2 Defence Spending in Real Terms

As part of the post-2008 federal austerity package, the defence budget was to be cut by €8.40 billion.<sup>854</sup> These economies were planned to be realised over the course of four years and consisted of €4.00 billion in savings in the *Bundeswehr*, as well as of cuts worth €4.4 billion in the MoD.<sup>855</sup> Assuming that economies were to be spread equally over this period, the defence budget would have needed to decrease by approximately €2.10 billion annually.

When considering the absolute numbers summarised in Table 4.4, the MoD seemed to have failed this goal in 2011 and 2012 and even increased spending by €0.30 billion and

<sup>853</sup> *Bericht des Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010*, 43.

<sup>854</sup> Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 'Tableau der Sparmaßnahmen'. Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 31 March 2014, [http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche\\_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/2010-06-07-soliden-finanzen-Anlage.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=3](http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/2010-06-07-soliden-finanzen-Anlage.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3).

<sup>855</sup> Interestingly, the Ministry of Finance did not demand €4.00 billion to be cut in the *Bundeswehr per se*, e.g., by merely decreasing procurement costs, but labelled this measure 'Reform of the Armed Forces', thus implying that the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* create aspired savings; cf. *ibid.*

€1.50 billion respectively. Nonetheless, these numbers must be treated with caution as hidden costs have contributed to distorting the defence budget. One factor was the decision to sell off MoD realty to the Institute for Federal Real Estate as of 2011.<sup>856</sup> Although this attempt aimed to concentrate resources and expertise in the appropriate hands within the state apparatus, it consequently meant that the MoD had to pay rent for property it previously owned;<sup>857</sup> therefore, inflating defence expenditure artificially.

Table 4.4: Federal Defence Expenditure (2010-2014)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Federal Expenditure</b>							
In € billions	316.90	313.80	319.40	310.00	296.50	1,277.60	255.50
<b>Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	1.10	2.10	2.00	1.50	0.90	n/a	1.50
<b>Defence Expenditure</b>							
In € billions	31.70	32.00	33.50	33.30	32.40	162.90	32.60
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a*	0.90	4.80	-0.60	-2.70	n/a	0.60
In per cent of Federal Expenditure	10.00	10.20	10.50	10.70	10.90	n/a	10.30
<b>Planned MoD Expenditure</b>							
As planned, in € billions	31.70	29.10	27.00	24.90	22.80	103.90	27.10
*Baseline = 2010.							

Sources: The German Ministry of Finance, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.

While realty is necessary for the MoD and the *Bundeswehr* to carry out their duties, other hidden costs distorting were defence budget is pensions. These account for more than 14.00 per cent of defence expenditure on average.<sup>858</sup> When considering that these payments merely constitute a cost factor without contributing to defence *per se*, this number is quite a burden for the defence budget.<sup>859</sup> The government even shared this reasoning until 2005, when pensions had traditionally been summarised in Budget Section 33, *Versorgung*,

<sup>856</sup> Bundesrechnungshof, *Bemerkungen 2013: Zur Haushalts- und Wirtschaftsführung des Bundes* (Bonn: Bundesrechnungshof, 2013), 5-6.

<sup>857</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>858</sup> Based on expenditure between 2007 and 2017; cf. Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 'Die Struktur des Bundeshaushaltes', Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 15 January 2016, <https://www.bundeshaushalt-info.de>, and Stefan Bayer, 'Der Einzelplan 14: Theoretische Bestimmungsgründe und praktische Ausgestaltung des Verteidigungshaushaltes', 253-255.

<sup>859</sup> cf. *ibid.*

which included pensions for all branches of government.<sup>860</sup> This, however, changed as of 2006, when the individual branches of government were suddenly required to finance pension payments for their former staff from their budgets. Again, a reallocation of funds and responsibilities worked as a disadvantage for the MoD.

To compensate for these distortions, Bayer has argued to deduct pension payments from defence spending.<sup>861</sup> Although the author basically agreed with Bayer's argument, she decided not to deduct these costs as they have to be paid by some branch of government anyhow. Nevertheless, to get a better understanding of expenditure in real terms, MoD spending was examined in the light of inflation. As illustrated in Table 4.4, total defence spending was €32.6 billion on average between 2010 and 2015. When factoring in inflation and the aspired economies of €2.10 billion annually, defence expenditure should not have exceeded €27.5 billion on average per annum. This suggests that the MoD, on average, fell €5.10 billion short of the stipulated savings goal. Moreover, this also implies that the achieved economies described in Table 4.2 were only of marginal effect as regards overall defence spending.

### **4.1.3 The Security Environment**

#### **4.1.3.1 Territorial and Ideological Security Environment**

In addition to examining financial aspects, evaluating the contemporary security environment was deemed vital for assessing reserve forces reforms. Therefore, Germany's territorial and ideological security environments in 2010 are explored on the following pages. As previously mentioned, a country's geographical location and political allegiance are essential in determining its territorial security environment. As regards geography, Germany is a semi-landlocked country with access to the North and Baltic Sea in the north.<sup>862</sup> Both land and sea border are with allied or friendly countries. Moreover, except for neutral Switzerland in the south, all neighbouring countries are EU members and

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<sup>860</sup> cf. Pre-2006 federal budgets: Sections 14, and 33.

<sup>861</sup> Stefan Bayer, 'Der Einzelplan 14: Theoretische Bestimmungsgründe und praktische Ausgestaltung des Verteidigungshaushaltes', 253-255.

<sup>862</sup> cf. Central Intelligence Agency, 'The World Fact Book: Germany'.

four of the six are even in NATO.<sup>863</sup> In contrast to the Cold War, when countries of the Warsaw Pact were directly bordering Germany, this post-2008 constellation suggests that an imminent attack with conventional means is improbable. In contrast to Britain, where the government perceived defensive alliances as a tool to shape the world, these international organisations assume a dominant role in Germany's strategic thinking.<sup>864</sup> In the 2011-DPG, Germany defined her national security strategy based on her membership in these alliances and deemed them crucial for her national security.<sup>865</sup> Moreover, the government seemed to be convinced that in today's complex security environment, individual countries cannot provide sufficient levels of security for their citizens alone but are depended on international military co-operation.<sup>866</sup>

In addition to the government's stance, national legislation makes memberships imperative. As stated in GG Art. 87a(2), *Bundeswehr* troops can merely be deployed for national defence, e.g., when German territory is under attack from a foreign aggressor. Until 1994, the government strictly adhered to this notion, why administrations largely abstained from engaging in international conflicts;<sup>867</sup> even when missions were conducted collectively under NATO command.<sup>868</sup> This strict interpretation of GG Art. 87a(2) was only discarded in 1994 when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the GG Art. 24(2) permits the deployment of *Bundeswehr* troops under the umbrella of defensive alliances when the majority of the *Bundestag* consents;<sup>869</sup> however, unilateral overseas deployments remained illegal.<sup>870</sup> It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the MoD has emphasised that Germany's engagement in international conflicts be limited to defensive alliances' missions.<sup>871</sup>

While this approach makes sense as regards national legislation, it also poses a threat as Germany is perceived as a part of defensive alliances whose members also engage in overseas deployments without the UN's consent, e.g., the United States' missions in Iraq.

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<sup>863</sup> European Union, 'Countries', and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 'NATO Member Countries'.

<sup>864</sup> cf. German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 6-8.

<sup>865</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>866</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>867</sup> cf. Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris (2005), *50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005*, 116.

<sup>868</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>869</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>870</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>871</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 5-8.

Therefore, although not participating, Germany is also a potential target for the adversaries fought by her international partners.

#### 4.1.3.2 Major Military Commitments

In general, military commitments are a highly controversial topic in Germany; even the ones fought in the context of joint deployments. This controversy mainly came to light in the campaign for the general election of 2002.<sup>872</sup> At the time, the United States was trying to convince her allies to join her in the attempt to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq.<sup>873</sup> During the campaign, both the Conservatives and Liberals expressed their dismay as regards military intervention in Iraq;<sup>874</sup> however, they affirmed their full support of the United States in case a mission was to be conducted based on a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution.<sup>875</sup> The Social Democrats and The Greens, on the other hand, went as far as to state that they would reject sending *Bundeswehr* troops to Iraq in any case, even if the United States requested support based on a UNSC resolution.<sup>876</sup>

**Afghanistan.** Despite these political disputes and the public's aversion to war, Germany was engaged in one major armed conflict at the time the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* was planned, namely, in Afghanistan.<sup>877</sup> Coinciding with the review process, the mission reached its peak as regards Germany's contribution of troops and costs between 2010 and 2012. Then, 5,350 service members, including approximately 535 reservists, served in Afghanistan and expenditure reached an annual average of €1.20 billion.<sup>878</sup> In total,

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<sup>872</sup> cf. Matthias Mader, 'Bevölkerungseinstellungen zu Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr', 123-124.

<sup>873</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>874</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>875</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>876</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>877</sup> Based on this anti-war ticket, which apparently struck a nerve with the general public, and due to the conservative candidate's lack of empathy for the victims of a major flood Gerhard Schröder (Social Democrats) won the 2002 general election.; *ibid.*, 96-97, and Citha D. Maaß, 'Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr', *SWP-Studie S 27*, (2007): 78-87, accessed 07 March 2017, [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2007\\_S27\\_mrs\\_ks.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2007_S27_mrs_ks.pdf), 78, 'Nach dem Wahlsieg: Bush hat Schröders Entschuldigung nicht akzeptiert', *Spiegel Online*, 23 September 2002, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nach-dem-wahlsieg-bush-hat-schroeders-entschuldigung-nicht-akzeptiert-a-215312.html>, 23 December 2017, and Michael Stürmer, 'Als Schröder Stoiber im Hochwasser versenkte', *Welt*, <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article108607179/Als-Schroeder-Stoiber-im-Hochwasser-versenkte.html>, 23 December 2017.

<sup>878</sup> 'Aus der aktuellen "Loyal": Profis der Reserve', *Reservistenverband*, 2014, accessed 05 January 2015, <https://www.reservistenverband.de/Archiv?menu=0299&newsid=28691>, including own calculations,



the engagement in NATO's ISAF mission lasted from 2002 through 2014 and was subsequently replaced in 2015 by NATO's Operation Resolute Support.<sup>879</sup> To this mission, the *Bundeswehr* currently contributes 1,136 troops including 66 reservists;<sup>880</sup> a number, which constitutes a decline in reservists' deployment from ten per cent to nearly six per cent.<sup>881</sup>

**The Nature of the Commitment.** Being stationed in Afghanistan's north, the *Bundeswehr*, at first, operated in a slightly more stable environment than her NATO partners in the south.<sup>882</sup> However, conditions gradually worsened, why the contingent of troops was more than doubled from the initial 1,200 to 3,000 in 2006.<sup>883</sup> In addition to the increasing tension, the operation's *de facto* leader, the United States, but also other allies, began to vehemently express their demands for the *Bundeswehr* to shift its focus from mere supportive contributions to actively engaging in combat.<sup>884</sup> While this request was certainly warranted, it posed quite a challenge to the government as certain German Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) had announced that they would withdraw from Afghanistan if the advertised humanitarian character of the mission should change to emphasising combat.<sup>885</sup> Therefore, complete compliance with allies' demands would potentially have jeopardised the success of ongoing civil and developmental projects.<sup>886</sup> To cater to both allied and domestic expectations, the MoD went for the middle ground and started focusing on developing and conducting a sophisticated training course for local Afghan police forces in addition to increasing Germany's contribution to fighting Afghan

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and '15 Jahre Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan', bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016, accessed 19 December 2016, <https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verteidigungspolitik/238332/15-jahre-afghanistan-einsatz>, including own calculations.

<sup>879</sup> *ibid.*, and cf. Citha D. Maaß, 'Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr'.

<sup>880</sup> Status: 02 July 2018; Bundeswehr, 'Einsatzzahlen - die Stärke der deutschen Kontingente', Bundeswehr, 2018, accessed June 03 2018, [https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/einsaetze/ueberblick/zahlen/!ut/p/z1/hY4xD4IwFIR\\_iwNrXwMR0a0qi8HEBInQxRSoBVMpKZX6861hMpF427v33eWAQg60Y2MrmGIVx6S7Cxpel1FyTvy17-\\_TdIdJFodZnJIAhyFc\\_gHUvfGMCIa05lC4jtVsx9FBQIHe2cheqFfaSG4Qqz4LoWhYV0t-UhWZjANQIVU5TSddGUQCqOY3rrlGT-3sxph-2HjYw9ZaJJQSkqOae\\_hXoIGDgfwLhP6RWxws5ZiQxRtZISDo/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922DSSC0AUE6UESA30M0](https://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/start/einsaetze/ueberblick/zahlen/!ut/p/z1/hY4xD4IwFIR_iwNrXwMR0a0qi8HEBInQxRSoBVMpKZX6861hMpF427v33eWAQg60Y2MrmGIVx6S7Cxpel1FyTvy17-_TdIdJFodZnJIAhyFc_gHUvfGMCIa05lC4jtVsx9FBQIHe2cheqFfaSG4Qqz4LoWhYV0t-UhWZjANQIVU5TSddGUQCqOY3rrlGT-3sxph-2HjYw9ZaJJQSkqOae_hXoIGDgfwLhP6RWxws5ZiQxRtZISDo/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922DSSC0AUE6UESA30M0).

<sup>881</sup> *ibid.*, including own calculations.

<sup>882</sup> Citha D. Maaß, 'Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr', 81.

<sup>883</sup> '15 Jahre Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan', bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.

<sup>884</sup> Citha D. Maaß, 'Die Afghanistan-Mission der Bundeswehr', 81, and 83.

<sup>885</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 84.

<sup>886</sup> *ibid.*, 83-84.

resistant forces.<sup>887</sup>

**Influence on the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*.** Constituting the first major overseas deployments of *Bundeswehr* troops in postwar Germany, the Afghanistan mission has truly been a turning point for the parliament, the public and the *Bundeswehr* alike. However, while politicians and civil society quarrelled at home over the necessity of the mission and the scope of contribution, service members in the theatre had to fulfil their duties based on outdated structures and strategies.

As argued by Wiesner, such a constellation can be an impetus for adapting structures and training as overseas deployments tend to uncover the shortcomings in defence postures.<sup>888</sup>

In the case of the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*, this reasoning holds true when revisiting Table 4.1. Here, it was highlighted that emphasis shifted from a conscription-based *Bundeswehr* to an all-volunteer force which was eventually supposed to be comprised of 90 per cent *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten*. Moreover, by suspending conscription and hiring significantly less voluntary conscripts, resources and training can be used almost exclusively on experienced service members; an approach, which has the potential to increase proficiency and the likelihood of successful engagements in global theatres.

Notwithstanding the structural adaptations, these cannot solely be attributed to the Afghanistan mission. These shortcomings have already been acknowledged in 2004 when then-Defence Minister Peter Struck advocated a *Bundeswehrreform* aiming to increase capabilities for the ongoing ISAF operation.<sup>889</sup> Only after the occurrence of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent financial constraints, the government seemed to have had the courage to profoundly change the *Bundeswehr*'s structures to finally cater to a mission that had been going on for more than eight years.

#### 4.1.3.3 Anticipated Threats

**Globalisation and New Technologies.** While the Afghanistan mission played a minor role in envisaging the new *Bundeswehr* structures, the MoD pointed out that Germany's

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<sup>887</sup> *ibid.*, 83.

<sup>888</sup> cf. Ina Wiesner, 'Die Transformation der Bundeswehr in Deutschland', eds. Thomas Jäger, and Ralph Thiele, (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 100-101.

<sup>889</sup> Peter Struck, *Grundzüge der Konzeption der Bundeswehr*, 12.

security environment consisted of additional threats that needed to be taken into account. For instance, when consulting the 2011-DPG, it appears that globalisation was a central security concern for the German government.<sup>890</sup> Although this development was originally judged to be favourable as it has the potential to spread progress and prosperity around the globe, negative implications were anxiously observed.<sup>891</sup> One factor mentioned in this context is organised crime, which is believed to have risen significantly by piggybacking on the increased flow of goods, capital and people.<sup>892</sup> Moreover, globalisation is attributed with the accelerated development and distribution of new technologies, which, in turn, has also led to a great public dependency on the former.<sup>893</sup> Therefore, cyber attacks were specifically mentioned as a novel threat to Germany.<sup>894</sup>

**Globalisation and Emerging Powers.** In addition to these developments, globalisation accompanying shifts in the political equilibrium were rated as particularly worrying.<sup>895</sup> Here, it is believed that the behaviour and attitudes of newly emerging regional and global powers cannot be anticipated as they do not have a long-standing history of involvement in the international community.<sup>896</sup> Moreover, it was argued that with the rise of economic power, e.g., in China, far-reaching political decisions are made that are outside the sphere of European influence;<sup>897</sup> therefore, creating a high degree of uncertainty for national security strategists.

**Failed States and Climate Change.** While globalisation is described in somewhat abstract terms, threats emerging from the increasing number of failing states and climate

<sup>890</sup> cf. German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 1.

<sup>891</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>892</sup> cf. Patrick Ernst Sensburg, 'Die neue Sicherheitslage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Fließende Grenzen von innerer und äußerer Sicherheit', ed. Patrick Ernst Sensburg (Frankfurt Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2010), 7 et seq.

<sup>893</sup> *ibid.*, 2-3, and SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 'Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung: Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch', accessed 26 April 2014, [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt\\_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhpol\\_SWP\\_GMF\\_2013.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/DeutAussenSicherhpol_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf), 2.

<sup>894</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 2.

<sup>895</sup> Heinrich Kreft, 'Deutschland, Europa und der Aufstieg der neuen Gestaltungsmächte' (bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013), accessed 11 April 2014, <http://www.bpb.de/apuz/173793/deutschland-europa-und-die-neuen-gestaltungsmaechte>.

<sup>896</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>897</sup> *ibid.*

change are already at Germany's doorstep.<sup>898</sup> Starting in 2015, Germany has experienced a substantial influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and North African countries. In total, 1.3 million asylum seekers have crossed the border between 2015 and 2017, which represents an increase of 292 per cent in comparison to 2012 through 2014.<sup>899</sup> Although this development seems surprising at first, the MoD had already anticipated this situation in 2011 by pointing out that war and climate change may cause mass migration towards Europe.<sup>900</sup>

Besides, the potential rise of terrorism has been attributed to failed states. For instance, the MoD has argued in the 2011-DPG that political instability and (or) power vacuums may enable terrorist organisations to foster their networks and to plan future attacks in the West.<sup>901</sup> As predicted by the government, both scenarios have become a reality. As of 2013, the so-called Islamic State has taken root in numbers Arab countries, including Syria and Iraq.<sup>902</sup> Moreover, between 2015 and 2017, the number of terror attacks in Europe has surged to 26, with Germany being a target in four.<sup>903</sup>

**Political Challenges.** Even though the government was able to predict specific developments, the ability to tackle them is more complicated. As seen above, these relatively novel threats make distinguishing between external and internal threats merely impossible.<sup>904</sup> While one can argue that this distinction is of secondary importance when it comes to protecting civilians, it is quite important in the legal context. As stated in GG Art. 73(1), the federal government in Berlin is responsible for defence on the national level; however, it has only limited jurisdiction when it comes to domestic security. Here, the *Grundgesetz*

<sup>898</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 1.

<sup>899</sup> bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 'Zahlen zu Asyl in Deutschland', bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, accessed 08 June 2018, <https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/flucht/218788/zahlen-zu-asyl-in-deutschland#Antraege>, including own calculations.

<sup>900</sup> cf. German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 2-3, and SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 'Neue Macht, Neue Verantwortung: Elemente einer deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik für eine Welt im Umbruch', 33.

<sup>901</sup> German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 2-3.

<sup>902</sup> 'Chronologie: Der syrische Bürgerkrieg im Überblick', *Zeit Online*, 12 April 2018, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/chronologie-der-syrische-buergerkrieg-im-ueberblick-1.2652348>, 12 April 2018.

<sup>903</sup> 'Terroranschläge in Europa seit 2015'.

<sup>904</sup> cf. Herfried Münkler, 'Die neue Sicherheitslage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', ed. Patrick Ernst Sensburg (Frankfurt Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2010), 99-105, and Ingo Wolf, 'Die Grenzen innerer und äußerer Sicherheit im föderalen System Deutschlands', ed. Patrick Ernst Sensburg (Frankfurt Main: Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, 2010), 19.

specifically emphasises that the federal government, and, therefore, the *Bundeswehr* cannot unilaterally take action but must closely collaborate with and work under the leadership of the individual *Bundesland*'s civilian forces, e.g., the police. While this article was thought to aid in preventing a military coup and avoiding the concentration of power in the hands of the parliament in Berlin, it makes dealing with the threats as mentioned earlier somewhat more challenging.

## 4.2 The 2012 Conception of Reserve

### 4.2.1 Revised Structures for Homeland Defence

#### 4.2.1.1 Commitments and Responsibilities

In October 2010, authors of the 2010-CSR had recommended to complement the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* with a separate review of the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve force.<sup>905</sup> In response to this suggestions, the 2012-COR was published less than two years later in February 2012.<sup>906</sup> Primarily building on the organisational foundation of the 2003 Conception for Reservists (2003-CFR), which was implemented between 2003 and 2009, the MoD decided to expand reservists' responsibilities in both the military and the societal sphere.<sup>907</sup>

**Definition and Term of Commitment.** Before delving into the specifics of the 2012-COR, however, the term reservist should be defined first. In Germany, the Legal Status of Reservists Act (LSRA), as well as the Legal Status of Military Personnel Act (LSMPA) Art. 59 et seq., are concerned with matters of the reserve. For instance, in LSRA Art. 1(1) and LSMPA Art 59(2) the law defines which group of people are considered reservists: upon completion of their term (*Zeitsoldaten*) or retirement (*Berufssoldaten*), former service members automatically enter the reserve if they had served for a minimum of two years. In peacetime, a reservist may be called for duty until s/he turns 45;<sup>908</sup> however, former

<sup>905</sup> Jürgen Weise et al., *Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr Oktober 2010*, 43.

<sup>906</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*.

<sup>907</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>908</sup> LSRA Art. 1(1), and LSMPA Art 59(2).

service members may request in writing to be considered for duty until they reach 65 years of age.<sup>909</sup> In the case of national defence, e.g., war or rising tensions at the borders, reservists are required to be ready to serve until they are 60.<sup>910</sup>

**Training and Military Commitments.** Depending on the rank one held as a *Zeit-* or *Berufssoldat*, training commitments vary between a maximum of six months (all ranks), nine months (non-commissioned officers) and 12 months (commissioned officers).<sup>911</sup> Beyond training, which is not necessarily held periodically, reservists may be called for duty in regular *Bundeswehr* units.<sup>912</sup> Here, they serve in any role within the *Bundeswehr*'s organisation,<sup>913</sup> in total, 2,500 posts in regular units are assigned to reservists annually.<sup>914</sup> In general, the MoD can only mobilise reservists to carry out military duties in *Bundeswehr* departments that are based in Germany.<sup>915</sup> If a reservist wants to serve abroad, e.g., in Afghanistan, s/he has to request this assignment specifically;<sup>916</sup> these kinds of deployments are not supposed to exceed seven months.<sup>917</sup>

**Non-Military Responsibilities.** Outside military structures, reservists may be mobilised to help in domestic emergencies such as natural disasters for a maximum of three consecutive months.<sup>918</sup> However, in this case, neither the *Bundestag* nor the MoD can unilaterally decide to deploy troops.<sup>919</sup> Due to Germany's federalist structure, the handling of regional crises are in the jurisdiction of the *Bundesländer*;<sup>920</sup> only when specifically requested by the *Bundesland*'s government, reservists may support local crisis relief units.<sup>921</sup> Besides domestic crisis aid, reservists may also be mobilised and deployed to lend sup-

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<sup>909</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>910</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>911</sup> *ibid.*, Art. 61.

<sup>912</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 3.

<sup>913</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>914</sup> Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, 'Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangelegenheiten der Bundeswehr', *Reserve Aktuell*, No 5 (2013): 6.

<sup>915</sup> *ibid.*, Art. 60.

<sup>916</sup> LSMPA Art. 62(2).

<sup>917</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>918</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 3, and LSMPA Art. 63(2).

<sup>919</sup> LSMPA Art. 63(1).

<sup>920</sup> GG Art. 35.

<sup>921</sup> *ibid.*

port in humanitarian crises abroad;<sup>922</sup> again, deployment is limited to three consecutive months.<sup>923</sup>

Further to carrying out military and humanitarian duties when mobilised, non-mobilised reservists are also required to volunteer for the *Bundeswehr*. Here, the 2012-COR explicitly highlights their role of agents of the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>924</sup> In this role, they are supposed to continually try to foster the ties between the armed forces and civil society.<sup>925</sup> They may be entitled to compensation for their efforts, e.g. when giving speeches or participating in official *Bundeswehr* events;<sup>926</sup> this includes monthly payments of up to €160.00 and the supply of service clothing, as well as the provision of relevant materials, free of charge.<sup>927</sup>

***Ungediente in the Reserve.*** Besides former service members, LSRA Art. 1(2) states that *Ungediente* may become reservists; however, they specifically have to enlist for reserve duty.<sup>928</sup> This article supports the MoD's intention to increasingly recruit *Ungediente* for the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve.<sup>929</sup> As emphasised in the 2012-COR, the MoD aims to motivate *Ungediente* to join the reserve in specialists' roles to broaden the *Bundeswehr*'s scope of capabilities without having to invest in intensive and costly training.<sup>930</sup> Nevertheless, even unskilled *Ungediente* are being targeted by the *Bundeswehr*'s recruitment team. A pilot course called *Allgemeine Grundausbildung* is being held in Bavaria since 2017, which provides modular basic military training on weekends for interested *Ungediente*;<sup>931</sup> reservists teach this course.

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<sup>922</sup> LSMPA Art. 63a.

<sup>923</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>924</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 3.

<sup>925</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>926</sup> LSRA Art. 7.

<sup>927</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>928</sup> cf. LSRA Art. 1(2).

<sup>929</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 3.

<sup>930</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>931</sup> cf. Bundeswehr. 'Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr', Die Dienststellen der Streitkräftebasis, accessed 14 November 2017, [http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/start/terraufg/kdoterraufgbw/!ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beK4KvDReiqcalidDFFKwFU1pSKvj5YpxMNJ7tPHOAQQpM866S3FVGczXwjE3Pqzk9Un\\_h-3QbjnG9OySHfRwg4hhO\\_wJssPEHloTkLiAbNmY\\_N-IAEmDABrjD9IY65RwhBevh5CVXF-U2JsiegsbYFKZ\\_H090vIkLoFZcRVWWHK3glw617RLDz3s-55IY6QSpDC1h98qpWkdpJ9JaOq0x0moOhqNnuDpIDg!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922LM510INRSRPG400G4](http://www.kommando.streitkraeftebasis.de/portal/a/kdoskb/start/terraufg/kdoterraufgbw/!ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beK4KvDReiqcalidDFFKwFU1pSKvj5YpxMNJ7tPHOAQQpM866S3FVGczXwjE3Pqzk9Un_h-3QbjnG9OySHfRwg4hhO_wJssPEHloTkLiAbNmY_N-IAEmDABrjD9IY65RwhBevh5CVXF-U2JsiegsbYFKZ_H090vIkLoFZcRVWWHK3glw617RLDz3s-55IY6QSpDC1h98qpWkdpJ9JaOq0x0moOhqNnuDpIDg!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922LM510INRSRPG400G4).

#### 4.2.1.2 Reservists in Regular *Bundeswehr* Units

In total, the 2012-COR requires 58,580 reservists to be trained for duty.<sup>932</sup> Training is conducted to qualify reservists to serve in two different roles within regular *Bundeswehr* units.<sup>933</sup> First, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, a total of 26,700 reservists is prepared to fill positions that are normally held by *Zeit-* or *Berufssoldaten*.<sup>934</sup> These posts include those that are vacant due to service members' deployments or mere shortage in manpower.<sup>935</sup> These positions are filled from a pool of reservists called the personnel reserve.<sup>936</sup> These posts have not specifically been created for reservists;<sup>937</sup> therefore, the personnel reserve has somewhat of a supplemental character as reservists mirror regular troops' responsibilities.<sup>938</sup> Nevertheless, serving in these positions is indispensable as reservists contribute to the *Bundeswehr*'s ability to maintain current levels of operation.<sup>939</sup>

In addition to their supplementary roles, reservists also hold posts that have been designed for reservists only;<sup>940</sup> this pillar of the reserve is called the reinforcement reserve.<sup>941</sup> As seen in Figure 4.1, a total of 31,880 reservists comprise this personnel pool.<sup>942</sup> These posts are usually filled with reservists that have acquired skills that the *Bundeswehr* does not possess at all or only to insufficient levels.<sup>943</sup> Employing reservists in these roles, therefore, expands the *Bundeswehr*'s abilities and allows to cover the full required spectrum of capabilities.<sup>944</sup>

Both the personnel and reinforcement reserve are designed to ensure prompt support for regular units and posts are allocated depending on the individual reservist's skills and

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<sup>932</sup> Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, 'Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangelegenheiten der Bundeswehr', 6.

<sup>933</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>934</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>935</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>936</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 11.

<sup>937</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>938</sup> cf. Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, 'Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangelegenheiten der Bundeswehr', 5-6.

<sup>939</sup> *ibid.*, 6.

<sup>940</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>941</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>942</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 11.


<sup>943</sup> Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, 'Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangelegenheiten der Bundeswehr', 6.

<sup>944</sup> cf. *ibid.*



knowledge.<sup>945</sup> On average, the federal budget assigns 2,500 posts annually to reservists, who then serve alongside *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten*.<sup>946</sup> As the obligation to serve is limited, one post is held by several reservists throughout the year.

Figure 4.1: Reservists in Regular *Bundeswehr* Units



Source: Reserve Aktuell.

#### 4.2.1.3 The Three Pillars of the Reserve

Reservists carrying out their duties in the personnel or the reinforcement reserve are usually categorised as members of the troop reserve.<sup>947</sup> Moreover, they are commonly linked to a specific regular unit.<sup>948</sup> As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the troop reserve is one of three pillars that together comprise the *Bundeswehr* reserve. The second pillar is the so-called general reserve.<sup>949</sup> It constitutes a pool of reservists, who have not been mobilised.<sup>950</sup> Its purpose is to ensure that the *Bundeswehr* has a sufficient number of troops at its disposal in the long term.<sup>951</sup> Members of this category usually carry out the duty of serving as agents of the *Bundeswehr* in society or other volunteer work.<sup>952</sup> The third pillar is the territorial reserve;<sup>953</sup> reservists in this category usually have a strong connection to a specific region and are employed to foster civil-military co-operation.<sup>954</sup> The territorial reserve is further seen to enable medium term augmentation of the *Bundeswehr*. Moreover,

<sup>945</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 27-28.

<sup>946</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 'Haushaltsrechnung und Vermögensrechnung des Bundes', Bundesministerium der Finanzen, accessed 28 September 2014, [http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche\\_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/Haushalts\\_und\\_Vermögensrechnungen\\_des\\_Bundes/haushalts\\_vermoegensrechnungen\\_des\\_bundes.html](http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Web/DE/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Bundeshaushalt/Haushalts_und_Vermögensrechnungen_des_Bundes/haushalts_vermoegensrechnungen_des_bundes.html).

<sup>947</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 10.

<sup>948</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>949</sup> *ibid.*, 11.

<sup>950</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>951</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 28.


<sup>952</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>953</sup> *ibid.*, 10.

<sup>954</sup> *ibid.*, 28.

since the implementation of the 2012-COR, the territorial reserve is also home to the newly created RSSU; therefore, the territorial reserve is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Figure 4.2: The Pillars of the Reserve



Source: Reserve Aktuell.

#### 4.2.1.4 Filling the Gap: Reservists and Homeland Defence

**The Conscription Gap.** Still in 2011, the government has emphasised that the *Bundeswehr*'s primary duty is homeland defence, namely, the protection of German citizens during an armed conflict aiming to harm the nation's territorial integrity.<sup>955</sup> While this is undoubtedly the most important responsibility for national armed forces, reality shows a different *de facto* responsibilities focus. As previously discussed, the *Bundeswehr* has been more actively engaged in overseas deployments, namely, in Afghanistan since 2002. In doing so, resources, especially those of *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten*, became bound in international commitments. When draft was still enforced, the MoD could rely on a vast pool of former conscripts to ensure territorial defence in case of emergencies;<sup>956</sup> however, with the suspension of conscription in 2011, the MoD lost this valuable instrument. To prevent the emergence of a capabilities gap, the 2012-COR, therefore, specifically assigned the responsibility for homeland defence to the territorial reserve;<sup>957</sup> here, the establishment of the RSSU concept was believed to aid this responsibility.<sup>958</sup>

<sup>955</sup> cf. German Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy Guidelines*, 8.

<sup>956</sup> Thomas Wollney, 'Enge Integration der Reserve in aktive Strukturen', ed. Hans Frank (Hamburg: Mittler, 2005), 80.

<sup>957</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 3 and 10.

<sup>958</sup> *ibid.*

**What is Homeland Defence?** Before explaining the RSSU in detail, it is necessary to explore how the MoD defined homeland defence. Traditionally, particularly until 2012, the government referred to homeland defence as *Landesverteidigung*. As of the 2012-COR, however, this term was replaced by the word *Heimatschutz*.<sup>959</sup> Although these expressions are generally interchangeable, authors of the 2012-COR have specified that the latter entails duties beyond the protection of the national territory.<sup>960</sup> In particular, the 2012-COR mentions military obligations that can be carried out on German soil. These include aerial and naval surveillance, securing critical infrastructure in case of terror or cyber attacks, as well as assistance to civilian forces, e.g., the police.<sup>961</sup> According to the MoD, assigning these duties to the reserve takes pressure off regular troops, who then do not have to cater to both *Heimatschutz* and foreign commitments.<sup>962</sup>

**Civil-Military Co-Operation.** In addition to these purely military assignments, the 2012-COR emphasises reservists' increasing role in civil-military co-operation.<sup>963</sup> Here, reservists closely collaborate with civilian organisations such as the police, the fire department and other crisis relief units.<sup>964</sup> Co-operation is not limited to crisis situations but already begins at the planning stage and may include consulting activities and training.<sup>965</sup> While carrying out these tasks, reservists are mobilised for duty and are integrated into the state, county or district commands.<sup>966</sup>

**Joint Support Service and the Territorial Reserve.** On the domestic level, the *Bundeswehr* is organised in 16 state, 33 county and 337 district commands.<sup>967</sup> As seen in Figure 4.3, the state commands are instructed by the *Bundeswehr* Command for Territorial Tasks (BCTT), which is part of the Joint Support Service.<sup>968</sup> The BCTT is located in Berlin

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<sup>959</sup> cf., for example, *ibid.*, 6.

<sup>960</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>961</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>962</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>963</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>964</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>965</sup> *ibid.*


<sup>966</sup> cf. Bundeswehr. 'Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr'.

<sup>967</sup> cf. *ibid.*, including own calculations.

<sup>968</sup> *ibid.*

from where all activities are coordinated.<sup>969</sup> The reservists serving in these commands are mobilised from the territorial reserve and may be assigned to either a state, county or district command.<sup>970</sup>

Figure 4.3: Command Structure and Organisation



Source: Joint Support Service.

Due to these structures, the *Bundeswehr* is present in every region of Germany. This approach is believed to have three significant advantages; first, if needed, *Bundeswehr* support can be provided promptly and anywhere in Germany.<sup>971</sup> Second, reservists who have the opportunity to serve close to home are more inclined to volunteer beyond their obligations as they do not have to travel a long distance to fulfil their duties.<sup>972</sup> Third, by recruiting locals, civilian-military co-operation is more efficient as reservists often both know their civilian counterparts personally and have a profound knowledge of their area of operation.<sup>973</sup>

#### 4.2.1.5 Regional Security and Support Units

**Purpose, Benefits and Obligations.** Building on this local character, the 2012-COR did strengthen not only reservists' work in the state, county and district commands but

<sup>969</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>970</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>971</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 28.

<sup>972</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>973</sup> *ibid.*

also introduced a new unit concerned with homeland defence, namely, the RSSU. While reservists working under the mentioned commands have to be mobilised and are assigned to specific posts, the RSSU are composed of non-mobilised reservists who volunteer for military duties.<sup>974</sup> By being attached to a regular parent unit, they complement and strengthen their regular counterparts' activities in the respective regions.<sup>975</sup> On the other hand, RSSU reservists also benefit from their service as they receive extra military training where they acquire additional skills.<sup>976</sup> Moreover, with about ten to 15 days of annual mandatory training and (or) service and the opportunity to serve close to home, the MoD hopes to motivate more reservists to get involved in the a RSSU.<sup>977</sup>

**Structures and Obligations.** In general, by establishing the RSSU, the MoD has created an additional tool to strengthen homeland defence and, therefore, to compensate for the lack of conscripts. The latter was particularly believed to be achieved through the RSSU' presence in all 16 *Bundesländer*.<sup>978</sup> Originally, the 2012-COR envisaged the establishment of one RSSU with 100 troops per *Bundesland*, which would have added up to 1,600 troops.<sup>979</sup> As illustrated in Table 4.5, this number was exceeded by more than a 1,000 by 2017 already. However, not all *Bundesländer* have established a RSSU yet.

For instance, Hamburg is still working on recruiting reservists and building the relevant structures.<sup>980</sup> Moreover, especially in the East, namely, in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Thuringia, recruitment is less successful.<sup>981</sup>

## 4.2.2 Societal Roles and Recruitment

### 4.2.2.1 Replacing Conscripts in the Societal Sphere

**Conscripts and Democratic Control.** The previous segment focused on examining the changing military roles and structures of Germany's reserve force after the introduction of

<sup>974</sup> cf. Bundeswehr. 'Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr'.

<sup>975</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>976</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 10 et seq.

<sup>977</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>978</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>979</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>980</sup> cf. Table 4.5.

<sup>981</sup> Bundeswehr. 'Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr'.

Table 4.5: Commands and RSSU Reservists Numbers (Status: 12/2017)

<i>Bundesland</i>	County/District Commands	Reservists Posts in RSSUs
Baden-Württemberg	4/44	300
Bavaria	7/96	700
Berlin	n/a	128
Brandenburg	4/14	100
Bremen	n/a	110
Hamburg	n/a	n.s.
Hesse	3/26	200
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania	0/8	100
Lower Saxony	6/59	300
North Rhine-Westphalia	5/54	327
Rhineland-Palatinate	n.s.	100
Saarland	n.s.	100
Saxony	3/13	100
Saxony-Anhalt	n.s.	110
Schleswig-Holstein	n.s.	101
Thuringia	1/23	100
<b>Total</b>	33/337	2,686

Source: Joint Support Service.

the 2012-COR. By evaluating these aspects, it has been demonstrated how the government intended to use reservists to close structural gaps left by the termination of draft. However, according to prevailing political and public opinion, conscripts did not fulfil only military duties but also assumed critical societal roles.<sup>982</sup> These responsibilities were mostly twofold; namely, conscripts acted as agents of the *Bundeswehr* in an intermediary role to society while they also imported non-military values to the armed forces.<sup>983</sup> In theory, the concept of mutual influence of the military and civilian sphere was thought to foster democratic control over the *Bundeswehr* while creating understanding for defence related issues within society. To a certain extent, this reasoning holds true in practice as all citizens were directly or indirectly connected to the armed forces until 2011. Former or current conscripts, as well as *Zivildienstleistende*, were involved in the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>984</sup> Their families and colleagues, on the other hand, passively experienced the *Bundeswehr* through the stories conscripts shared at home. However, for the majority of people, these points of contact had ceased alongside draft. Moreover, without an annual turnover of recruits, fewer citizens with a military background will make the transition to civilian life in the future. Conversely, without conscripts, who the MoD theoretically drafted from all social, educational and political backgrounds, the *Bundeswehr* will not be composed of a cross-section of society anymore. Therefore, it can be argued that the *Bundeswehr*'s future structures do not reflect society as a whole, which, in turn, somewhat bears the risk of segregating the *Bundeswehr* even further from society.<sup>985</sup>

**Legislation and Democratic Control.** While this reasoning and attached worries can be understood in the light of the country's 20th-century history, Buch pointed out that

<sup>982</sup> cf., for example, Detlef Buch, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht', 168.

<sup>983</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>984</sup> Even when objecting to serving in the military, all young men deemed fit for service were connected to the *Bundeswehr*. First, they had to undergo the same official medical examinations by *Bundeswehr* physicians. Second, they had to contribute to the compulsory community service, which was administered through the MoD, which also paid their allowance. When conscription was suspended, the compulsory community service was terminated as well. With the federal volunteer service, the government created a substitute to benefit the compulsory community service's primary beneficiaries, namely, social services and charities; cf., for example, Helmut K. Anheier et al., *Ein Jahr Bundesfreiwilligendienst: Erste Erkenntnisse einer begleitenden Untersuchung*, 1. edn., (Heidelberg, and Berlin: Centrum für soziale Investitionen und Innovationen (CSI) Rubrecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, and Hertie School of Governance GmbH, 2012).

<sup>985</sup> cf. Hans Frank, 'Von der innerdeutschen Grenze zum Hindukusch', ed. Hans Frank (Hamburg: Mittler), 17.

existing research does not suggest a causal relationship between the suspension of conscription and the loss of democratic control.<sup>986</sup> Nonetheless, administrations in Germany were always keen to respond to *Bundeswehr* related concerns with appropriate measures. National legislation, including the *Grundgesetz*, as well as complementary laws such as the Parliamentary Participation Act, reflect this conduct. Here, politicians purposely limited both military leaders' and the government's leeway to control the *Bundeswehr* unilaterally by explicitly placing monitoring and governance, as well as the decision to declare the state of emergency or to send troops abroad in joint military missions, in the hands of the *Bundestag*.<sup>987</sup> Establishing this legislation suggests that politicians in postwar Germany were eager to ensure the highest degree of public governance and civilian influence over the armed forces.

**Reservists and Democratic Control.** Nonetheless, again taking the country's 20th-century history into account, it is somewhat understandable that civil society expects governance beyond this top-down political approach; especially when considering that political control or legislation does not necessarily prevent the expected detachment process. Traditionally, conscription, and, therefore, the average 'citizen in uniform', was perceived as the most efficient instrument to maintain a bottom-up control system to anchor the *Bundeswehr* in society.<sup>988</sup> By consulting the 2012-COR, it becomes apparent that the MoD aspired to keep this control mechanism by establishing the reserve force as a substitute for conscripts in the societal sphere.<sup>989</sup> In this context, the MoD particularly highlighted reservists' potential to act as agents of the *Bundeswehr* within civil society. In practice, the MoD expects reservists to be ready to answer any question their environment might have about Germany's defence policy or the *Bundeswehr*'s structures, responsibilities and missions.<sup>990</sup> Moreover, they are required to talk about their military duties proactively and

<sup>986</sup> cf. Detlef Buch, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht', 169.

<sup>987</sup> cf. GG Art. 87a, Art. 115a, and 115b.

<sup>988</sup> cf. Hans Frank, 'Von der innerdeutschen Grenze zum Hindukusch', 17, and Detlef Buch, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht', 168-169.

<sup>989</sup> cf. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*.

<sup>990</sup> *Ausbildung zum Mittler*, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01 (Bundeswehr, 2013), accessed 03 July 2017, [http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/reserve/grundlagen/weisungen/!ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beKwRFtxocJGiMkghdTIFa0EpJreDni3EzGs92njinAIAxw8K6W3Na64WrgGZscF0GcxO7MdZNwHSBdLcMkSnZj3CAc\\_gXYyOMPUIR9KSAbNqa\\_N3zYAwN25h1\\_kFYbq4QlvHg9hKziTanEVhf0LUTApNL5-zptci-QwIw4CSMMuZtBrqxtb3MHHez7nkitpRKk0OR-cf](http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/reserve/grundlagen/weisungen/!ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beKwRFtxocJGiMkghdTIFa0EpJreDni3EzGs92njinAIAxw8K6W3Na64WrgGZscF0GcxO7MdZNwHSBdLcMkSnZj3CAc_gXYyOMPUIR9KSAbNqa_N3zYAwN25h1_kFYbq4QlvHg9hKziTanEVhf0LUTApNL5-zptci-QwIw4CSMMuZtBrqxtb3MHHez7nkitpRKk0OR-cf)



convey a realistic but positive image of their service.<sup>991</sup>

**Training.** To prepare reservists for this role, the MoD has commissioned the Reservists' Association to administer appropriate training courses.<sup>992</sup> In these lectures, participants not only obtain expertise in defence related subjects but are taught communication skills, presentation techniques and strategies on how to present themselves better to the public.<sup>993</sup> Training takes five days and is, in principle, available to all reservists.<sup>994</sup> Still, in order to test the success of this program, the MoD decided to limit participation to a maximum of 72 reservists per annum.<sup>995</sup> Therefore, the MoD has determined that it will give preference to applicants who, due to their social, political or academic engagements, are disseminators of information.<sup>996</sup>

**Impartiality.** Despite the focus on formal training, the MoD further acknowledged that it is not the reservists' theoretical knowledge that will aid in establishing a strong link between the *Bundeswehr* and society but rather their ability to convey authenticity.<sup>997</sup> Similar to conscripts, reservists are somewhat more impartial than *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten* as they are not economically dependent on their *Bundeswehr* salaries. Moreover, reservists are not integrated into the *Bundeswehr* hierarchical structures on a full-time basis but rather move between civilian and military life regularly. Hence, opinions expressed by

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<sup>991</sup> cf. Schelzig, *Weisung für die Reservistenarbeit in den Jahren 2015/2016* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2015), accessed 03 July 2017, [http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/reserve/grundlagen/weisungen!/ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beKwRFTxocJGiMkghdTIFa0EpJreDni3EzGs92njnAIAxW8K6W3Na64WrgGZscF0GcxO7MdZNwHSBdLcMkSnZj3CAc\\_gXYyOMPUIR9KSAbNqa\\_N3zYAwN25h1\\_kFYbq4QlvHg9hKziTanEVhf0LUTApNL5-zptci-QwIw4CSMMuZtBrqxtb3MHHez7nkitpRKk0OR-cfBbqdI3C-lnFtpr2qPnqy6moydtn6u/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922TDM80AIEDTJTR10N5](http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/reserve/grundlagen/weisungen!/ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beKwRFTxocJGiMkghdTIFa0EpJreDni3EzGs92njnAIAxW8K6W3Na64WrgGZscF0GcxO7MdZNwHSBdLcMkSnZj3CAc_gXYyOMPUIR9KSAbNqa_N3zYAwN25h1_kFYbq4QlvHg9hKziTanEVhf0LUTApNL5-zptci-QwIw4CSMMuZtBrqxtb3MHHez7nkitpRKk0OR-cfBbqdI3C-lnFtpr2qPnqy6moydtn6u/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TDM80AIEDTJTR10N5), 5.

<sup>992</sup> *Ausbildung zum Mittler*, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01, 1.

<sup>993</sup> *ibid.* and Alfred Claußen, 'Erfahrungsbericht eines Reservisten: Reservisten verbessern ihre kommunikativen Fähigkeiten', *Reserve Aktuell*, No 2 (2014): 14-15, 14.

<sup>994</sup> *Ausbildung zum Mittler*, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01, 1.

<sup>995</sup> Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Spezifische Anforderungen an das Training „Mittler mit Multiplikatorfunktion“* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2013), accessed 03 July 2017, [http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/reserve/grundlagen/weisungen!/ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beKwRFTxocJGiMkghdTIFa0EpJreDni3EzGs92njnAIAxW8K6W3Na64WrgGZscF0GcxO7MdZNwHSBdLcMkSnZj3CAc\\_gXYyOMPUIR9KSAbNqa\\_N3zYAwN25h1\\_kFYbq4QlvHg9hKziTanEVhf0LUTApNL5-zptci-QwIw4CSMMuZtBrqxtb3MHHez7nkitpRKk0OR-cfBbqdI3C-lnFtpr2qPnqy6moydtn6u/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922TDM80AIEDTJTR10N5](http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/reserve/grundlagen/weisungen!/ut/p/z1/hU67DoIwFP0WB9beKwRFTxocJGiMkghdTIFa0EpJreDni3EzGs92njnAIAxW8K6W3Na64WrgGZscF0GcxO7MdZNwHSBdLcMkSnZj3CAc_gXYyOMPUIR9KSAbNqa_N3zYAwN25h1_kFYbq4QlvHg9hKziTanEVhf0LUTApNL5-zptci-QwIw4CSMMuZtBrqxtb3MHHez7nkitpRKk0OR-cfBbqdI3C-lnFtpr2qPnqy6moydtn6u/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TDM80AIEDTJTR10N5).

<sup>996</sup> *Ausbildung zum Mittler*, Anlage D zu KdoSKB-AZ 31-01-01, 1.

<sup>997</sup> cf. Schelzig, *Weisung für die Reservistenarbeit in den Jahren 2015/2016*, 5.

reservists are, in theory, more balanced, which, in turn, has the potential to lead to greater acceptance in public. Conversely, reservists observe civilian debates actively and, like conscripts before, bring these attitudes and values with them when reporting for duty.

**Potential Range of Influence.** Considering the aforementioned factors, it can be inferred that reservists have the potential of bringing together the best of both worlds. However, when recalling that the MoD only aimed to recruit and train approximately 60,000 reservists, one could argue that this number is too small to fulfil the described societal duties.<sup>998</sup> Even though this argument appears compelling at first glance, it neglects to consider that when conscription was still in place, citizens were often drafted against their will;<sup>999</sup> therefore, not only positive but also negative attitudes toward the *Bundeswehr* spread faster. In contrast, the new generation of reservists is either volunteering for service or has previously served as a *Zeit-* or *Berufssoldat*. This suggests that they are more committed to their roles in the reserve force and, therefore, are more inclined to express favourable opinions about their duties.

**The Media and Democratic Control.** Based on these factors, it can be argued that reservists are a more efficient instrument to foster a positive image of the *Bundeswehr* in society than conscripts. Furthermore, with the suspension of conscription, the MoD involuntarily established an additional tool of civilian control over the armed forces, namely, by triggering increased media interest in the *Bundeswehr*. For instance, Buch stipulated that the suspension of conscription has resulted in resurgent media interest in the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>1000</sup> In the beginning, coverage primarily focused on the progress and potential shortcomings of the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*.<sup>1001</sup> However, over time, reporting started to shift, and journalists seemed to develop a keen interest in service members'

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<sup>998</sup> cf. Redaktion Reserve Aktuell, 'Der Reserve Verpflichtet: Das Kompetenzzentrum für Reservistenangelegenheiten der Bundeswehr', *Reserve Aktuell*, No 5 (2013): 5-8, 6.

<sup>999</sup> *Bericht des Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr zum Prüfauftrag aus der Kabinettsklausur vom 7. Juni 2010*.

<sup>1000</sup> Detlef Buch, 'Das Ende der Wehrpflicht', 169.

<sup>1001</sup> cf., for example, 'Rüstungsskandal: Bundeswehr sieht "erhebliche Mängel" beim Sturmgewehr G36', *Spiegel Online*, 14 September 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-sieht-erhebliche-maengel-beim-sturmgewehr-g36-a-922280.html>, 9 May 2015.

and reservists' personal experiences in the armed forces.<sup>1002</sup> Here, documentaries and (or) articles often made use of embedded journalism, where reporters chiefly tried to understand the motivation for enlisting voluntarily.<sup>1003</sup> In doing so, reporters did not just add a good story to their portfolios, but also served as an instrument of democratic control of the *Bundeswehr* as they provided timely and regular coverage of the *Bundeswehr* and its troops.

#### 4.2.2.2 Anti-War Sentiments and Recruitment

**The Influence of Mainstream Satire.** While the discussed embedded journalism offered the MoD a unique tool to highlight positive aspects of the *Bundeswehr*, the increased media coverage also triggered another guild's interest in defence, namely, that of political satirists.<sup>1004</sup> In contrast to traditional journalism, which often grants airtime to both *Bundeswehr* critics and military personnel, mainstream comedy is beyond the reach of the *Bundeswehr*'s public relations team. Before the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*, defence policy has been widely underrepresented in the comedy arena; however, as of 2011, numerous artists have started to target the *Bundeswehr*. Marc-Uwe Kling, for instance, referred to conscription as a 'sick' concept, which permitted the government to 'snatch all young men' to teach them '[...] how to shoot people without hesitating, pausing or asking questions'.<sup>1005</sup> As regards the recruitment of young adults after the suspension of conscription, Nico Semsrott, 'on behalf of consumer protection', even felt inclined to issue a warning that the *Bundeswehr*'s slogan 'Career with a Future' may 'sometimes [result] in

<sup>1002</sup> See, for example, Deutschland dienen: Freiwillig in der Bundeswehr', TV documentary *Vor Ort: Die Reportage*, 'Reservisten: Lückenbüßer für die Bundeswehr?', documentary, YouTube video, 04:49, posted by DW Deutsch, 25 April 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3cpY5XyZfY>, accessed 06 March 2017, and Vicky Braunholz, 'Meine Schwester, die Soldatin', *Bento*, 15 June 2017, <http://www.bento.de/gefuehle/bundeswehr-wenn-die-kleine-schwester-nach-dem-abi-soldatin-wird-1418978/>, 29 June 2017.

<sup>1003</sup> See, for example, '7 Tage...beim Bund', TV documentary *7 Tage...*, reported by Julian Amershi, and Willem Konrad, broadcasted by NDR, 23 October 2016.

<sup>1004</sup> cf. Thomas Buhlmann, and Meike Wanner, *Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“: Forschungsbericht* (Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, 2013), 6.

<sup>1005</sup> Marc-Uwe Kling, *Das Känguru-Manifest: Live und ungekürzt* (Hamburg: Hörbuch Hamburg Verlag, 2011), chap. 44. Translated by the author.

a short [future] for the recruit'.<sup>1006</sup>

Similar mechanisms are apparent as regards satirists' attitude toward patriotism. Marc-Uwe Kling, for instance, has described the latter as a 'benign tumour, which, if not monitored carefully, may develop [...] into a malignant one'.<sup>1007</sup> Moreover, he referred to patriots as people with a distorted view of history, who 'exhibit signs of idiocy'.<sup>1008</sup> Max Uthoff, even resorted to more explicit stylistic means when stating that '[t]here is no positive [approach to] patriotism. The fixation on one's own country always promotes the rejection of [everything] foreign. Nationalism is [like] a whore. [This concept] may be used by virtually anyone, and, if one is not careful, one can catch something nasty'.<sup>1009</sup>

**Anti-War Sentiments in the Public.** The mainstream success of these artists suggests that they do not express minority views but rather reflect the prevailing public opinion. Especially Mr Uthoff's statement seems to echo the inclination of citizens to equalise patriotism with nationalism, which carries a strong negative connotation in Germany. To some extent, this adverse public perception of patriotism/nationalism is also projected on the armed forces and soldiers are often suspected to be 'fascist, racist [and] to glorify war'.<sup>1010</sup> For instance, during the *Bundeswehr*'s first open day in Leipzig on 13 June 2015 fierce protests ignited opposing the MoD's alleged intention to advertise 'the profession of killing and death' as a common occupational choice.<sup>1011</sup>

**Pacifistic Tendencies in the Socialisation Process.** To explore the roots of these attitudes, one must take a closer look at Germany's 20th-century history and the postwar socialisation processes, which exhibited strong pacifistic characteristics.<sup>1012</sup> This becomes explicitly apparent when examining school curricula.<sup>1013</sup> Here, teachers and administrat-

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<sup>1006</sup> 'Nico Semsrott: Freude ist nur ein Mangel an Information', live performance at *3satfestival 2013*, performed by Nico Semsrott, broadcasted by 3Sat, 23 May 2015. Translated by the author.

<sup>1007</sup> Marc-Uwe Kling, *Die Känguru-Chroniken: Live und ungekürzt* (Hamburg: Hörbuch Hamburg Verlag, 2012), chap. 66. Translated by the author.

<sup>1008</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1009</sup> Live Performance at *Die Anstalt*, performed by Max Uthoff, broadcasted by ZDF, 03 February 2015.

<sup>1010</sup> Dominik Wullers, 'Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?', 21 November 2013, *Zeit Online*, <http://www.zeit.de/2013/48/soldaten-deutschland/komplettansicht>, 03 July 2014.

<sup>1011</sup> cf. 'Zu Besuch bei den Streitkräften', news broadcast, reported by Gerd Haunert, broadcasted by ARD, 13 June 2015.

<sup>1012</sup> cf. Dominik Wullers, 'Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?'.

<sup>1013</sup> cf. *ibid.*

ors, who were socialised during or after the '68 peace movement, still coin the academic environment, which, in turn, lead to the creation of a somewhat *Bundeswehr* hostile and anti-war doctrine.<sup>1014</sup> These attitudes even extend to school athletics. During the Third Reich, the Nazis politicised sports with the intent to prepare the youth for their assigned roles as 'resilient soldiers and healthy mothers'.<sup>1015</sup> It is, therefore, quite comprehensible that postwar politicians stressed the separation of sports and politics and that schools still tend to favour the acquisition of academic knowledge over school athletics.<sup>1016</sup> Combined with the rejection of the military by families and peers due to their pacifist upbringing, there are neither significant motivational factors to join the armed forces nor is there any form of formal preparation in place that would prepare young adults for military service.<sup>1017</sup>

**2013 *Bundeswehr* Survey.** While the factors mentioned above already suggest that German citizens are somewhat sceptical of the *Bundeswehr*, a 2013 *Bundeswehr* does not come to much more flattering conclusions.<sup>1018</sup> For instance, only 32 per cent of Germans hold the *Bundeswehr* in high regards when they are asked to rate the *Bundeswehr* in comparison to other state institutions such as the police.<sup>1019</sup> Moreover, the majority of respondents spontaneously associated the word '*Bundeswehr*' with terms such as 'war', 'weapons', and 'soldiers' rather than with 'security' or 'safety'.<sup>1020</sup> As regards the latter two, the survey even attests a declining trend, which suggests that citizens are not inclined to perceive the *Bundeswehr* as a stabilizing political instrument.<sup>1021</sup> Besides these rather negative findings, however, the survey also identified a positive trend,<sup>1022</sup> while the majority of citizens older than 70 are rather critical of the *Bundeswehr* and its responsibilities, young adults seemed to have come to accept the *Bundeswehr* as a

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<sup>1014</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1015</sup> 'Fitness, Sport und Körperkult: Die Moden der Bewegung!', TV science magazine *Quarks & Co.*, presented by Ranga Yogeshwar, broadcasted by WDR, 04 April 2017.

<sup>1016</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1017</sup> cf. Dominik Wullers, 'Was glaubt ihr eigentlich, wer wir sind?'

<sup>1018</sup> cf. Thomas Buhlmann, and Meike Wanner, *Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“: Forschungsbericht.*

<sup>1019</sup> *ibid.*, 7.

<sup>1020</sup> *ibid.*, 5, and 12.

<sup>1021</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>1022</sup> *ibid.*, 14.

potential employer.<sup>1023</sup> Nevertheless, the survey also acknowledges that young adults usually have not yet acquired the necessary knowledge about a career in the *Bundeswehr* as their spontaneous association responses were 'uniforms' and 'barracks'.<sup>1024</sup>

#### 4.2.2.3 Recruitment Strategies

**The Recruitment Pool.** Provocatively phrased, the above-discussed arguments suggest that the *Bundeswehr* is forced to recruit its prospective service members from a pool of inveterate pacifists or uninformed youngsters.<sup>1025</sup> This judgement is particularly bad news for the reserve, as it must already compete with the *Bundeswehr*'s regular units as well as the private sector for the best suitable candidates.<sup>1026</sup> Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the 2012-COR identified retiring *Zeit-* or *Berufssoldaten* as the reserve's main recruitment targets for volunteer reserve duties.<sup>1027</sup>

Simultaneously though, the MoD acknowledged that the suspension of conscription, as well as the overall downsizing of troops, had substantially diminished this recruitment pool.<sup>1028</sup> Therefore, the MoD also stated that, despite the aforementioned societal obstacles, recruitment efforts must also include *Ungediente*;<sup>1029</sup> here, the government has identified university graduates as the most valuable candidates since the MoD expects them to be

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<sup>1023</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1024</sup> *cf. ibid.*

<sup>1025</sup> It should be noted that since the peak of the 2015 refugee crisis, the right-wing populist party *Alternative für Deutschland* has gained significant traction and even received 12.6 per cent of votes in the general election of 2017. These results suggest that Germany's political landscape has shifted significantly. Moreover, as attested by the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, Germany's domestic intelligence agency, violent crimes committed by right-wing extremists have risen by 18 per cent between 2014 and 2016 from 1,408 registered offences to 1,600. Although this development has to be carefully observed, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that right-wing populism is a mainstream trend. Quite the contrary, the majority of the population has shown a great motivation to confront right-wingers in protests and other grassroots movements. Although no reliable data on the impact on *Bundeswehr* recruitment was available when this study was completed in late 2018, the author surmised that the majority's attitudes towards the *Bundeswehr* had not improved significantly; *cf.* Presseschau: Pegida', *bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/198115/presseschau-pegida>, 03 July 2017 and 'Alternative für Deutschland', *bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, <http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/211108/afd>, 03 July 2017, Der Bundeswahlleiter, 'Bundestagswahl 2017', accessed 01 November 2017, <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html>, and Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 'Rechtsextremistische Straf- und Gewalttaten', accessed 03 October 2018, <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-rechtsextremismus/zahlen-und-fakten-rechtsextremismus/rechtsextremistische-straf-und-gewalttaten-2016>.

<sup>1026</sup> *cf.* Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, *Konzeption der Reserve*, 17.

<sup>1027</sup> *ibid.*, 15.

<sup>1028</sup> *cf. ibid.*, 17.

<sup>1029</sup> *ibid.*, 15.

better prepared for leadership roles.<sup>1030</sup> Moreover, by recruiting civilian specialists, the MoD hopes to utilise skill sets obtained by reservists in their civilian occupations without the need for the *Bundeswehr* to provide further training.<sup>1031</sup>

**Awareness Gap.** While this strategy is undoubtedly warranted from the MoD's point of view, circumstances suggest that not only societal obstacles might hinder the recruitment of *Ungediente*, namely, an awareness gap. In its 2013 survey, the *Bundeswehr* already admitted to the said gap among young adults,<sup>1032</sup> i.e., probably the most important group of people when it comes to recruitment for the armed forces. Moreover, as regards specialists' recruitment, a knowledge gap among employers in the private sector seems to prevail.<sup>1033</sup> According to the Reservists' Association, this lack of information among business owners is currently preventing more successful co-operation between the MoD and employers of reservists.<sup>1034</sup>

#### 4.2.2.4 Communication Strategies

**The MoD Website(s).** Considering the above-described knowledge gap among average citizens and business owners, it can be inferred that MoD's current communication strategy appears insufficient for recruiting civilians for the reserve; an assumption, which is further substantiated when consulting today's go-to medium, namely, the *Bundeswehr*'s website. Although interested civilians can find an entire section specifically dedicated to the reserve, navigating the site is rather difficult for people not familiar with military jargon or the *Bundeswehr*'s organisational structures.<sup>1035</sup> For instance, the website is overloaded with unintelligible information, PDF files outlining rules and regulations and related links to other branches of the *Bundeswehr*, which again present themselves incomprehensible to

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<sup>1030</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1031</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>1032</sup> cf. Thomas Buhlmann, and Meike Wanner, *Ergebnisse der Bevölkerungsumfrage 2013 zum Image der Bundeswehr sowie zur Wahrnehmung und Bewertung des Claims „Wir. Dienen. Deutschland.“: Forschungsbericht*, 14.

<sup>1033</sup> cf. Inga-Christien Dittmar, 'Auftaktsymposium "Die Reservisten der Bundeswehr und ihre Arbeitgeber"', *Reserve Aktuell*, No. 3 (2014): 4-5.

<sup>1034</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1035</sup> cf. Bundeswehr, 'Herzlich Willkommen auf der Website für Reservisten der Bundeswehr', Bundeswehr, accessed 02 July 2017, <http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de>.

the layperson.<sup>1036</sup>

Consulting the section on careers in the reserve forces can also be somewhat disappointing;<sup>1037</sup> instead of providing useful information on how to join the reserve and what duties the service entails, potential candidates are advised to either contact a *Bundeswehr* career centre or to consult the *Bundeswehr*'s career portal for further information.<sup>1038</sup> Objectively, both options are legitimate options to communicate with a potential future employer. However, with the demand to get in touch with the *Bundeswehr* directly, the MoD has created a psychological barrier, as contacting the *Bundeswehr* in person might have a discouraging effect on the average citizen. The career portal, on the other hand, only presents information on serving in the *Bundeswehr*'s regular units.<sup>1039</sup>

**Reserve Aktuell.** In addition to the website, the MoD advertises the Reservists' Association's quarterly magazine *Reserve Aktuell* as a valuable source of information on the reserve.<sup>1040</sup> However, initially designed as a periodical for trained reservists and not for civilian candidates, authors writing for *Reserve Aktuell* also predominantly use military jargon and technocratic language. Therefore, in its current state, the magazine, is rather unsuitable for recruiting civilians.

**Brochures.** A similar conclusion must be drawn after assessing a glossy 24-pages brochure, which the MoD has published alongside various other PDF files on its website.<sup>1041</sup> Albeit authors have made an effort to use a more comprehensible language here, they were

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<sup>1036</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1037</sup> cf. Bundeswehr, 'Ihre Karriere als Reservist in der Bundeswehr', Bundeswehr, accessed 05 July 2017, [http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/persfueres/!ut/p/z1/04\\_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MQjydDAwC3f2MjM3NPYwNDaz0wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxm2GqH6wfpR-V1ViWWKFxkF9UkpNaopeYDHKhfmRGY15KTmpAfrIjRKAGN6LcoNxREQAs12xN/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3005](http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/persfueres/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MQjydDAwC3f2MjM3NPYwNDaz0wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxm2GqH6wfpR-V1ViWWKFxkF9UkpNaopeYDHKhfmRGY15KTmpAfrIjRKAGN6LcoNxREQAs12xN/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL2922TIB00AGN2377H3005).

<sup>1038</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1039</sup> Status: June 2017; cf. Bundeswehr, 'Bundeswehr: Mach, was wirklich zählt', Bundeswehr, accessed 01 July 2017, <https://www.bundeswehrkarriere.de>.

<sup>1040</sup> Bundeswehr, 'Reserve Aktuell 1/2017', Bundeswehr, accessed 15 February 2017, [http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/res\\_aktuell/!ut/p/z1/04\\_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTN2NjQw83UJdvIJ9QowMTEz1wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxmuFtpB-sH6UflZVYllihV5BfVJKTWqKXmAxyoX5kRmJeSk5qQH6yIO5gIDei3KDCUREAH6FVIw!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7\\_B8LTL29225G320IFUDJSLT20K2](http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/res_aktuell/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTN2NjQw83UJdvIJ9QowMTEz1wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6wSmp-pFAM8xxmuFtpB-sH6UflZVYllihV5BfVJKTWqKXmAxyoX5kRmJeSk5qQH6yIO5gIDei3KDCUREAH6FVIw!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/#Z7_B8LTL29225G320IFUDJSLT20K2).

<sup>1041</sup> Hamel, *Herzlich Willkommen auf der Website für Reservisten der Bundeswehr* (Bundeswehr, 2018), accessed 24 April 2018, [http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/!ut/p/z1/04\\_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTD3CzA08zRzdzQ2M\\_Iz9Tcz1wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6BbmhigAw2HAa/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/](http://www.reservisten.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/resarb/start/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zinSx8QnyMLI2MTD3CzA08zRzdzQ2M_Iz9Tcz1wwkpiAJKG-AAjgb6BbmhigAw2HAa/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/).



not able to present the recruitment process without resorting to military terminology.<sup>1042</sup> Also, the second part of the brochure, which elaborates on reservists' duties, lacks to provide real-life examples but strikes the informed reader as a mere summary of the LSMPA and LSRA.<sup>1043</sup>

**Social Media.** By the time this study had been completed in 2018, the MoD had not undertaken any measures to update the reserve's communication platforms to appeal more efficiently to civilians. However, regarding recruitment strategies for the *Bundeswehr's* regular units, and especially for the voluntary conscripts, the *Bundeswehr's* public relations team has begun to explore new means of appealing to potential recruits, namely, adolescents. The most prominent development to mention in this context is the launch of an official YouTube channel focusing on a Reality TV-style series called *Die Rekruten*.<sup>1044</sup> Here, a camera team followed selected new voluntary conscripts and documented their journey from civilian to soldier.<sup>1045</sup>

In support of this new endeavour, the MoD has also updated parts of its web presence. First, the *Bundeswehr's* career portal has been redesigned to include dynamic visual effects and now uses colloquial language;<sup>1046</sup> site visitors are addressed personally, and the appropriate formal salutation *Sie* has been dropped in favour of the informal *du*.<sup>1047</sup> Second, the MoD has launched an additional website explicitly geared toward pupils.<sup>1048</sup> Here, the armed forces are portrayed similarly to a sports association by accentuating group activities and fun.

**Advertising Costs.** Given the attempt to blend information on military careers with social situations and hobbies adolescents may easily relate to suggests that the MoD has shifted to a more aggressive public relations strategy for recruiting; a development,

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<sup>1042</sup> *ibid.*, 8.

<sup>1043</sup> *ibid.*, 11 et seq.

<sup>1044</sup> 'The Recruits'. Translated by the author; cf. 'Die Rekruten', *Die Rekruten TV*, Official YouTube Channel, <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZPAni75bkLnjGO8yhuJpdw>, 06 July 2017.

<sup>1045</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1046</sup> cf. 'Bundeswehr, 'Bundeswehr: Mach, was wirklich zählt'.

<sup>1047</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1048</sup> See Bundeswehr, 'Bundeswehr: Entdecke die Bundeswehr', Bundeswehr, accessed 01 July 2017, <https://www.bundeswehrentdecken.de>.

which is also reflected by the MoD's growing expenditure on advertising. As presented in Table 4.6, advertisement costs increased by a stunning 264 per cent in ten years. The most profound leaps can be observed from 2010 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2012, where advertising expenditure rose by 33.2 per cent and 80.0 per cent respectively. However, considering that conscription was suspended in 2011, these numbers are hardly surprising as the MoD was forced to implement new marketing strategies to advertise to young adults. Regrettably, the published advertising costs are not broken down according to categories, i.e., one cannot estimate the percentage spent on the recruitment of *Zeitsoldaten*, *Berufssoldaten*, voluntary conscripts or reservists. However, the budget marked advertising costs as *Nachwuchsgewinnung*, a term which suggests marketing to young talents.<sup>1049</sup> This, in turn, allows inferring that the MoD intends to focus primarily on appealing to young adults. Moreover, it implies that, by the time this thesis was completed, no sufficient recruitment strategy of civilians for the reserve was in place.

Table 4.6: Advertising Expenditure in Million Euros (2006-2015)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Expenditure</b>	9.7	10.4	10.3	12.0	12.0
<b>Annual <math>\Delta</math> in per cent</b>	-0.6	7.2	-1.4	16.5	0.0
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>Expenditure</b>	16.0	28.9	30.0	30.0	35.3
<b>Annual <math>\Delta</math> in per cent</b>	33.2	80.9	3.7	0.0	17.7

Source: The German Federal Ministry of Finance, including own calculations.

## 4.3 Key Findings

1. The analyses of relevant government publication has implicitly revealed empirical proof for the 2008 financial crisis' influence on German defence planning. While no specific economization goals were mentioned in the 2010-CSR or the Inspector General's report, both documents emphasised that 40,000 troops were to be cut to

<sup>1049</sup> 'Young Talent Recruitment'. Translated by the author.

contribute to overall government savings.

2. Explicit empirical evidence for the impact of the 2008 financial crisis was discovered in contemporary financial statements and defence budgets. Here, it was found that the MoD needed to contribute €8.40 to overall economization measures after the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis. While savings could not be realised to the full degree, significant economies were achieved as regards personnel costs.
3. In general, it was found that the government estimated that Germany's security environment was stable as defence planners did not anticipate imminent territorial threats. Nevertheless, in relevant publications, the government listed numerous threats, which authors connected with the negative implications of globalisation, e.g., (cyber) terrorism, uncontrolled migration due to failed states and climate change. However, no specific measures on how to encounter these challenges were expressed by the government.
4. The discussion on the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* and the 2012-COR has highlighted that both the regular and reserve force underwent profound restructuring as of 2010. Here, the suspension of conscription was identified as the most incisive decision as it significantly reduced the *Bundeswehr*'s troop strength and shifted former conscripts' duties to the reserve. On the one hand, the government envisaged that reservists would fill conscripts' responsibilities in the societal sphere. On the other hand, reservists were to relieve the regular force as regards homeland defence and to fill vacancies that were left by the enforced redundancies.

## Chapter 5

# Germany's 1970s *Wehrstrukturreform* and the Reserve Force

*Krieg ist nicht mehr die ultima ratio, sondern die ultima irratio.*<sup>1050</sup>

- Willy Brandt -<sup>1051</sup>

In the previous chapter, the changing roles and responsibilities of reservists following the implementation of the 2012-COR has been discussed in light of the suspension of conscription. To examine this phenomenon, political, financial, strategic and structural characteristics were elaborated. Following the same blueprint, this chapter explores the 2012-COR's historical counterpart. Due to the lack of a specific reserve forces review following the 1973 oil price shock, the reform of the *Bundeswehr*'s post-1973 reserve is referred to under the umbrella of the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*.

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<sup>1050</sup> 'War is not the ultima ratio any more, it is the ultima irratio'. Translated by the author; Willy Brandt, *Willy Brandt: Nobelpredlesung*, Speech, Oslo, 11 December 1971, published by the Nobel Prize Committee, accessed 01 January 2017, [https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-lecture-t.html](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1971/brandt-lecture-t.html).

<sup>1051</sup> German Chancellor (1969-1974).

## 5.1 The *Wehrstrukturreform* in Context

### 5.1.1 The 1970s: A Decade of Defence Reviews

In the 1970s, the *Bundeswehr* had been subject to various defence reviews. In total, the government published four Defence White Papers and one separate reserve forces' review, namely, the 1971-COR. Additionally, two supplemental reports on *Wehrgerechtigkeit* and *Wehrstruktur* were commissioned by the government and delivered by the 1972 Commission on Structural Reform (1972-CSR) in 1971 and 1972 respectively. Although not all of these documents were relevant to the analysis of changing reservists' roles and responsibilities following the 1973 oil price shock, the preceding defence reviews are discussed in this subsection to illustrate the evolution of Germany's military posture in the 1970s. The 1979 Defence White Paper, on the other hand, has been omitted as it outlined measures that only became relevant in the 1980s.<sup>1052</sup>

#### 5.1.1.1 Defence Reviews (1970-1972)

**Impetus for Reform.** The roots of the 1970s defence reviews can be traced back to 1969. Following the general election on 28 September 1969, a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Liberals assumed government.<sup>1053</sup> Headed by the social democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt, this constellation constituted a caesura in postwar German politics, which had primarily been dominated by the Conservatives.<sup>1054</sup> Soon after taking office, Willy Brandt addressed the *Bundestag* in a government declaration, where he discussed issues concerning federal finances and the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>1055</sup> While highlighting that the government needed to increase collaboration with Germany's European and international partners to counter

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<sup>1052</sup> As of 1979, the Army underwent yet another reform to adapt its structures. This reform is known as *Heeresstruktur 4*; Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Weißbuch 1979 Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 148 et seq.

<sup>1053</sup> Der Bundeswahlleiter, 'Wahl zum 6. Deutschen Bundestag am 28. September 1969', Der Bundeswahlleiter, accessed 15 November 2016, <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/1969.html>.

<sup>1054</sup> Der Bundeswahlleiter, 'Willkommen beim Bundeswahlleiter', accessed 15 November 2016, <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundeswahlleiter.html>.

<sup>1055</sup> Willy Brandt, *Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969*, Government Declaration (Bonn, 1969), published by *Bundeskanzler-Willy-Brandt-Stiftung*, accessed 09 April 2016, [http://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Regierungserklaerung\\_Willy\\_Brandt\\_1969.pdf](http://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Regierungserklaerung_Willy_Brandt_1969.pdf), 5, and 16.

imbalances in the federal budget, Willy Brandt refrained from demanding to balance budgets by cutting defence expenditure.<sup>1056</sup> He instead noted that the *Bundeswehr* needed to undergo a thorough review, which would have to respect societal changes, the subjects of *Wehrgerechtigkeit*, technological advancements and NATO partners' demands as guiding directives.<sup>1057</sup>

**1970 Defence White Paper.** As announced by Willy Brandt, a review of the *Bundeswehr* was conducted quickly, and its results were published in May 1970.<sup>1058</sup> The key problems identified by the MoD were threefold; first, as already mentioned in the 1969 government declaration, the MoD judged that the drafting process in its contemporary form was not fair and needed to be reformed to ensure the highest degree of *Wehrgerechtigkeit*.<sup>1059</sup> This was thought to be achieved through drafting more *Wehrpflichtige* into service by reducing the length of mandatory basic training and service.<sup>1060</sup> However, no specific number was stated.<sup>1061</sup> Second, the MoD stipulated that the *Bundeswehr* needed more officers, *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten*;<sup>1062</sup> especially in the Army.<sup>1063</sup> To motivate more individuals to pursue a career in the *Bundeswehr*, the MoD, therefore, aimed to introduce various measures to give *Zeitsoldaten* a competitive advantage when transitioning from military life to the civilian job market;<sup>1064</sup> again, no specific measures were elaborated in detail.<sup>1065</sup> However, merit-based promotions within the *Bundeswehr* were supposed to become more frequent.<sup>1066</sup> Fourth, the MoD stipulated that the *Bundeswehr*'s equipment was out of date and needed to be replaced to meet the demands of NATO's recently adopted strategy of flexible response.<sup>1067</sup>

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<sup>1056</sup> *ibid.*, 5.

<sup>1057</sup> The changes in society are addressed in detail in Subsection 5.2.2; cf. *ibid.*, 15-16.

<sup>1058</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*.

<sup>1059</sup> This issue is further discussed later in this chapter; *ibid.*, 49.

<sup>1060</sup> *ibid.*, 50.

<sup>1061</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1062</sup> *ibid.* 49-50.

<sup>1063</sup> *ibid.*, 50.

<sup>1064</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1065</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1066</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1067</sup> At the beginning of the 1970s, the *Bundeswehr* still used equipment provided by the allied forces in the mid-1950s. According to the doctrine of massive retaliation, the equipment was unsuitable to serve

The latter was undoubtedly paramount to military planners; however, the defence budget would not allow tackling this problem in 1970. Although Willy Brandt had not connected federal finances with the *Bundeswehr*'s budget, the 1970 Defence White Paper indeed did. As stipulated by its authors, total government spending was planned to be approximately DM90.40 billion in 1970, of which the government had assigned DM2.68 billion to economic stimuli packages.<sup>1068</sup> Noting that all ministries had to contribute to these consolidation efforts, the government demanded that the MoD would have to realise DM1.08 billion or 40 per cent of federal economies.<sup>1069</sup> To meet this financial directive, the MoD enforced a procurement freeze, which also stopped equipment acquisition plans that had already been (partially) initiated;<sup>1070</sup> therefore, torpedoing a crucial goal of the 1970 defence review.

**The Commission on Structural Reform I.** In addition to reviewing the *Bundeswehr*'s structures on the ministerial level, the government further decided to have the *Bundeswehr* examined by an independent commission. On 09 July 1970, the 1972-CSR was established and instructed to submit suggestions on two specific issues; first, *Wehrgerechtigkeit* needed to be improved.<sup>1071</sup> Second, the *Bundeswehr*'s structures were supposed to be adapted to meet the demands of the 1970s security environment.<sup>1072</sup>

The first report on *Wehrgerechtigkeit* was submitted to the government on 03 February 1971.<sup>1073</sup> The key problem, as identified by the 1972-CSR, was that the contemporary drafting process was not fair as up to 30 per cent of *Wehrpflichtige* were able to evade draft.<sup>1074</sup> Consequently, draft evaders did neither have to serve as conscripts nor were they required to participate as reservists in military exercises upon completion of their term.<sup>1075</sup>

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the new strategy of flexible response. Moreover, due to its age, the costs to maintain the equipment were disproportional to its benefits; *ibid.*, 139-141.

<sup>1068</sup> *ibid.*, 183.

<sup>1069</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1070</sup> *ibid.*, and 139.

<sup>1071</sup> Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, *Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Analyse und Optionen* (Bonn: Wehrstruktur-Kommission, 1972/1973), 25.

<sup>1072</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1073</sup> Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, *Wehrgerechtigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Bericht der Wehrstruktur-Kommission an die Bundesregierung* (Bonn: Wehrstruktur-Kommission, 1971), 5.

<sup>1074</sup> *ibid.*, 23-24.

<sup>1075</sup> Peter Richard Munz, 'Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur', (doctoral thesis, University of Gießen,

While these circumstances did not pose a problem as regards military strengths, which with approximately 1.5 million reservists largely exceeded required numbers, 30 per cent of an age cohort enjoyed significant advantages over their peers.<sup>1076</sup> First, they could make an immediate transition from the *Abitur* to university.<sup>1077</sup> Second, their careers were not interrupted by reservists' duties.<sup>1078</sup>

To overcome this injustice, the 1972-CSR suggested increasing the drafting ratio by 15 per cent.<sup>1079</sup> This goal was thought to be best achieved through legislation and incentives. First, the 1972-CSR recommended granting fewer exemptions based on physical impairments or exceptional circumstances.<sup>1080</sup> Moreover, to ensure that all drafted individuals were able to serve as conscripts, the 1972-CSR suggested reducing the mandatory service period from 18 to 16 months.<sup>1081</sup> Second, the 1972-CSR proposed that conscripts' salaries should be increased to convince more *Wehrpflichtige* to refrain from attempting to evade draft.<sup>1082</sup>

**The 1971 Conception of Reserve.** Independent from the 1972-CSR, the MoD also conducted a separate review of the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve force, which was published on 09 July 1971.<sup>1083</sup> The findings of the 1971-COR were later included in the 1971/72 Defence White Paper.<sup>1084</sup> In accordance with the contemporary *Zeitgeist*, its primary purpose was to make mobilisation of reservists fairer.<sup>1085</sup>

In the 1970s, there were two kinds of mandatory exercises for which reservists were

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1978), 19.

<sup>1076</sup> *ibid.*, 19, and Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 59.

<sup>1077</sup> cf. Peter Richard Munz, 'Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur', 18 et seq.

<sup>1078</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1079</sup> Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, *Wehrgerechtigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Bericht der Wehrstruktur-Kommission an die Bundesregierung*, 23.

<sup>1080</sup> *ibid.*, 24.

<sup>1081</sup> *ibid.*, 23.

<sup>1082</sup> While these suggestions aimed at increasing *Wehrgerechtigkeit*, the 1972-CSR also noted that these measures would result in an additional burden on the defence budget. According to the 1972-CSR's calculations, higher salaries and an increasing number of conscripts would account for DM200.00 million annually; *ibid.*, 23, and 79-80.

<sup>1083</sup> Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Reservistenkonzeption 1971*, cited in Dietmar Schössler, and Armin Steinkamm, *Reservisten '71/'72: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Reservistenverbandes*, 169-191 (Bonn: Mönch, 1972), 169.

<sup>1084</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 50 et seq.

<sup>1085</sup> *ibid.*, 51-52.



mobilised on a regular basis;<sup>1086</sup> those aiming to maintain training levels and those testing reservists' operational readiness.<sup>1087</sup> Considering that reservists constituted 65 per cent of the Army, 43 per cent of the Air Force and 49 per cent of the Navy, keeping reservists' skills up to date was crucial for the *Bundeswehr*'s defence posture.<sup>1088</sup> However, similar to the drafting process, mobilisation for reservists' duties followed somewhat unfair rules. Reservists belonging to Mobilisation Group I and II, namely, individuals who had recently completed their term as conscripts, as well as specialists or highly skilled reservists, were called up for duty more frequently.<sup>1089</sup> The remaining reservists were categorised as Mobilisation Group III and were mostly treated as backup with little to no obligation to participate in exercises.<sup>1090</sup>

Broadly speaking, this system put highly skilled and fit reservists at a disadvantage as they were mobilised regularly, while the less capable were exempted from serving beyond their term as conscripts. Although the MoD acknowledged that it would not be able to limit the mobilisation of specialists, *Wehrgerechtigkeit* was believed to be enhanced by calling up a higher ratio of reservists from Mobilisation Group I and II.<sup>1091</sup>

To do so, the MoD decided to cut the mandatory reservists' service period.<sup>1092</sup> Before the 1971-COR came into effect on 01 January 1971, reservists' obligation to serve in military exercises could range from 12 days (operational readiness) to four weeks (maintenance of training levels) annually.<sup>1093</sup> Following the implementation of the 1971-COR, the total required serving period was limited to 48 days.<sup>1094</sup> Moreover, non-officers could now only be mobilised within the first two to three years following their *Wehrdienst*;<sup>1095</sup> non-commission officers and commissioned officers, on the other hand, were now relieved

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<sup>1086</sup> cf. Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 51.

<sup>1087</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1088</sup> The Army consisted of the *Feldheer* and the *Territorialheer*. Here, reservists provided 45 per cent and 85 per cent of troop strength respectively; Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 50.

<sup>1089</sup> *ibid.*, 51.

<sup>1090</sup> *ibid.*, 50.

<sup>1091</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1092</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1093</sup> *ibid.*, 51.

<sup>1094</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1095</sup> *ibid.*

of reservists' duties after turning 45 or 60 respectively.<sup>1096</sup>

In addition to changing mandatory service periods for reservists, the 1971-COR also aimed to redistribute the concentration of Army and Navy reservists.<sup>1097</sup> As regards the former, the MoD stipulated that it was necessary to increase the number of available reservists at the border to the GDR.<sup>1098</sup> Reservists for the Navy, on the other hand, were supposed to be recruited more proactively in coastal regions to ensure prompt availability of troops in case of emergencies.<sup>1099</sup> For the reserve in general, the 1971-COR judged that the number of non-commissioned and commissioned officers was too low.<sup>1100</sup> According to the 1971-COR, this was particularly evident in the Air Force and the Medical Service;<sup>1101</sup> here, they advocated recruiting fewer but better-qualified reservists and increasing the number of reservists' medical training centres respectively.<sup>1102</sup>

**1971/72 Defence White Paper.** Soon after publishing the 1970 Defence White Paper, the 1971-COR and the first 1972-CSR report, the MoD released the results of yet another defence review in December 1971.<sup>1103</sup> Both as regards finances and structural changes, it can be interpreted as the continuation and (or) implementation of its predecessor. While no concrete economies are discussed, the MoD highlighted that it was increasingly competing with other ministries for federal funds, which resulted in the relative decline of its budget.<sup>1104</sup> To compensate for this development, the MoD decided to adhere to the notion of procurement freezing.<sup>1105</sup> Concerning *Wehrgerechtigkeit*, the government tried to achieve more fairness by cutting the length of mandatory basic training as proposed from 18 to 15 months;<sup>1106</sup> with this measure, the MoD hoped to increase the annual number

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<sup>1096</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1097</sup> Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Reservistenkonzeption 1971*, cited in Dietmar Schössler, and Armin Steinkamm, *Reservisten '71/'72: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Reservistenverbandes*, 183. et seq.

<sup>1098</sup> *ibid.*, 183.

<sup>1099</sup> *ibid.*, 186-187.

<sup>1100</sup> *ibid.*, 170.

<sup>1101</sup> *ibid.*, 185 et seq.

<sup>1102</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1103</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1971/1972: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*.

<sup>1104</sup> *ibid.*, 153.

<sup>1105</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1106</sup> *ibid.*, 39.

of conscripts undergoing training.<sup>1107</sup> Besides, service members' military training and education was to be more tailored to the demands of the civilian job market by emphasising the acquisition of transferable skills.<sup>1108</sup>

**The Commission on Structural Reform II.** The second 1972-CSR report on the *Wehrstruktur* was submitted on 28 November 1972 and identified four key issues.<sup>1109</sup> First, with 325,000 troops, of which only 65 per cent were combat-ready, the Army did not meet the readiness required stipulated by the SACEUR and was, therefore, thought not be able to defend the West-German territory sufficiently.<sup>1110</sup> Second, the 1972-CSR estimated that the defence budget was too low in comparison to overall government spending.<sup>1111</sup> If this ratio would not improve in favour of the MoD, the 1972-CSR presumed that crucial investments in equipment could not be realised.<sup>1112</sup> Third, the 1972-CSR considered the number of *Zeit-* and *Berufssoldaten* too low as not enough conscripts could be motivated to enlist in the *Bundeswehr* upon completion their term.<sup>1113</sup> Fourth, and despite this recruitment problem, the MoD could not draft more conscripts due to financial and operational considerations.<sup>1114</sup> Keeping in mind that the baby boomers started to come of age in the 1970s, the 1972-CSR, therefore, anticipated that the issue of *Wehrgerechtigkeit* would exacerbate.<sup>1115</sup>

To overcome these issues, the 1972-CSR examined three models for a 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*, which the commission labelled A, B, and C.<sup>1116</sup> Model A, which proposed an all-volunteer force, was dismissed almost immediately as the 1972-CSR judged that it would not provide sufficient numbers of troops to encounter a potential attack from the Warsaw Pact.<sup>1117</sup> In Model B, the 1972-CSR proposed a militia structure, which chiefly

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<sup>1107</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1108</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1109</sup> Wehrstruktur-Kommission der Bundesregierung, *Die Wehrstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Analyse und Optionen*, 5.

<sup>1110</sup> *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>1111</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1112</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1113</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1114</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1115</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1116</sup> *ibid.*, 27.

<sup>1117</sup> *ibid.*, 29.

echoed the Swiss militia system. The 1972-CSR favoured this model as it was supposed to ensure the highest degree of *Wehrgerechtigkeit*;<sup>1118</sup> however, the 1972-CSR ultimately dropped this model, as they judged that a militia based force could not meet defensive alliances' proficiency requirements.<sup>1119</sup>

With Model C, the 1972-CSR proposed a mixed force structure, which was supposed to consist of *Zeitsoldaten*, *Berufssoldaten* and *Wehrpflichtigen*.<sup>1120</sup> While this model chiefly resembled the *Bundeswehr*'s contemporary structures, it proposed some additional features, which the 1972-CSR believed would aid in making structures more efficient and affordable and drafting a fairer process.<sup>1121</sup> First, the total number of troops was set to be approximately 490,000, which, according to the 1972-CSR, should be mobilised in full within three days.<sup>1122</sup> Second, to support this readiness commitment, the Army was supposed to receive more troops and better equipment.<sup>1123</sup> Third, the *Wehrdienst* was to be reduced from 18 to 15 months.<sup>1124</sup> Fourth, the 1972-CSR proposed to grant former conscripts several perks, including career support, preferential treatment for social benefits and bank loans, as well as a one-time tax cut of DM1,500.<sup>1125</sup> Fifth, *Ungediente*, who had been deemed fit for duty but were not drafted, should be levied with a one-time tax burden of DM1,500.<sup>1126</sup> Sixth, *Kriegsdienstverweigerer* should continue their service in social organisations in lieu of military service.<sup>1127</sup>

#### 5.1.1.2 Defence Reviews (1973-1979)

**1973/74 Defence White Paper.** The first two 1970s Defence White Papers mainly focused on the issue of *Wehrgerechtigkeit*. Besides, the 1972-CSR had highlighted that the defence budget needed to increase in order to upgrade the *Bundeswehr*'s equipment to

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<sup>1118</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1119</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1120</sup> *ibid.*, 32 et seq.

<sup>1121</sup> *ibid.*, 32-33.

<sup>1122</sup> *ibid.*, 35.

<sup>1123</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1124</sup> *ibid.*, 32-33.

<sup>1125</sup> *ibid.*, 40-41.

<sup>1126</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1127</sup> *ibid.*

international standards.<sup>1128</sup> Previously, the MoD's strategy had been to favour the former over the latter. This, however, changed with the 1973/74 Defence White Paper.<sup>1129</sup> Now, the government intended to increase the *Bundeswehr's* combat strength, which, according to the MoD, was only to be achieved by upgrading the *Bundeswehr's* equipment.<sup>1130</sup> To do so, large investments had to be made.<sup>1131</sup> However, as noted by in the 1973/74 Defence White Paper, the defence budget was still too small as its share of federal spending was continuously decreasing.<sup>1132</sup> While this funding enabled the *Bundeswehr* to continue running at contemporary capacity, it did not allow for necessary investments in equipment or structural adaptations.<sup>1133</sup> As the MoD did not expect defence budgets to rise anytime soon, military planners started to look at personnel costs as a source for internal funding.<sup>1134</sup> Noting that the latter had increased disproportionally in the past decade, the MoD, therefore, decided to free financial sources by implementing severe cuts to manpower.<sup>1135</sup> In consequence, it was determined to reduce the number of *Zeit-* and *Berifssoldaten* by 30,000.<sup>1136</sup> In order not to jeopardise military capabilities, the MoD decided that reservists had to compensate for this reduction in manpower.<sup>1137</sup> The accompanying shift of responsibilities is discussed in detail in later in this chapter.

**1975/76 Defence White Paper.** With the 1973/74 Defence White Paper, the MoD had begun a *Wehrstrukturreform*, which was partially based on the 1972-CSR's 1972 recommendations. In the subsequent defence review of 1975/76, no further structural adaptations were suggested.<sup>1138</sup> As regards the defence budget, the Defence White Paper highlighted that initiated measures had been successful in reallocating funds to procurement.<sup>1139</sup> Ac-

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<sup>1128</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 26.

<sup>1129</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*.

<sup>1130</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 61.

<sup>1131</sup> *ibid.*, 175.

<sup>1132</sup> *ibid.*, 62, and 208.

<sup>1133</sup> *ibid.*, 63.

<sup>1134</sup> *ibid.*, 62.

<sup>1135</sup> *ibid.*, 65.

<sup>1136</sup> *ibid.*, 68.

<sup>1137</sup> *ibid.*, 65 et seq.

<sup>1138</sup> cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*.

<sup>1139</sup> *ibid.*, 207-208.

cording to the MoD, allocated funds were sufficient for supporting contemporary structures, which, in turn, allowed the *Bundeswehr* to operate on satisfactory levels.<sup>1140</sup>

### 5.1.2 Savings Goals and Defence Expenditure

As seen in Subsection 5.1.1, financial constraints exercised significant influence on the MoD in the early 1970s. With a savings goal of DM1.08 billion, the government expected the defence budget to contribute a disproportionately large percentage to overall federal consolidation efforts in 1970.<sup>1141</sup> While the MoD first tried to absorb imposed economies by introducing a procurement freeze, it changed strategy in 1973 and implemented a *Wehrstrukturreform* in 1973, which aimed to save funds through redundancies. On the following pages, this development is explored in detail by examining defence expenditure in the context of federal budgets and economic stimuli packages.

#### 5.1.2.1 Defence Expenditure in Context (1970-1974)

The 1970s were characterised by economic turmoil, which the government tried to encounter with a mix of budget cuts and economic stimuli packages.<sup>1142</sup> The former were mostly enforced from 1970 through 1974 and accounted for a total of DM30.20 billion;<sup>1143</sup> government investment was approximately DM21.10 billion during this period.<sup>1144</sup> The primary purpose of these measures was to foster economic growth and later to support industries that were most affected by the 1973 rise in commodity prices such as oil.<sup>1145</sup> As illustrated in Table 5.1, federal expenditure rose by DM43.45 billion from 1970 to 1974. Combined with inflation, this upward trend reflects the said investments.

Economies, on the other hand, are not visible in the total federal expenditure. The reason being that savings were to be realised by freezing ministries' budget at contemporary

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<sup>1140</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1141</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 139-141.

<sup>1142</sup> Claus-Martin Gaul, *Konjunkturprogramme in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Einordnung und Bewertung der Globalsteuerung von 1967 bis 1982* (Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, 2008), 11 et seq.

<sup>1143</sup> *ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>1144</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1145</sup> *ibid.*, 15.

Table 5.1: Federal Defence Expenditure (1970-1974)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Federal Expenditure</b>							
In DM billions	90.95	100.14	109.28	120.39	134.4	555.16	111.03
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	10.11	9.12	10.17	11.64	n/a	10.26
<b>Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	3.45	5.24	5.48	7.03	6.99	n/a	5.64
<b>Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In DM billion	20.16	22.84	31.59	27.27	28.95	130.81	26.16
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	13.29	38.31	-13.68	6.16	n/a	11.02
In per cent of Federal Expenditure	22.17	22.81	28.91	23.03	21.54	n/a	23.69
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	n/a**	2.89	26.74	-20.34	-6.47	n/a	0.71
*MoD, foreign troops, civil defence.							
**Baseline = 1970.							

Sources: The German Federal Government, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.

levels;<sup>1146</sup> at least until 1973. As displayed in Table 5.1, 1973 marked the beginning of declining defence expenditure; both in total and relative numbers. As regards the former, funding dropped by 13.68 per cent in 1973; when factoring in inflation, however, real defence spending even decreased by 20.71 per cent. Moreover, relative defence expenditure, namely, the MoD's share of total federal spending, dropped to 23.03 per cent. In 1974, on the other hand, it appeared that expenditure had risen by 6.16 per cent. When considering 1974's inflation of 6.99 per cent, however, the MoD's budget decreased by 0.83 per cent. Besides, the MoD's share of total federal expenditure continued to fall and accounted for only 21.51 per cent.

Notwithstanding the continuation this downward trend, 1974's numbers have to be treated with caution. As of 01 January 1974, the government had decided to bundle all government pensions in one designated budget.<sup>1147</sup> Therefore, the MoD did not have to pay former service members or civilian employees from its own budget; therefore, the negative adjustment of defence expenditure in 1974 can partially be justified.

<sup>1146</sup> cf. Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 139-141.

<sup>1147</sup> Pensions were now paid out of Budget Section 33 'Versorgung'; Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 208.

### 5.1.2.2 Defence Expenditure in Context (1975-1979)

Similar to the first half of the decade, the government continued its policy of economic stimuli and invested approximately DM44.30 billion in the economy from 1975 through 1979.<sup>1148</sup> However, in contrast to the preceding period, no economies were levied on the federal budget.<sup>1149</sup> As illustrated in Table 5.2, the latter continuously grew and reached a maximum spending of DM204.44 billion in 1979. A similar trend can be observed as regards defence expenditure. As seen in Table 5.2, the MoD was not imposed with direct economies. Nevertheless, defence expenditure's share of total government spending continued to drop and eventually accounted for less than 20 per cent of overall government spending. Moreover, the annual increase hardly compensated inflation.

Table 5.2: Federal Defence Expenditure (1975-1979)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>Federal Expenditure</b>							
In DM billion	153.95	168.09	171.8	188.64	204.44	886.92	177.38
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	14.55	9.18	2.21	9.8	8.38	n/a	7.39
<b>Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	5.91	4.25	3.74	2.72	4.04	n/a	4.13
<b>Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In DM billion	31.37	32.9	33.85	36.74	38.63	173.49	34.70
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	8.36	4.88	2.89	8.54	5.14	n/a	5.36
In per cent of Total Expenditure	20.38	19.57	19.7	19.48	18.89	n/a	19.60
Annual $\Delta$ in per cent	-5.39	-3.97	0.66	-1.12	-3.03	n/a	-1.87
*MoD, foreign troops, civil defence.							

Sources: The German Federal Government, including own calculations, and OECD, including own calculations.

### 5.1.3 Security Environment

In order to assess a given nation's security environment, this thesis looks at both territorial and ideological parameters. While distinguishing between these two was already tricky

<sup>1148</sup> Claus-Martin Gaul, *Konjunkturprogramme in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Einordnung und Bewertung der Globalsteuerung von 1967 bis 1982*, 14.

<sup>1149</sup> *ibid.*



in Chapter Four, it was somewhat more challenging for the 1970s example. During this period, Germany was at the centre of conflicts stemming from the Cold War's confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Hence, both territorial and ideological threats met at the border of West-Germany and the GDR. Nevertheless, the decade was also characterised by the so-called *détente*, which, based on several international and bilateral agreements, contributed to an improvement in threat levels. This subsection, therefore, examines both the said treaties and the German government's perspective to estimate the security environment's stability.

### 5.1.3.1 The Global Perspective of *Détente*

**Initial Postwar Period.** From the end of World War Two until the mid-1960s, relations between East and West were characterised by hostility, mistrust and the fostering of the communist and capitalist agenda in the states dependent on the Soviet Union and the United States respectively.<sup>1150</sup> NATO's strategic answer to growing Warsaw Pact aggression at the time was the doctrine of massive retaliation.<sup>1151</sup> It was mainly built on deterrence by emphasising that the United State was capable of completely annihilating any adversary daring to attack NATO.<sup>1152</sup> Considering this threat, and the Soviet Union's willingness to respond to aggression in a similar way, initiating talks aiming to decrease tension between the two blocs were hardly feasible.<sup>1153</sup> Nevertheless, tentative attempts to improve relations with the East were undertaken by both France and Germany in the early 1960s.<sup>1154</sup> Due to pressures from NATO allies, however, then-President de Gaulle's and then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Gerhard Schröder's efforts were scotched almost instantly.<sup>1155</sup> Here, it became apparent that consultations regarding the improvement of relations were highly dependent on the superpowers' backing.<sup>1156</sup> In the 1960s, however, both the Soviet Union

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<sup>1150</sup> cf. Wolf-Dieter Karl, 'Entspannungspolitik: Der Weg von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation in den Ost-West-Beziehungen', ed. Karl-Dieter Schwarz (Bad-Honef-Erpel: Osang, 1977), 133.

<sup>1151</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1152</sup> cf., *ibid.*

<sup>1153</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1154</sup> *ibid.*, 136.

<sup>1155</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1156</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 137.

and the United States were preoccupied with other pressing matters;<sup>1157</sup> while the former was busy trying to foster her influence in her Eastern satellite states, the latter saw herself confronted with the challenges of the war in Vietnam.<sup>1158</sup>

**Non-Proliferation Treaty.** Although NATO changed its doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response in the mid-1960s, this step did not contribute to decreasing the tensions with the Warsaw Pact but further fostered the notion of ‘us against them’.<sup>1159</sup> Nevertheless, the first signs of *détente* were felt in 1968 when the Soviet Union, the United States and numerous other countries, including Britain and Germany, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>1160</sup> In this agreement, signatory nations accepted three terms; first, existing nuclear arsenals should be frozen at current levels.<sup>1161</sup> Second, countries possessing nuclear weapons should not equip other nations with a nuclear arsenal.<sup>1162</sup> Third, countries who had not developed or obtained nuclear weapons in the past should refrain from doing so in the future.<sup>1163</sup>

**Helsinki Accords and MBFR.** Around the same time the NPT was negotiated, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact toyed with the idea of entering further talks to improve relations.<sup>1164</sup> However, due to divergent expectations and contesting agendas, the preparation of a multinational conference, which later became known as the Helsinki Accords, proved to be a difficult process. In 1967, the incumbent Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Harmel, proposed reviewing NATO’s situation and to publish recommendations on the alliance’s future strategy.<sup>1165</sup> The findings of the so-called Harmel report were twofold; first NATO’s emphasis should be shifted from retaliation to defence.<sup>1166</sup> Second,

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<sup>1157</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1158</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1159</sup> Dieter O.A. Wolf, ‘Zur Deutschland-, Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, eds. Günter Walpuski, and Dieter O.A. Wolf (Munich: Oldenburg, 1979), 126-127.

<sup>1160</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. S.U.-U.K.-U.S., 01 July 1968.

<sup>1161</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1162</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1163</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1164</sup> Günter Walpuski, *Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 179.

<sup>1165</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1166</sup> *ibid.*

NATO members should proactively determine approaches that would aid in improving the relationship with the Eastern Bloc.<sup>1167</sup> In principle, the Warsaw Pact's strategic estimates mirrored this reasoning why it suggested entering negotiations with the West, which were supposed to lead to troop reductions in Europe.<sup>1168</sup>

Notwithstanding common interests, the Warsaw Pact initially did not want to consult with the United States but was interested in talks with European nations.<sup>1169</sup> In 1969, the Finnish Government proposed holding talks in Helsinki and the Eastern Bloc submitted a list of suggested topics, which included mutual renunciation of violence as well as economic, academic and technological co-operation.<sup>1170</sup> While supporting this approach, NATO did not just yet agree on a meeting, as member countries demanded the participation of the United States and Canada.<sup>1171</sup> Moreover, NATO stipulated that the subject of MBFR needed to be added to the agenda. Eventually, in 1970, both parties agreed on the agenda, and the Warsaw Pact consented to allowing the United States and Canada to be part of the conference.<sup>1172</sup>

In 1972, negotiations eventually commenced and proceeded in three phases.<sup>1173</sup> From late 1972 to the spring of 1973, the participating nations started preparing the meeting in Helsinki.<sup>1174</sup> Subsequently, in the summer of 1973, participating countries' ministers for foreign affairs convened to commence negotiations.<sup>1175</sup> Finally, from autumn of 1973 through the summer of 1975, delegations from 35 states held talks and agreed in a final act on numerous measures that were believed to foster mutual trust.<sup>1176</sup> Widely regarded as one of the most crucial documents for starting the era of *détente*, the Helsinki Accords of 01 August 1975 included propositions for co-operation in trade, academia, technology and environmental protection.<sup>1177</sup> Moreover, people-to-people contact was aspired to

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<sup>1167</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1168</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1169</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1170</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1171</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1172</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1173</sup> *ibid.*, 179-180.

<sup>1174</sup> *ibid.*, 180.

<sup>1175</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1176</sup> *ibid.*, 180-181.

<sup>1177</sup> *ibid.*

be fostered by facilitating cultural and educational exchange.<sup>1178</sup> Besides, the Helsinki Accords further marked the West's acceptance of the *status quo* in Europe and the Soviet Union's recognition that the United States reserved the right to intervene in European affairs.<sup>1179</sup>

Although demanded by NATO in 1969, MBFR was not discussed in Helsinki.<sup>1180</sup> Instead, separate negotiations commenced on 30 October 1973 to confer if it was possible to agree on means to reduce troops on a mutual and balanced basis.<sup>1181</sup> Moreover, strategies concerning arms control and co-ordinated crisis management were put on the agenda.<sup>1182</sup> Although no tangible progress was made until the end of the 1970s, negotiations were appreciated as a forum to discuss and built trust.<sup>1183</sup>

**SALT-I and SALT-II.** Simultaneously to the Helsinki Accords and MBFR negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the so-called Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which aimed to limit the expansion of anti-ballistic missile systems.<sup>1184</sup> The first round of meetings, SALT-I, were held between 1969 and 1972 and concluded with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM-Treaty).<sup>1185</sup> In Article 1, the superpowers agreed not to install a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system.<sup>1186</sup> Moreover, Article 9 prohibited signatories to share this technology with other nations, while Article 5 banned the instalment of an early warning system.<sup>1187</sup>

The SALT-II negotiations took place between 1972 and 1979 and somewhat constituted the continuation of SALT-I.<sup>1188</sup> Its primary goal was to limit a nuclear arms race, however, due to the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the treaty was never ratified by

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<sup>1178</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1179</sup> *ibid.*, 181.

<sup>1180</sup> *ibid.*, 183.

<sup>1181</sup> *ibid.*, 183-184.

<sup>1182</sup> *ibid.*, 184.

<sup>1183</sup> *ibid.*, 185.

<sup>1184</sup> cf. Dieter O.A. Wolf, 'Zur Deutschland-, Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', 136.

<sup>1185</sup> *ibid.*, and Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. S.U.-U.S., 26 May 1972.

<sup>1186</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1187</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1188</sup> '1979: Carter and Brezhnev Sign the SALT-II Treaty', The History Channel, 2018, accessed 22 August 2018, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/carter-and-brezhnev-sign-the-salt-ii-treaty>.

the United States.<sup>1189</sup>

**Four Power Agreement on Berlin.** Due to the involvement of the two superpowers and numerous European actors, the above-discussed treaties had a truly global character. The Four Power Agreement on Berlin, on the other hand, not only intended to stabilise the European security situation but also had implications for the citizens of West-Berlin.<sup>1190</sup> Signed on 03 September 1971, the agreement's primary goals were threefold; first, it aimed to prevent future conflicts by placing relations of the involved parties as regards Berlin on a firm legal footing.<sup>1191</sup> Therefore, jurisdictions and allied rights in Berlin were affirmed in Art. 1(3).<sup>1192</sup> Furthermore, the signatories agreed to solve arising difficulties by peaceful means.<sup>1193</sup> Second, the Soviet Union agreed not to block access routes to West-Berlin and guarantee a safe passage for transit.<sup>1194</sup> Third, to facilitate contact between family members on both sides, the Soviet Union was not to intervene in telecommunications between the enclave and the GDR.<sup>1195</sup> Moreover, citizens of West-Berlin should be treated in the same way as other tourists travelling to the GDR.<sup>1196</sup>

#### 5.1.3.2 The German Perspective *Détente*

**Security Concerns and Strategies.** As the aforementioned agreements demonstrate, Germany's European partners were keen to reach *détente* with the Eastern Bloc during the 1970s. Their intentions were presumably congruent with Germany's, namely, to stabilise Europe's security situation.<sup>1197</sup>

From NATO's perspective, the latter would have been severely harmed by an annexation of West-Germany as this event would have weakened the alliances' military and strategic

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<sup>1189</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1190</sup> Viermächte-Abkommen zwischen den USA, der UdSSR, Großbritannien und Frankreich vom 3. September 1971, U.S.-S.U.-U.K.-F.R., 03 September 1971.

<sup>1191</sup> cf. *ibid.*, Art. 1.

<sup>1192</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1193</sup> *ibid.*, Art. 1(1) and 1(2).

<sup>1194</sup> This included all routes, namely, land, air and waterways; cf. *ibid.*, Art. II(B).

<sup>1195</sup> *ibid.*, Art. II(C).

<sup>1196</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1197</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 7 et seq.

clout. Moreover, it would have shifted the Warsaw Pact's influence further to the West.<sup>1198</sup> Therefore, troops from six NATO members were stationed in Germany.<sup>1199</sup> For Germany, on the other hand, easing tensions with the Warsaw Pact was essential for survival. As she directly bordered the Eastern Bloc, Germany would have been the first victim of the Warsaw Pact's aggression.<sup>1200</sup> Furthermore, the German government was burdened with the responsibility to prevent a fraternal war, which the *Bundeswehr* would have had to fight with the GDR's National People's Army (NPA).

In addition to supporting SALT and signing both the Helsinki Accords and the NPT, the government, therefore, pursued further strategies to develop good relations with the Eastern Bloc.<sup>1201</sup> Referred to as the *Neue Ostpolitik*, Germany's contemporary approach was primarily based on the attempt to reach bilateral agreements with Eastern countries.<sup>1202</sup> Central to the negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) were to outlaw the use of force and to foster person-to-person contacts between civilians.<sup>1203</sup>

**Prerequisites and Obstacles.** Notwithstanding Germany's good intentions, the government had to deliver specific prerequisites and overcome certain obstacles to enter and conclude negotiations. From as early as the Adenauer administration, reunification was the

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<sup>1198</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>1199</sup> *ibid.*, 16-17.

<sup>1200</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>1201</sup> Prior and (or) in addition to the discussed treaties, Germany signed the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971) and the Biological Weapons Convention (1972); cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 42, and Günter Walpuski, *Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 179 et seq., and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. S.U.-U.K.-U.S., 01 July 1968.

<sup>1202</sup> cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 3.

<sup>1203</sup> cf. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken: 'Moskauer Vertrag' vom 12. August 1970, D.E.-S.U., 12 August 1970, Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen: 'Warschauer Vertrag' vom 7. Dezember 1970, D.E.-P.L., 07 December 1970, Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 21. Dezember 1972, D.E.-D.D., 21 December 1972, and Vertrag über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: 'Prager Vertrag' vom 11. Dezember 1973, D.E.-C.S.S.R., 11 December 1973.

top priority of every German government.<sup>1204</sup> While this aspiration is understandable from an emotional point of view, it also indicated that Germany did not accept contemporary borders and nation-state territories.<sup>1205</sup> Aware of this quandary, then-Chancellor Willy Brandt, the architect of the *Neue Ostpolitik*, chose to abandon reunification for the time being and instead favour the progress of *détente*.<sup>1206</sup> While this decision was accompanied by a fierce public debate in Germany and was certainly not made lightheartedly, her allies were less than thrilled to watch Germany engage in bilateral talks with the Eastern Bloc.<sup>1207</sup> Fearing that Germany could draw nearer to the East and leave the Western alliance, the British, French, and American ambassadors to Moscow tried to intervene in negotiations and prevent Germany from signing a treaty with the Soviet Union.<sup>1208</sup> Perceiving this conduct as an attempt to meddle in German foreign affairs and, therefore, curtailing Germany's sovereignty, this endeavour led to a fallout between Germany and her allies;<sup>1209</sup> most notably with Britain, which German politicians regarded the driving forces behind this endeavour.<sup>1210</sup>

**Treaty of Moscow.** Despite these difficulties, the first treaty of the *Neue Ostpolitik*, the Treaty of Moscow, was signed on 12 August 1970.<sup>1211</sup> The prerequisite was explicitly mentioned in Art 3., which stated that peace could only be sustained when both signatory parties mutually accepted contemporary borders and refrained from making territorial claims, now and in the future.<sup>1212</sup> Consequently, Germany did not only abandon her quest for a rapid reunification with the GDR but also officially abandoned the idea of reclaiming former German territories in the East. The most important resolutions, however, were outlined in Art. 1 and 2;<sup>1213</sup> in the former, the Soviet Union and Germany declared

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<sup>1204</sup> Wolf-Dieter Karl, 'Entspannungspolitik: Der Weg von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation in den Ost-West-Beziehungen', 137.

<sup>1205</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1206</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1207</sup> cf. Always Good Neighbours - Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949-2001, 13-14.

<sup>1208</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1209</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1210</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1211</sup> Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken: 'Moskauer Vertrag' vom 12. August 1970, D.E.-S.U., 12 August 1970.

<sup>1212</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1213</sup> *ibid.*

that it was their goal to preserve peace and that they would strive to work on developing normal relations.<sup>1214</sup> Moreover, in Art. 2, both signatories committed themselves to solve differences by peaceful means without threatening to resort to violence.<sup>1215</sup> Although the latter may appear logical from today's perspective, this pledge did indeed mark the beginning of *détente* between the Soviet Union and Germany and replaced a 15 years state of apprehension.

**Treaty of Warsaw.** Following the Treaty of Moscow, Germany signed another crucial agreement with an Eastern Bloc country, namely, with Poland.<sup>1216</sup> Considering Germany's inhuman treatment of the Polish people in the first half of the 20th-century, reaching this agreement, from a human relations perspective, was even more important than the Treaty of Moscow. Moreover, for it to come into being, both parties needed to meet some specific prerequisites, that were less technical than territorial issues. For Poland, signing such an agreement with the (former) enemy requested working through the grief and humiliation inflicted upon her people in two World Wars. Due to Germany's accumulated moral debt, on the other hand, she had to admit to her guilt publicly and ask for forgiveness. Besides fulfilling the latter technocratically on the political level, a genuine act of repentance was expressed by then-Chancellor Willy Brandt when he famously kneeled in front of the Warsaw Ghetto memorial only hours before the Treaty of Warsaw was signed on 07 December 1970.<sup>1217</sup>

While negotiations for the Treaty of Warsaw demanded significant political and human efforts on both sides, the agreement itself largely mirrored the Treaty of Moscow.<sup>1218</sup> In Art. 1, both signatories committed themselves to accepting contemporary borders and refraining

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<sup>1214</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1215</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1216</sup> Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen: 'Warschauer Vertrag' vom 7. Dezember 1970, D.E.-P.L., 07 December 1970.

<sup>1217</sup> Bernd Rother, 'Willy Brandt: Der Kniefall von Warschau', eds. Claudia Fröhlich, and Michael Kohlstruck (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1999), 299 et seq.

<sup>1218</sup> cf. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken: 'Moskauer Vertrag' vom 12. August 1970, D.E.-S.U., 12 August 1970, and Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen über die Grundlagen der Normalisierung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen: 'Warschauer Vertrag' vom 7. Dezember 1970, D.E.-P.L., 07 December 1970.



from claiming territories from the other party, now and in the future.<sup>1219</sup> Furthermore, and again similar to the Treaty of Moscow, Art. 2 determined that conflicts should not be solved by the use of force or the threatening of the other party but should be answered by peaceful means.<sup>1220</sup> Art. 3, however, was more explicit as regards person-to-person contacts and stipulated that the normalisation of relations should be obtained by enabling exchange on the economic, academic, technological and cultural level.

**Basic Treaty.** Signing such an agreement with Poland had already been a milestone for the *Neue Ostpolitik*. However, from an emotional and practical perspective, the Basic Treaty, which was concluded with the GDR on 21 December 1972, was even more important for Germany.<sup>1221</sup> On the one hand, it entailed the prospect of improving the lives for civilians on both sides of the border by enabling and fostering contacts between family members.<sup>1222</sup> This, according to the Art. 7 of the treaty, was supposed to be achieved by mutual socio-economic, technological and cultural exchange.<sup>1223</sup> More importantly, however, was the ambition to improve mail and telecommunication services and to co-operate in legal affairs.<sup>1224</sup>

Furthermore, the agreement also marked the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two German states.<sup>1225</sup> This step was mainly enabled through mutual acknowledgment of the political and legal *status quo*, which was highlighted in several articles of the agreement.<sup>1226</sup> Art. 1, for instance, stated that both countries accepted the other party as equal before the law and pledged to work towards establishing good and normal neighbourly relations.<sup>1227</sup> In Art. 2, 4, and 6, the *pari passu* status was further under-

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<sup>1219</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1220</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1221</sup> cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 43.

<sup>1222</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1223</sup> Specific provisions were not stated in the Basic Treaty but were governed by additional treaties. These included agreements on issues regarding traffic (26 May 1972), health (25 April 1974), banking and money transactions (25 April 1974), as well as post and telecommunications (30 March 1976); cf. Günter Walpuski, and Dieter O.A. Wolf, 'Zur Entwicklung der Internationalen Politik', 138-139.

<sup>1224</sup> cf. Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 21. Dezember 1972, D.E.-D.D., 21 December 1972, Art. 7.

<sup>1225</sup> cf. *ibid.*, Art. 8.

<sup>1226</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1227</sup> *ibid.*

scored;<sup>1228</sup> the former specifically acknowledged the *status quo* as regards the countries borders and territories and, for the first time, officially recognised the existence of the ‘other’ Germany.<sup>1229</sup> In Art. 4 and 6, on the other hand, the signatories emphasised their sovereignty by stating that both states were autonomous in domestic and foreign affairs and affirmed that one party could not act on behalf of the other on the international level.<sup>1230</sup> As regards the use of force or the threat thereof in times of conflict, Art. 3 was congruent with the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Poland and emphasised that differences were to be solved by peaceful means.<sup>1231</sup> Nevertheless, the Basic Treaty took this idea a step forward and highlighted in Art. 5 that their contribution to peace in Europe was to work together to reduce the number of troops in Europe.<sup>1232</sup> In addition to this medium-term goal, both signatories affirmed their goal was to ultimately banish all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from the continent.<sup>1233</sup>

**Treaty of Prague.** Similar to the Basic Treaty, the Treaty of Prague, which was signed on 11 December 1973, marked the beginning of diplomatic relations between Germany and the CSSR.<sup>1234</sup> Again, administrations on both sides had to make specific concessions.<sup>1235</sup> First, in Art. 1, both parties declared the 1938 agreement on the Sudetenland invalid.<sup>1236</sup> For Germany, agreeing to this provision meant that she had abandoned plans to reclaim territories in the East; a decision, which was not well received by displaced persons in Germany, who were expelled from the Sudetenland after World War Two.<sup>1237</sup> The CSSR, on the other hand, also made concessions and affirmed in Art. 4(2) that she will not make

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<sup>1228</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1229</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1230</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1231</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1232</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1233</sup> cf. *ibid.*, Art 5(2).

<sup>1234</sup> cf. Vertrag über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: ‘Prager Vertrag’ vom 11. Dezember 1973, D.E.-C.S.S.R., 11 December 1973.

<sup>1235</sup> cf. *ibid.*, Art. 1 and 2.

<sup>1236</sup> This so-called Munich Agreement or Diktat, signed by Nazi-Germany, Britain, France and Italy, had forced the CSSR’s predecessor to render the Sudetenland to the Nazis; cf. *ibid.*, and Abkommen zwischen Deutschland, dem Vereinigten Königreich, Frankreich und Italien, Getroffen in München, am 29. September 1938, D.E.-U.K.-F.R.-I.T., 29 September 1938.

<sup>1237</sup> cf. ‘Das Münchner Abkommen 1938’, LEMO: Lebendiges Museum, 02 May 2002, accessed 03 May 2014, <https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/ns-regime/aussenpolitik/muenchnerabkommen>.

territorial claims in the future.<sup>1238</sup> In Art. 3 and 4, both signatories further underscored that they accepted contemporary borders as binding and proclaimed their willingness for closer collaboration in economics, academia, technology, culture, environmental protection, sports and traffic in Art. 5.<sup>1239</sup>

## **5.2 The Reserve in the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform***

### **5.2.1 The 1970s: Discovering the Importance of the Reserve**

As seen in the previous section, the MoD and the 1972-CSR produced various defence reviews throughout the 1970s and even published the results of an examination of the *Bundeswehr*'s reserve in 1971. While the latter was presumably well intended, it did not significantly adapt the reserve force's structures but merely limited reservists' obligations to participate in military exercises. However, when economic challenges increasingly exercised financial pressures on the defence budget, the MoD began acknowledging the importance of reservists' for Germany's defence posture. Although no separate review of the was conducted, reservists' responsibilities changed significantly as of 1973. On the following pages, this post-1973 development is discussed by highlighting reservists' place in the *Bundeswehr*'s structures.

#### **5.2.1.1 The Reserve Force and the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform***

**From Neglect to Necessity.** From its foundation in 1955 to the beginning of the 1970s, the *Bundeswehr* did not consider reservists' participation crucial for Germany's defence.<sup>1240</sup> Reasons for this judgement were twofold; first, in the 1950s and 1960s, the threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion was imminent why the *Bundeswehr* needed to have large numbers of combat-ready troops at its disposal.<sup>1241</sup> Until the 1970s, the MoD met this prerequisite comfortably as the conscription ratio was high and cases of conscientious

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<sup>1238</sup> cf. Vertrag über die gegenseitigen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Tschechoslowakischen Sozialistischen Republik: 'Prager Vertrag' vom 11. Dezember 1973, D.E.-C.S.S.R., 11 December 1973.

<sup>1239</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1240</sup> cf. Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 58.

<sup>1241</sup> *ibid.*

objection were low.<sup>1242</sup> Second, due to NATO's strategy of massive retaliation, which was primarily built on the United State's ability to protect her European allies with her nuclear weapons arsenal, military planners felt somewhat secure in case the Soviet Union was to launch an attack on Germany.<sup>1243</sup>

In the early 1970s, however, this deliberate neglect of reservists gradually began to change and was eventually replaced with a strong dependence on the reserve.<sup>1244</sup> This development commenced in 1973, when the MoD announced its intention to restructure the *Bundeswehr* and to 'outsource' specific responsibilities to the reserve force.<sup>1245</sup> The framing factors of this strategy change were mainly twofold; first, with NATO's transition from massive retaliation to a doctrine of flexible response in the mid-1960s, the *Bundeswehr* was required to ensure a rapid augmentation of skilled troops.<sup>1246</sup> Therefore, reservists, i.e., retired *Zeitsoldaten* and *Wehrpflichtige*, now needed to be trained more efficiently for cases of emergencies.<sup>1247</sup> Second, due to high birth rates in the previous decades, more youngsters than ever before reached the military age in the 1970s, which increasingly complicated the implementation of *Wehrgerechtigkeit*.<sup>1248</sup> Therefore, in conjunction with changing public attitudes towards the armed forces, the number of conscientious objectors rose dramatically as of 1968, which made recruitment of skilled service members more challenging.<sup>1249</sup>

**Personnel vs. Procurement.** In addition to these unfavourable circumstances, the government also imposed severe economies on the MoD as of 1973 while expressing that they expected the *Bundeswehr* to retain combat-readiness.<sup>1250</sup> This demand would have already been difficult to meet under normal conditions; however, it indeed came at the worst possible time. In the 1970 defence review, experts had already voiced concerns that military capabilities were at stake if the *Bundeswehr* was not able to invest in procurement

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<sup>1242</sup> Please refer to Subsection 5.2.2 for further details.

<sup>1243</sup> cf. Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 58.

<sup>1244</sup> cf. Martin Rink, *Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989*, 58.

<sup>1245</sup> cf. Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*, 68, and 112.

<sup>1246</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 58.

<sup>1247</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1248</sup> cf. Peter Richard Munz, 'Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur', 19.

<sup>1249</sup> Please refer to Subsection 5.2.2 for further details.

<sup>1250</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 71-72, and Tables 5.1, and 5.2.

to keep up with advancements in military technology.<sup>1251</sup> Meanwhile, the situation had further worsened as maintenance costs had increased disproportionately and, therefore, made retaining outdated equipment more costly;<sup>1252</sup> both as regards military capabilities and financially.<sup>1253</sup> In other words, it had become inevitable to discontinue enforcing the procurement freeze of 1970.<sup>1254</sup> To allow compensating for less federal funding and investment in necessary equipment updates, the 1973/74 Defence White Paper, therefore, opted to save personnel costs, which, at the time, accounted for the most substantial portion of operating expenses.<sup>1255</sup> Consequently, the MoD determined that troops were to be reduced by 30,000.<sup>1256</sup>

**Reservists' Obligation to Serve.** While no specific review of reserve forces was conducted, the decision to reduce troop strength had severe implications for reservists. At the time, military planners calculated that the *Bundeswehr* needed 1.2 million service members during times of conflict and 495,000 in peacetime.<sup>1257</sup> By cutting manpower by 30,000, however, the latter would have been reduced to 465,000, which would have left the MoD with a significant capabilities gap.<sup>1258</sup> Therefore, speaking from a strategic standpoint, implementing the proposed manpower cut of 30,000 was not feasible. On the other hand, redundancies were deemed inevitable to meet the required savings goals and to make necessary investments in equipment.<sup>1259</sup>

To solve this quandary, the MoD, resorted to a trick, which allowed implementing the proposed redundancies of regular troops but kept total *Bundeswehr* numbers at 495,000. Already before 1973, retired *Zeitsoldaten* and *Wehrpflichtige* were obliged to prepare to

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<sup>1251</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*. 139-141.

<sup>1252</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 76-77.

<sup>1253</sup> cf. *ibid.*

<sup>1254</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*. 139.

<sup>1255</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 71 et seq.

<sup>1256</sup> *ibid.*, 68.

<sup>1257</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1258</sup> cf. Wilhelm Langer, 'Reservisten des Heeres', 162.

<sup>1259</sup> Der Bundeskanzler, *Weißbuch 1970: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr*. 139.

be mobilised for service in regular *Bundeswehr* units upon completion of their term;<sup>1260</sup> however, the *Bundeswehr* could only require reservists (*Wehrpflichtige*) to report for duty for the first three months after leaving their mandatory service. In the course of the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*, this period was extended to 12 months. Often, this novel provision meant that new reservists received their marching orders within a couple of days after they had processed out of the *Bundeswehr*.<sup>1261</sup>

**Adaptations to Training.** During their additional term, reservists did not work jobs created explicitly for reservists but filled posts that were previously held by *Zeit-* or *Berufssoldaten*;<sup>1262</sup> therefore, enabling the MoD to implement the required redundancies without reducing the *Bundeswehr*'s total troop strength.<sup>1263</sup> To carry out these duties, reservists needed to acquire specific skills, which were often not taught to conscripts.<sup>1264</sup> To eliminate this problem, the MoD decided to select *Wehrpflichtige* for consecutive reservist duty already during their mandatory term.<sup>1265</sup> Chosen recruits were, therefore, not attached to combat forces but received specialised on-the-job training to ensure that they would be capable of filling these posts later.<sup>1266</sup>

#### 5.2.1.2 Reservists and Homeland Defence

**Homeland Defence Structures.** In the early days of the *Bundeswehr*, military planners had widely neglected to develop solid structures for homeland defence.<sup>1267</sup> A first attempt to close this strategic gap was taken on 01 June 1957, when the Command for Territorial Defence was established to act as a liaison between the *Bundeswehr* and NATO troops stationed in Germany after World War Two.<sup>1268</sup> Following the Soviet invasion of the CSSR

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<sup>1260</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 68.

<sup>1261</sup> Wilhelm Langer, 'Reservisten des Heeres', 162.

<sup>1262</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1263</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1264</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 71-72.

<sup>1265</sup> *ibid.*, 73.

<sup>1266</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1267</sup> Martin Rink, *Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989*, 75.

<sup>1268</sup> *ibid.*

in 1968, however, homeland defence increasingly moved into the MoD's focus.<sup>1269</sup> With the *Blankeneser Erlass* of 31 March 1970, the Army was restructured and now consisted of the *Feldheer* and *Territorialheer*.<sup>1270</sup> While the former chiefly replaced the now abolished Command for Territorial Defence, the latter was entrusted with the responsibility of homeland defence in the event of war.<sup>1271</sup> The *Territorialheer* was structured as an infantry and consisted of homeland defence units, the so-called *Heimatschutztruppen*, which were predominantly staffed with reservists.<sup>1272</sup> Until the beginning of the 1970s, the MoD allocated 235 peacetime troops to the *Heimatschutztruppen*;<sup>1273</sup> in times of conflict, this number was to be augmented to 9,000.<sup>1274</sup>

**Reservists Responsibilities.** By placing the responsibility for homeland defence in the hands of the *Territorialheer* and its *Heimatschutztruppen*, the *Bundeswehr* had already been highly dependent on reservists.<sup>1275</sup> However, following the implementation of the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*, this dependence increased further as the total number of troops assigned to the *Heimatschutztruppen* rose to 45,000 (peacetime) and 103,000 (wartime).<sup>1276</sup> With this augmentation, the MoD intended strengthening the *Bundeswehr*'s presence in Germany despite having been forced to implement the aforementioned 30,000 redundancies.<sup>1277</sup> Consequently, reservists were mostly assigned the responsibility to defend German territory and to protect critical infrastructure.<sup>1278</sup>

Similar to the situation of reservists serving consecutively in regular units, this strategy was somewhat inhibited by the lack of appropriate training.<sup>1279</sup> Again, reservists had to

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<sup>1269</sup> Wilhelm Langer, 'Reservisten des Heeres', 154.

<sup>1270</sup> *ibid.*, 153-154.

<sup>1271</sup> *ibid.*, 153.

<sup>1272</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 96.

<sup>1273</sup> Martin Rink, *Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989*, 76.

<sup>1274</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1275</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 96.

<sup>1276</sup> cf. Martin Rink, *Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989*, 75-76.

<sup>1277</sup> cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 61.

<sup>1278</sup> Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 113.

<sup>1279</sup> cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1973/1974: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 112.

be re-educated to make sure that the MoD would be able to successfully integrate them in the *Heimatschutztruppen*'s infantry structures.<sup>1280</sup> Training was, therefore, paramount to enable reservists to fulfil their responsibilities in homeland defence.<sup>1281</sup> To ensure a rapid acquisition of necessary skills, new competencies were taught in the framework of military exercises, which were held for up to 28 consecutive days.<sup>1282</sup> Moreover, by assigning reservists to the same units, training was repeated regularly.<sup>1283</sup>

## 5.2.2 Recruitment and the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*

In his government declaration of 1969, then-Chancellor Willy Brandt already referred to social changes, which he believed would significantly influence how the public will perceive the *Bundeswehr* in the years to come.<sup>1284</sup> This statement has to be understood in the light of burgeoning student protests and the strengthening of the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition* (APO). Both developments have contributed to a somewhat *Bundeswehr* hostile climate, which, in turn, largely resulted in the rise of conscientious objection in the 1970s. As the MoD already received an insufficient number of applications by qualified individuals, the *Bundeswehr* faced substantial recruitment problems. As no recruitment strategies other than the *Wehrpflicht* were in place, the *Bundeswehr* tried to keep conscientious objection as low as possible by intensifying the scrutiny process of prospective conscientious objectors. On the following pages, the 1970s increase in conscientious objection is discussed in conjunction with explaining the origins of the student protests and the APO's main characteristics and political goals.

<sup>1280</sup> For instance, reservists who were trained to stir a tank had to be taught relevant infantry skills; *ibid.*

<sup>1281</sup> Besides this skills deficit, the *Heimatschutztruppen* were provided with insufficient and too little equipment. This problem persisted throughout the 1970s; cf. Die Bundesregierung, *Weißbuch 1975/1976: Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr*, 113, and Gerhard Brugmann, 'Reservisten in Planung und Einsatz', 108.

<sup>1282</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1283</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1284</sup> Willy Brandt, *Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969*, 15-16.



### 5.2.2.1 *Kriegsdienstverweigerung*

**Conscious Objection in Numbers.** In the 1971-COR, the MoD highlighted that the *Bundeswehr* had sufficient numbers of reservists at its disposal;<sup>1285</sup> however, non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers were rarely found in the reserve.<sup>1286</sup> To recruit these kinds of service members, the *Bundeswehr* had to rely on conscripts who were willing to contribute additional efforts to their service and were motivated to advance their military careers beyond the completion of their *Wehrdienst*.

As illustrated in Table 5.3, chances of finding such conscripts became increasingly challenging in the 1970s. As displayed by the numbers in Table 5.3 this trend already started in 1968, when conscientious objection suddenly increased by 100.4 per cent. Being only disrupted by three negative outliers in 1974, 1975, and 1978, this development continued throughout the 1970s when ever more *Wehrpflichtige* applied to be recognised as *Kriegsdienstverweigerer*. The applications' approval rates, on the other hand, did not develop linear and appear somewhat arbitrary; on average, 46.66 per cent approvals were granted.

**The Testing of Conscience.** In the first years following the foundation of the *Bundeswehr* in 1955, conscientious objection was the exception to the rule.<sup>1287</sup> According to Munz, recruits willingness to serve can be explained by contemporary social norms, which perceived *Kriegsdienstverweigerung* a deviation to the norm.<sup>1288</sup> Therefore, the *Bundeswehr* generously ignored the few conscientious objectors during this period and did not require applicants to jump through stringent bureaucratic hoops.<sup>1289</sup>

As *Kriegsdienstverweigerung* became more frequent, however, the *Bundeswehr* increasingly felt the need to put a halt to this development.<sup>1290</sup> Changing legislation to limit individuals' rights to object conscription was not an option. Being part of the *Grundgesetz*,

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<sup>1285</sup> Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Reservistenkonzeption 1971*, cited in Dietmar Schössler, and Armin Steinkamm, *Reservisten '71/'72: Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme des Reservistenverbandes*, 170.

<sup>1286</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1287</sup> 'Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde', TV documentary *Geschichte im Ersten*, reported by Knut Weinrich, broadcasted by ARD, 12 March 2018.

<sup>1288</sup> Peter Richard Munz, 'Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur', 81.

<sup>1289</sup> 'Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde', TV documentary *Geschichte im Ersten*.

<sup>1290</sup> *ibid.*

Table 5.3: *Kriegsdienstverweigerer* (1965-1980)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Applications (Total)</b>	<b>Applications (Δ in per cent)</b>	<b>Applications (Approved)</b>	<b>Approvals (Δ in per cent)</b>	<b>Approval Rate (In per cent)</b>
<b>1965</b>	3,437	n/a*	2,064	n/a*	60.05
<b>1966</b>	4,431	22.43	2,750	33.24	62.06
<b>1967</b>	5,963	34.57	4,739	72.33	79.47
<b>1968</b>	11,952	100.4	5,588	17.9	46.8
<b>1969</b>	14,420	20.6	7,500	34.2	52.0
<b>1970</b>	19,363	34.3	9,351	24.7	48.3
<b>1971</b>	27,657	42.8	11,033	18.0	39.9
<b>1972</b>	33,792	22.2	13,132	19.0	38.9
<b>1973</b>	35,192	4.1	16,649	26.8	47.3
<b>1974</b>	34,150	-3.0	18,621	11.8	54.5
<b>1975</b>	32,565	-4.6	18,496	-0.7	56.8
<b>1976</b>	40,618	24.7	16,505	-10.8	40.6
<b>1977</b>	69,969	72.3	18,474	11.9	26.4
<b>1978</b>	39,698	-43.3	18,414	-0.3	46.4
<b>1979</b>	45,515	14.7	30,727	66.9	67.5
<b>1980</b>	54,193	19.1	30,250	-1.6	55.8
*Baseline = 1965.					

Günter Walpuski, *Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 116, including own calculations.

*Kriegsdienstverweigerung* on the grounds of conscience was an undeniable right.<sup>1291</sup> To circumvent this obstacle, the MoD, therefore, began to demand applicants to undergo a time-consuming, stressful and often humiliation process to prove that they genuinely wanted to object conscription on the grounds of their conscience.<sup>1292</sup>

This method became known as the *Gewissensprüfung* or the testing of one's conscience and consisted of a two-step process.<sup>1293</sup> First, applicants needed to submit a written request explaining their motivation.<sup>1294</sup> Subsequently, prospective conscientious objectors were forced to appear in front of a *Bundeswehr* panel and repeat their reasons.<sup>1295</sup> During these encounters, *Bundeswehr* representatives often confronted applicants with indiscreet personal and trick questions. A frequently asked question was to require applicants to elaborate on what they would do if an armed assailant attacked their mothers, partners or wives. If they answered that they would defend them with force, the MoD usually denied the approval as conscientious objectors.<sup>1296</sup>

In an attempt to counter the *Bundeswehr*'s conduct, a network of dedicated lawyers tried to coach prospective conscientious objectors.<sup>1297</sup> However, as seen in Table 5.3, approvals and rejections did not follow a discernible pattern but were somewhat arbitrary. Reasons for this were twofold; first, these panels were not based on due process.<sup>1298</sup> Instead of unbiased judges, *Bundeswehr* representatives constituted these committees.<sup>1299</sup> Instructed by the MoD to decrease the numbers of *Kriegsdienstverweigerer*, these people cannot be described as impartial.<sup>1300</sup> Second, the MoD did not publish any generally binding guidelines on how to conduct the hearings.

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<sup>1291</sup> To change the *Grundgesetz*, the government needs the consent of two-thirds of the *Bundestag* and the *Bundesrat*; GG Art. 4(3), and GG 79(2).

<sup>1292</sup> cf. Patrick Bernhard, 'Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Zivildienst' (bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013), accessed 15 July 2019, <http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verteidigungspolitik/216758/kriegsdienstverweigerung>.

<sup>1293</sup> 'Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde', TV documentary *Geschichte im Ersten*.

<sup>1294</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1295</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1296</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1297</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1298</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1299</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1300</sup> *ibid.*

**Social Reservations, Acceptance, and *Zivildienst*.** Reflecting this somewhat hostile and biased process, the high number of applicants for conscience objection in the 1970s is quite astonishing. Nevertheless, the contemporary social climate at the time seemed to have supported this development. When *Kriegsdienstverweigerung* became more frequent, society initially sided with the *Bundeswehr*;<sup>1301</sup> conscientious objectors were largely shunned and perceived as cowards or being lazy.<sup>1302</sup> Over time, however, attitudes gradually changed and acceptance for their decision grew.

Evidence for this can be found by looking at the number of posts offered to *Zivildienstleistende*. As illustrated by Table 5.4, only a small number of posts was available until 1968. Yet, coinciding with the rise in *Kriegsdienstverweigerung* in 1968, ever more organisations started offering opportunities to fulfil the *Wehrpflicht* by contributing time and efforts to social causes. In consequence, society started accepting that conscientious objectors were not lazy but instead were genuine when they stated that they did not want to serve the country by carrying a rifle.<sup>1303</sup>

#### 5.2.2.2 Student Protest and the *Außerparlamentarische Opposition*

**The 1968 Generation.** The first generation of *Bundeswehr* recruits was born between 1937 and 1950. Being the children of former *Wehrmacht* soldiers, these youngsters were raised to accept that serving in the armed forces was the norm.<sup>1304</sup> However, as discussed on the previous pages, these attitudes drastically changed in the late 1960s. Instead of blindly following their parents' directives, young adults began questioning their countries' and their parents' past.<sup>1305</sup> Known in Germany as the 1968 Generation, this generation demanded the full democratisation of the nation by calling for 'former' Nazis to be removed from their jobs in the public sector.<sup>1306</sup> As regards the *Bundeswehr*, the 1968 Generation's

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<sup>1301</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1302</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1303</sup> cf. Patrick Bernhard, 'Kriegsdienstverweigerung und Zivildienst'.

<sup>1304</sup> Peter Richard Munz, 'Wehrgerechtigkeit und Wehrstruktur', 81.

<sup>1305</sup> 'Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF', TV documentary, broadcasted by ZDFinfo, 08 January 2015.

<sup>1306</sup> Following World War Two, a workforce shortage forced representatives of the allied nations to reinstate 'former' members of the Nazi party as judges, teacher, professors, politicians, police officers and *Bundeswehr* service members. Despite their disreputable past, these individuals worked in their professions

Table 5.4: *Zivildienstleistende* (1965-1980)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Total</b> ( $\Delta$ in per cent)	<b>Available Posts</b>	<b>Available Posts</b> ( $\Delta$ in per cent)
<b>1965</b>	1,416	n/a*	n/s**	n/s**
<b>1966</b>	11,75	-17.02	n/s**	n/s**
<b>1967</b>	1,542	31.23	n/s**	n/s**
<b>1968</b>	1,762	14.27	2,815	n/s**
<b>1969</b>	2,589	46.94	4,720	67.67
<b>1970</b>	4,853	87.45	5,879	24.56
<b>1971</b>	6,148	26.68	8,032	36.62
<b>1972</b>	8,762	42.52	11,145	38.76
<b>1973</b>	10,640	21.43	16,709	49.92
<b>1974</b>	13,643	28.22	22,000	31.67
<b>1975</b>	15,105	10.72	24,214	10.06
<b>1976</b>	16,254	7.61	30,941	27.78
<b>1977</b>	18,316	12.69	36,108	16.70
<b>1978</b>	25,513	39.29	37,802	4.69
<b>1979</b>	26,794	5.02	43,800	15.87
<b>1980</b>	31,871	18.95	47,099	7.53
*Baseline = 1965.				
**No statistics kept.				

Günter Walpuski, *Verteidigung + Entspannung = Sicherheit: Texte und Materialien zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, 117, including own calculations.

attitudes were as firm. Stipulating that the *Wehrpflicht* violated a conscript's constitutional rights of personal freedom and physical integrity, serving in the *Bundeswehr* was frowned upon as an act of voluntarily giving up one's human rights.<sup>1307</sup>

Even though it cannot be claimed that all members of this age cohort shared the exact same values, peer pressure might have worked as a catalyst for objecting conscription; especially in the group the *Bundeswehr* was most interested in for recruiting officers from, namely, students. Triggered by the United State's war in Vietnam, German students, alongside their peers in France and North America, started organising themselves in protests against militarism and the ongoing violation of human rights.<sup>1308</sup> Being the host of numerous American military bases, students particularly perceived the German government as complicit in this war on humanity.<sup>1309</sup>

***Außerparlamentarische Opposition.*** Another issue on the 1968 Generation's agenda was preventing the ratification of the so-called emergency laws. When the *Grundgesetz* was drafted and approved by the allies, the latter retained the right to intervene in Germany if their interests or their troops' safety was compromised by civil unrest, external military aggression or other domestic circumstances.<sup>1310</sup> In order to put some authority back into German hands, the incumbent grand coalition sought to amend the *Grundgesetz* by including legislation that would allow the government to act during domestic emergencies without requiring the consent of the *Bundestag*.<sup>1311</sup> While this undertaking is generally comprehensible and appears logical, the intellectual youth of Germany and their supporters were alarmed.<sup>1312</sup> In addition to removing power from the parliament, these new laws included the infringement of GG Art. 10, which guaranteed the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications.<sup>1313</sup> Although claiming that legislation would only be applied in the state of emergency, students worried that the government would declare their

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unchallenged for almost two decades; *ibid.*

<sup>1307</sup> *ibid.*, and 'Als das Gewissen geprüft wurde', TV documentary *Geschichte im Ersten*.

<sup>1308</sup> 'Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF'.

<sup>1309</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1310</sup> Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris (2005), *50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005*, 100-101.

<sup>1311</sup> cf. Jeannine V. de Soet, 'Public Opinion Pressures on German Security Policy', eds. Alexandre Vautravers, and Daniel Donovan (Geneva, GE: Uni-Mail), 170.

<sup>1312</sup> *ibid.*, 171.

<sup>1313</sup> Rolf Clement, and Paul Elmar Jöris (2005), *50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955-2005*, 102.

protests a state of civil unrest and use the laws to spy on them.<sup>1314</sup> However, the public's greatest fear at the time was to relapse into the *Weimarer Republik*, when emergency laws enabled the Nazis to rule uncontestedly and, therefore, eventually contributed to Hitler's rise to power.<sup>1315</sup>

Due to the small *Bundestag*'s opposition, the grand coalition could not be overruled, which made the passing of the emergency laws very likely.<sup>1316</sup> In an attempt to bring their views forward, students, politicians from the opposition as well as various other supporters such as lawyers and journalists formed the APO.<sup>1317</sup> With frequent protests in all major German cities, the APO tried to sway lawmakers' votes.<sup>1318</sup> Nevertheless, the *Bundestag* passed the emergency laws on 05 May 1968;<sup>1319</sup> yet, they were not as far-reaching as initially intended.<sup>1320</sup> First, instead of placing power into the hands of the government, an emergency parliament resembling *Bundestag*'s allocation of seats was to be convened in cases of emergency.<sup>1321</sup> Second, the executive, namely, police forces, were prohibited from violating the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications.<sup>1322</sup>

### 5.3 Key Findings

1. The chapter's evaluation of Defence White Papers and accompanying government publications highlighted that the MoD had to contribute to overall economization measures in the 1970s, which were the direct result of financial constraints following the 1973 oil price shock. At the same time, the MoD needed to update its equipment, which would have increased defence expenditure. The MoD, therefore, ultimately decided to favour procurement plans and implemented 30,000 redundancies in the regular force to realise savings.

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<sup>1314</sup> cf. 'Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF'.

<sup>1315</sup> Jeannine V. de Soet, 'Public Opinion Pressures on German Security Policy', 171.

<sup>1316</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1317</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1318</sup> cf. 'Die Geschichte der RAF: Die Brandstifter - Die Gründung der RAF'.

<sup>1319</sup> Jeannine V. de Soet, 'Public Opinion Pressures on German Security Policy', 171.

<sup>1320</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1321</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>1322</sup> *ibid.*

2. By examining the development of defence spending throughout the 1970s, statistical evidence for the influence of the 1973 oil price shock on the MoD's budget was found. It was highlighted that defence expenditure started to decrease after 1973 both in total and relative numbers.
3. The analysis of various international and bilateral agreements has revealed that the Soviet threat was of central concern to German defence planners in the 1970s. However, it was stipulated that the government placed great trust in these contracts, and, therefore, estimated that the *détente* aided in improving Germany's contemporary security situation.
4. The chapter outlined that the reform of Germany's reserve forces was an ongoing process in the 1970s. While only moderate adaptations to training obligations were implemented before the 1973 oil price shock, the MoD started to realise the potential of reservists once it had to enforce significant redundancies in the regular force. In fact, the examination of reservists' roles in homeland defence revealed that the *Bundeswehr* increasingly dependent on the employment of reservists to maintain combat strength.



# Chapter 6

## Comparative Analyses and Conclusion

*Qui bene distinguit, bene docet!*<sup>1323</sup>

This study commenced based on the motivation to explore how governments reform their national reserve forces in times of economic turmoil. By comparing European countries with a high extraneous and experimental variance, it was further aspired to assess whether financially driven defence reviews produce similar adaptations to national reserve forces or not. Therefore, Chapters Two through Four explored examples of reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil in Britain and Germany. While the chapters followed a similar blueprint, country-specific aspects were respected in the discussions. For instance, the investigation of the British examples concentrated on the implications of the reforms for the single services. As regards the German examples, on the other hand, the exploration focused on the suspension of conscription and societal developments and obstacles.

In this chapter, Britain's and Germany's reform attempts are compared to assess whether both countries shifted their reserve forces' roles and responsibilities in a similar way following the launch of financially driven reforms. The comparative analyses of the contemporary and historical examples are then used in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 to develop a theory on how governments reform national reserve forces in times of economic turmoil.

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<sup>1323</sup> 'S/he who distinguishes well teaches well!' Translated by the author.

## 6.1 Comparative Analyses

### 6.1.1 The Contemporary Examples

#### 6.1.1.1 General Observations

As seen in Chapters Two and Four, both Britain and Germany launched comprehensive defence reviews in 2010, which governments also complemented with separate reserve forces' reforms. The biggest difference between these reforms was the suspension of conscription in Germany. While Britain had already maintained professional forces for a long period of time, Germany only made this transition with the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*. Another difference was found as regards the angle from which London and Berlin started reviewing their national armed forces. In Britain, the approach was rather concentrated, as the government published the strategic paper (2010-NSS) and structural plans (2010-SDSR) only one day apart. In contrast, Germany's review process was somewhat scattered. First, the government published the 2010-CSR's and the Inspector General's reports in 2010, which alluded to envisaged structural adaptations of the *Bundeswehr*. The 2011-DPG, which summarised strategic evaluations, were issued several months later.

These divergent approaches suggest that in Britain structure followed strategy, while in Germany, strategy followed structure. In light of the contemporary financial constraints, this allows concluding that Britain decided first to determine the affordable strategic scope and subsequently adapted her defence posture's structures accordingly. In Germany, on the other hand, this conduct indicates that the government opted first to evaluate which structures were fundable at the time and afterwards defined what strategic focus these structures would support.

#### 6.1.1.2 Examination of the Assumed Explanatory Factor

**Change in Government.** As already mentioned, the 2008 financial crisis was the assumed explanatory factor for reserve forces reforms in Britain and Germany in 2010. However, Chapters Two and Four also highlighted another possible explanation for the governments' motivation to conduct defence reviews; i.e., a change in government. In

Britain, the Labour government was forced out of office by the first post-war coalition government consisting of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. In Germany, on the other hand, coalition governments are the norm rather than the exception. Here, a Conservatives/Liberals administration relieved a coalition of the Social Democrats and The Greens. In other words, both countries moved more to the conservative end of the political spectrum in 2010 and 2009 respectively.

This observation could be interpreted as Conservative governments' inclination to conduct defence reviews. This conclusion, however, would be short-sighted. The analysis of the British political discourse, for example, revealed that Gordon Brown's Labour government already acknowledged that the country's defence posture had to be scrutinised. Therefore, as elaborated in Chapter Two, a National Security Strategy and a Green Paper on defence were published in 2008/2009 and early 2010 respectively. In Germany, a similar process was observed; while the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform* was widely regarded as the most incisive post-war reform of the *Bundeswehr* as it entailed the suspension of conscription, the Social Democrats/Greens coalition had also launched defence reviews during their term.<sup>1324</sup>. Therefore, the conservative agenda cannot be confirmed as an impetus for defence reviews. Circumstances rather suggest that reforms were launched in order to deliver results as promised in the election campaigns.

**The 2008 Financial Crisis.** The 2008 financial crisis, however, could be established as an explanatory factor in both Chapters Two and Four. Here, empirical and statistical evidence was sought and found in relevant government publications, defence budgets and personnel statistics. As seen in Table 6.1, both the British and German MoDs were obliged to make significant contributions to overall economization efforts. Furthermore, the envisaged measures to achieve these savings were rather similar; except for the scrapping of equipment, which was extensively discussed in Britain but was not central to the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*.

However, as elaborated in Chapters Two and Four, reducing personnel costs was paramount for both Britain and Germany. Therefore, as highlighted in Table 6.1, it is not surprising that both countries envisaged significant reductions; both as regards regular service member

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<sup>1324</sup> Most notable the 2003-CFR

and civilian employees. Although slightly differing in total numbers, both countries had in common that only non-frontline service members were made redundant. The British government explicitly voiced this strategy; in Germany, however, this conduct was expressed more subtle as a large percentage of redundancies were achieved through the suspension of conscription, i.e., by making non-deployable recruits redundant.

Table 6.1: Contemporary Examples: Defence Budgets and Economisation Measures

	Britain	Germany
<b>Defence Budgets</b>		
Planned Defence Budgets Cuts	yes	yes
Envisaged Economies	£4.30bn	€8.40bn
Financially Driven Defence Reviews	yes	yes
<b>Economisation Measures</b>		
Manpower Reductions (Regulars)	33,000	40,000
Workforce Reductions (Civilian)	32,000	50,000
Scrapping of Equipment	yes	no
Sale of Surplus Land and Real Estate	yes	yes
Renegotiation of Procurement Contracts	yes	yes

Sources: Chapters Two and Four.

Despite a similar set of measures, Chapters Two and Four demonstrated that Britain was more successful in achieving the required savings. Moreover, when directly comparing the numbers in Table 6.2, it becomes apparent that British defence expenditure significantly exceeded Germany's; both regarding total expenditure and per capita. Moreover, although accounting for approximately 10 per cent of federal spending, the low total and per capita defence spending suggests that Germany's investments in defence were already small. Hence, the German government had fewer options to reduce the MoD's budget than their British counterpart.

**Security Environments.** In Chapters Two and Four, the contemporary British and German security environments were examined by respecting both the territorial and ideological characteristics. When comparing the countries directly, it becomes apparent that both

Table 6.2: British and German Defence Expenditure (2010-2014)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>British Defence Expenditure</b>							
In US\$ billion	58.08	60.27	58.50	56.86	59.18	292.89	58.58
Per Capita in US\$	917.48	944.50	910.43	879.65	910.29	n/a	912.47
In per cent of national exp.	5.39	5.38	5.24	5.04	4.87	n/a	5.18
<b>British Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	2.50	3.84	2.58	2.31	1.45	n/a	2.54
<b>German Defence Expenditure</b>							
In US\$ billion	46.3	48.1	46.5	45.9	46.1	232.90	46.58
Per Capita in US\$	571.80	594.81	573.25	565.19	565.75	n/a	574.16
In per cent of federal exp.	10.00	10.20	10.50	10.70	10.90	n/a	10.46
<b>German Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	1.10	2.10	2.00	1.50	0.90	n/a	1.50
Financial Year.							

Sources: SIPRI, including own calculations, and OECD.

governments assessed that they operated in somewhat stable conditions. In this context, both London and Berlin cited the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union as the main factor for stabilising European security. Furthermore, by stipulating that both countries were members of the EU and NATO, Chapters Two and Four judged that Britain and Germany were surrounded by allied and (or) friendly neighbours, who did not express any aspirations to invade either country.

In addition to these framing factors, Chapters Two and Four further explored the threats which the British and German governments deemed most harmful for their countries. When consulting Table 6.3, it appears as if both London and Berlin identified similar threats. However, the discussions in Chapters Two and Four also revealed that governments prepared differently for these risk factors. In contrast to Germany, where the government merely listed anticipated threats, Britain has developed a sophisticated risk assessment framework to cater to the volatile nature of contemporary threats such as (cyber) terrorism. In doing so, the British government created a tool, which would allow the MoD to prepare more flexible responses.

Table 6.3: Contemporary Examples: Perceived Threats

	Britain	Germany
<b>Globalisation</b>	opportunity	opportunity/threat
<b>New Technologies</b>	opportunity/threat	opportunity/threat
<b>Failed States</b>	threat	threat
<b>Uncontrolled Migration</b>	not specifically mentioned	threat
<b>Terrorism</b>	threat	threat
<b>Cyber Terrorism</b>	threat	threat
<b>Shift in Power Equilibrium</b>	threat	threat
<b>Climate Change</b>	not specifically mentioned	threat
<b>Natural Disasters</b>	threat	threat
<b>Pandemics</b>	threat	not specifically mentioned

Sources: Chapters Two and Four.

This divergence again points to Britain's proactive and Germany's reluctant attitudes as regards defence policies and their enforcement. Further proof for this inference is found when considering Britain's and Germany's engagements in Afghanistan. While Britain joined the United States' efforts from the beginning, Germany only followed suit after the UN had supported the operation in 2002. Moreover, Britain's contribution was larger than Germany's. Strategically, Britain took a leading role in Helmand and deployed, during the operation's peak period, about 9,500 troops; this conduct cost the British taxpayers approximately £3.07 billion annually. Germany, on the other hand, sent about 5,350 during the same period and only spent €1.20 billion on average annually.

This different degree of engagement in Afghanistan suggests that Britain, in general, acts more self-confident in the global theatre and deliberately assumes greater responsibilities; a fact, which is also reflected in the government's decision to maintain British nuclear deterrent. Germany, on the other hand, is not only more reluctant but somewhat limited as regards the enforcement of defence policies as the *Grundgesetz* prohibits the government to engage in unilateral operations. Therefore, broader British engagements in international security suggest that Britain operated in a stable, yet slightly more complex security environment than Germany in 2010.

### 6.1.1.3 Reservists Roles and Responsibilities

The examination of Britain's and Germany's security environments revealed that both countries did not anticipate any imminent threats to their territorial integrity. However, the nuances of the security environments were somewhat different due to the government's divergent perceptions of their roles in international security, different legislative circumstances and engagement levels. As highlighted in Table 6.4, these differences also reflect on reservists' scope of duties. While both the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR have produced similar shifts in reservists' responsibilities, legislation again somewhat limited the employment of German reservists. For instance, the reserve may only be deployed to assist during natural disasters or for crisis management, if the *Bundesländer* specifically request support. Moreover, reservists cannot be ordered to participate in overseas or peacekeeping missions; here, reservists need to specifically request a deployment.

This, again, suggests that the British MoD has more leeway as regards the enforcement of defence policies. Nonetheless, as indicated by Table 6.4, the goals of the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR were somewhat similar and primarily expanded reservists' responsibilities as regards homeland defence. As elaborated in Chapters Two and Four, both the British and German MoDs had made significant numbers of regulars redundant to achieve required economies. Simultaneously, reservists' numbers increased in most branches of the British Armed Forces (except for the Army) and all *Bundeswehr* services following the implementation of the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR. This development, therefore, infers that the main objective of this shift in responsibilities was to compensate for redundant regulars. Moreover, the employability of reservists was thought to be increased by integrating them more efficiently in regular structures while simultaneously adding their civilian acquired abilities to the armed forces' skills set.

Although appearing logical from a strategic standpoint, Britain did not support this step on the structural level. Quite the contrary, the MoD closed 40 Army Reserve bases, and smaller reserve units were consolidated; therefore, limiting the presence of the reserve throughout Britain. Germany, on the other hand, moved in the opposite direction. By establishing at least one RSSU in each *Bundesland*, the MoD has ensured that reservists are present in every part of the country.

Table 6.4: Contemporary Examples: Implications for Reservists

	Britain	Germany
<b>Homeland Defence</b>		
Augmentation/Resilience/Border Defence	yes	yes
Natural Catastrophes	yes	limited
Crisis Management	yes	limited
Military-Civilian Co-operation (Planning Stage)	all reservists	Territorial Reserve
Safeguarding of Major Events	yes	no
Aerial and Coastal/Naval Surveillance	yes	yes
Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure	yes	yes
<b>Specialised Roles</b>	yes	yes
Cybersecurity	yes	yes
<b>Out of Country Deployments</b>		
Overseas Deployments (UNSC)	yes	limited
Peacekeeping	yes	limited
<b>Structures</b>		
Integration in Regular Units	Army Reserve	Troop Reserve
Reserve Forces' Bases	closed/consolidated	evenly spread
<b>Other</b>		
Agents of the Armed Forces in Society	yes	yes
Increase in the Number of (Volunteer) Reservists	RAF, RN	all services

Sources: Chapters Two and Four.



#### 6.1.1.4 Explanatory Factor and Outcome

Chapters Two and Four established that the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR were the result of financially driven defence reviews, which governments in London and Berlin had launched following the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, the comparative analysis shows that Britain and Germany similarly adapted their reserve forces in the course of the FR-2020 and the 2012-COR. This observation is quite interesting when considering Britain's and Germany's slightly different security environments, which mostly varied as regards the assumed responsibilities in international security.

Therefore, as seen in Table 6.5, this thesis concludes that financial constraints exercised more considerable influence on both British and German defence planning in 2010. Hence, the 2008 financial crisis can be confirmed as the explanatory factor for the FR-2020 and 2012-COR.

Table 6.5: Contemporary Examples: Explanatory Factor and Outcome

	Britain	Germany
<b>Outcome/Dependent Variable</b>		
Implemented Reserve Forces Reform	yes	yes
<b>Explanatory Factor</b>		
2008 Financial Crisis	confirmed	confirmed

Sources: Chapters Two and Four.

### 6.1.2 The Historical Examples

#### 6.1.2.1 General Observations

Chapters Three and Four examined British and German reform attempts in the 1970s. Similar to the contemporary examples, both governments conducted general defence reviews and scrutinised the structures and roles of their national reserve forces. However, the separate reserve forces' reviews were not as clearly linked to their parent reforms as they were in 2010. In Britain, the government conducted the Majury Review (Army) before commencing the 1975 Mason Review. Moreover, the Mitchell Committee convened to

assess the RN's reserve elements while the 1975 Mason Review was still in the assessment phase. Therefore, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the results of both reviews were widely ignored in the 1975 Mason Review. In Germany, the situation was slightly different. A separate review of the reserve, the 1971-COR, was conducted before the 1973 oil price shock struck the German economy. Thereafter, matters concerning the reserve were included in the subsequent Defence White Papers.

Nevertheless, a direct comparison of the review processes allows concluding that the British administration seemed to be more experienced in conducting defence reviews than their German counterpart. As discussed, the 1975 Mason Review had already been Labour's second defence review and constituted the third postwar defence reform in Britain. In Germany, on the other hand, the government did not deem a review of the *Bundeswehr* necessary until the late 1960s. However, the publication of five Defence White Papers in the 1970s indicates that the German government began to understand the importance of regular defence scrutiny in this decade.

The varying degree of defence planning experience, however, was not the most apparent difference in the 1970s review process. In contrast to the contemporary examples, Britain and Germany differed significantly as regards their armed forces' structures; i.e., while Britain already maintained professional forces in the 1970s, the *Bundeswehr* was still conscription-based. Therefore, Germany was in a more comfortable position as regards troop numbers and recruitment.

#### **6.1.2.2 Examination of the Assumed Explanatory Factor**

**Change in Government.** Comparable to the contemporary examples, economic turmoil was the assumed explanatory factor for the 1975 Mason Review and the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform*. However, and again similar to the situation in 2010, the reforms were preceded by a change in government. This time, Labour replaced a conservative administration in Britain in 1974. In Germany, on the other hand, a grand coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats was relieved by a coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals in 1969. In contrast to 2010, these general elections shifted both Britain and Germany to the left/liberal political spectrum. Nevertheless, an inclination to conduct defence reviews

cannot be attested for left/liberal governments either. As elaborated in Chapter Three, the incoming Labour government felt pressured to conduct a defence review as its Conservative predecessor had restored cost-intensive engagements such as ANZUK. In Germany, on the other hand, the 1970s have to be understood as the turning point for the MoD, as this decade marked the beginning of the formalisation process of defence planning. In other words, previous administrations had neglected to bring the latter on a practical and formal footing. Therefore, a review of the *Bundeswehr*'s structures, roles and responsibilities had been inevitable no matter the incoming government's political affiliation.

**The 1973 Oil Price Shock.** Considering the envisaged measures, however, suggests that the 1973s oil price shock did indeed influence defence planning in both Britain and Germany. As seen in Table 6.6, MoDs in both countries needed to contribute significant sums to overall government economies. Simultaneously, Chapters Three and Five revealed that the British Armed Forces, as well as the *Bundeswehr*, would have needed an upgrade of their equipment to cater to the advancements in military technology. Nevertheless, the British government decided to scrap numerous ships and aircrafts; most notably in the RN.

Table 6.6: Historical Examples: Defence Budgets and Economisation Measures

	Britain	Germany
<b>Defence Budgets</b>		
Planned Defence Budgets Cuts	yes	yes
Envisaged Economies	£4.70bn	DM1.08bn
Financially Driven Defence Reviews	yes	yes
<b>Economisation Measures</b>		
Manpower Reductions (Regulars)	38,000	30,000
Workforce Reductions (Civilian)	30,000	not specified
Scrapping of Equipment	yes	no
Procurement Freeze	no	initially
Renegotiation of Procurement Contracts	yes	yes

Sources: Chapters Three and Five.

In Germany, on the other hand, the *Bundeswehr* couldn't afford to lose any equipment as it

still largely used materials dating back to its foundation in the 1950s. Being confronted with the quandary, both Britain and Germany, therefore, also opted to reduce the number of their regular troops. Moreover, Britain also aimed to lay off numerous civilian employees.

Table 6.7: British and German Defence Expenditure (1970-1974)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>British Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In US\$ billion	6.07	6.72	7.86	8.45	9.35	38.45	7.69
<b>British Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	6.36	9.44	7.08	9.18	15.99	n/a	9.61
<b>German Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In US\$ billion	6.2	7.3	9.0	11.9	4.4	38.75	7.75
<b>German Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	3.45	5.24	5.48	7.03	6.99	n/a	5.64
*Financial Year.							

Sources: SIPRI, and OECD.

Table 6.8: British and German Defence Expenditure (1975-1979)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	$\Sigma$	$\bar{x}$
<b>British Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In US\$ billion	11.54	10.77	11.58	14.22	18.37	66.49	13.30
<b>British Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	24.11	16.77	15.89	8.28	13.35	n/a	15.68
<b>German Defence Expenditure*</b>							
In US\$ billion	15.3	15.5	17.3	21.4	24.8	94.23	18.85
<b>German Inflation Rate</b>							
In per cent	5.91	4.25	3.74	2.72	4.04	n/a	4.13
*Financial Year.							

Sources: SIPRI, and OECD.

When consulting Tables 6.7 and 6.8, it becomes apparent that the proposed measures were only partially successful. Generally speaking, Britain and Germany spent approximately the same amounts in real terms on defence in the first half of the 1970s. However, starting with the 1973 oil price shock, spending developed differently. In Britain, 1973 marked the

year when defence expenditure began to rise continuously until 1979; however, inflation also grew disproportionately during this period. This constellation suggests that Britain's financial commitment to defence declined significantly in the 1970s. In Germany, on the other hand, defence spending showed a sharp decrease in 1974, namely, in the year following the oil price shock. Thereafter, expenditure started rising again; however, from 1975 through 1977, increased funding must largely be perceived as a compensation measure for rising inflation rates.

**Security Environments.** As regards the security environment, Chapters Three and Five suggest the London and Bonn came to different conclusions as regards the stability of the security situation. This reasoning was derived from three observations; first, as seen in Table 6.9, both countries estimated that the Soviet threat was paramount to defence planning in the 1970s; however, the reactions to this hazard were different. As discussed in Chapter Three, the British government anxiously observed the Warsaw Pact's augmentation efforts. Moreover, defence planners judged that the signed international treaties did not provide sufficient levels of protection from a Soviet attack. In Chapter Five, on the other hand, it was described that the German government firmly believed in the transformative power of *détente*. At first glance, this suggests a certain degree of gullibility on Germany's part. Yet, considering that the government managed to sign several additional bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and her satellite states, it can be argued that Germany's security situation was indeed more stable than Britain's. Second, while Table 6.9 highlights that both Britain and Germany contributed to NATO commitments in Europe, Britain estimated that her share of responsibilities was significantly larger as she provided approximately 70 per cent of NATO's naval strength in Europe. Moreover, with Polaris, Britain contributed to Europe's deterrence with nuclear means; a service, which Germany could not provide. Third, although both countries were confronted with domestic terrorism, only the conflict in North Ireland influenced defence planning as British troops were deployed to this region. Germany's struggle with the Red Army Faction, on the other hand, concerned the police rather than the *Bundeswehr* as domestic incidents cannot be dealt with by deploying the armed forces; therefore, the Red Army Faction was also not discussed in Chapter Five.

Table 6.9: Historical Examples: Perceived Threats and Strategic Focus

	Britain	Germany
<b>Soviet Threat</b>	yes	yes
<i>détente</i>	mistrust	promising
<b>NATO Commitments</b>	mainly navel	mainly ground forces
<b>Domestic Terrorism</b>	Nationalists vs Unionists	Red Army Faction vs FRG

Sources: Chapters Three and Five.

### 6.1.2.3 Reservists Roles and Responsibilities

This divergent assessment of the 1970s security situation also reflected on the envisaged role of the reserve during this decade. As described in Chapter Three, both the TAVR and the RNR underwent separate scrutiny. However, in comparison to Germany, these reviews did not constitute true reserve forces' reforms. As seen in Table 6.10, British reservists were thought to fulfil the same duties they were entrusted with before the Majury Review and the Mitchell Committee's report; i.e., augmentation, resilience, border defence and the protection of British citizens in Britain. Nevertheless, two small adaptations to the TAVR and RNR were discovered as regards deployment and structures. First, after the 1975 Mason Review, reservists were earmarked for service in the UKLF and BOAR. Second, reserve forces' units' integration with their regular counterparts was to be advanced.

In Germany, on the other hand, reservists' importance for the national defence posture was emphasised for the first time in the *Bundeswehr*'s history. As elaborated in Chapter 5, the MoD had initially neglected the reserve force as an integral part of the *Bundeswehr*. This changed, however, when the MoD was forced to enforce significant redundancies in the regular force in the course of imposed economization measures. As seen in Table 6.10, the responsibility for homeland defence was almost entirely transferred to the reserve's *Territorialheer* and its *Heimatschutztruppen*.

Table 6.10: Historical Examples: Implications for Reservists

	Britain	Germany
<b>Homeland Defence</b>		
Augmentation/Resilience/Border Defence	yes	mostly <i>Territorialheer</i>
Defence of Citizens	all branches	mostly <i>Territorialheer</i>
<b>Earmarked for Assignments in</b>		
UKLF	yes	no
BAOR	yes	no
NATO	yes	yes
<b>Increase in the Number of Reservists</b>	Army, RN,	mostly <i>Territorialheer</i>
<b>Specialised Roles</b>	yes	yes
<b>Structures</b>		
Integration in Regular Units	Army, RN	all services

Sources: Chapters Three and Five.

#### 6.1.2.4 Explanatory Factor and Outcome

Comparable to the situation in 2010, Chapters Three and Five established that the 1975 Mason Review and the 1973 *Wehrstrukturreform* were financially driven defence reviews in the aftermath of the 1973s oil price shock. The comparative analysis, however, has revealed that Britain did not launch a comprehensive reserve forces' reform in the 1970s. Here, it was inferred that Britain perceived her security environment too complex and unstable to transfer responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force. As regards Germany, the complete opposite was stipulated for the 1970s example. Not only did the government judge Germany's security environment to be improving, but it also acknowledged that reservists may make Germany's defence posture more robust and affordable.

Therefore, as seen in Table 6.11, this thesis confirms economic turmoil as the driving force for changing reserve forces' roles and responsibilities in Germany in the 1970s. For the historical British example, this conclusion cannot be drawn.

Table 6.11: Historical Examples: Explanatory Factor and Outcome

	Britain	Germany
<b>Outcome/Dependent Variable</b>		
Implemented Reserve Forces Reform	limited	yes
<b>Explanatory Factor</b>		
1973 Oil Price Shock	inconclusive	confirmed

Sources: Chapters Three and Five.

## 6.2 Findings

The exploration of the four examples and the subsequent comparative analyses have revealed that Britain and Germany conducted defence reviews both in 2010 and in the 1970s. The examinations further established two factors that preceded the reforms, namely, a change in government and severe economic turmoil. After comparing the examples, it can be concluded that the specific political agendas can be excluded as the impetus for defence reviews as administrations from both sides of the political spectrum engaged in reform efforts.

Preceding economic turmoil, on the other hand, was identified as an influential factor in all four reforms; at least, at the planning stage. Here, the thesis highlighted that both the British and German MoDs attempted to realise savings through a combination of specific measures. In both the contemporary and historical British examples, economizations included adaptations to equipment, e.g., scrapping of equipment and renegotiation of procurement contracts, as well as redundancies in the regular force and civilian workforce. In Germany, on the other hand, the *Bundeswehr*'s equipment was primarily spared from economies and was even upgraded during the 1970s. However, in both examined periods, regular troops were made redundant; civilian employees were mainly laid off during the 2010 *Bundeswehrreform*. At the same time, all four examples showed that an increase in reservists' numbers accompanied the decline in regular troop numbers.

Congruent with this similar sequence of events, the study confirmed that defence budgets declined in either real or relative terms in all four examined examples. Nevertheless, for



the historical British example, it was concluded that inflation and not the 1975 Mason Review's adaptations caused this decline. Moreover, despite the similar sequence, a shift of responsibilities from the regular force to the reserve force was only found in both contemporary and the historical German examples. This development was not confirmed for Britain in the 1970s as the government envisaged only limited adaptations to the TAVR and the RNR. The comparative analysis of the historical examples, therefore, suggests that the perceived security environment exercised greater influence on British defence planning as regards the reserve in the 1970s. In contrast to Germany, where the government judged that the Soviet threat had been mainly contained due to international and bilateral agreements, Britain did not estimate that her security environment was improving. Moreover, it was stipulated that defence planners judged that regulars should fulfil most of the armed forces' responsibilities due to Britain's extensive responsibilities in NATO's European naval commitments.

Table 6.12: Findings

	Britain (2010)	Britain (1970s)	Germany (2010)	Germany (1970s)
<b>Framing Factors</b>				
Financially Driven Defence Reviews	yes	yes	yes	yes
(Perceived) Security Environment	vulnerable/stable	complex/unstable	stable	improving
<b>Outcome/Dependent Variable</b>				
Implemented Reserve Forces Reform	yes	limited	yes	yes
<b>Explanatory Factor</b>				
Economic Turmoil	confirmed	inconclusive	confirmed	confirmed

Sources: Chapters One through Six.

When following the framework of the explanatory factor and outcome, which was introduced in Chapter One, the observations mentioned above produce Table 6.12. Here, it is highlighted that the explanatory factor, i.e., economic turmoil, was confirmed for financially driven defence reviews and subsequent reserve forces' reforms, when governments conduct their defence planning in somewhat stable or improving security environments. Moreover, as shown in Table 6.12, economic turmoil does even exercise influence on

reforms when the security situation is perceived as complex or unstable. Nevertheless, a shift of responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force cannot be confirmed for these kinds of circumstances.

### **6.3 Conclusion**

The findings of this thesis suggest that economic turmoil tends to exercise some degree of influence on national defence planning. The reason being that, due to their workforce and equipment intensive structures, MoDs are prone to be subject to government economization measures in times of financial constraints. However, the results of this study also indicate that the extent of the impact on defence planning varies depending on the government's estimates of the contemporary security environment. In this context, the thesis stipulated that perceived stable or improving security situations result in comprehensive reserve forces' reforms. Here, the study highlighted that the reserve is used as a tool to create savings while also maintaining proficiency levels. In other words, when MoDs need to enforce redundancies in the regular force due to financial pressures, shifting responsibilities to the reserve force may contribute to making a country's defence posture both more affordable and sustainable. As elaborated in the thesis, reasons for this are twofold; first reserve units are cheaper to maintain than their regular counterparts. Second, reservists can be trained to assume any role within the armed forces.

In conclusion, this thesis' results have produced the following theory:

Countries operating in stable or improving security environments, who experience severe economic turmoil, tend to engage in comprehensive reserve forces' reforms, which allow the MoD to realise savings through redundancies in the regular force while maintaining proficiency levels with the support of reservists; i.e., financially driven defence reviews in stable or improving governments tend to shift responsibilities from the regular to the reserve force.

## 6.4 Suggested Further Research

This thesis studied how reservists' roles and responsibilities changed following the implementation of financially driven defence reviews in Britain and Germany. To select these two focus countries, the study used the MSSD approach; here, the thesis demonstrated that Britain and Germany possessed a sufficient extraneous variance, experimental variance in relevant areas and the same assumed explanatory factor. However, the historical British example illustrated that the latter, even though it was present at the time, did not shift reservists' roles and responsibilities to the same degree as it did in the other examples. Thus, it would be advisable to conduct further research on the topic of reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil. Here, examples with both stable or unstable security environments should be considered.

A subsequent study may advance this topic by using one of two strategies. First, one could aim for increasing the statistical validity of this thesis' findings by building on this study's MSSD approach.<sup>1325</sup> Here, other European countries, e.g., France, and (or) Spain could serve as examples; combined with Britain and Germany, these countries constitute a larger sample, which, in turn, would increase the validity of results.<sup>1326</sup> Alternatively, this study's MSSD approach could be copied to investigate a different set of nations with high extraneous variance, e.g., Asian, South American, or Anglo-Saxon countries.<sup>1327</sup>

Second, another approach would entail using the MDSD strategy and compare countries with low extraneous variance.<sup>1328</sup> As argued by Jahn, this route allows to test hypotheses and make generalised assumptions about phenomena.<sup>1329</sup> Again, this study's examples could be used as a starting point; however, either Britain or Germany would need to be compared to countries such as Brazil and (or) Japan.<sup>1330</sup>

Both strategies have the potential to further contribute to the subject of reserve forces' reforms in times of economic turmoil. However, since both approaches need to gather and

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<sup>1325</sup> cf. Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>1326</sup> cf. *ibid.*, 233.

<sup>1327</sup> *ibid.*, and B. Guy Peters, *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science: Theories and Methods*, 40.

<sup>1328</sup> Todd Landman, *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*, 29-30.

<sup>1329</sup> cf. Detlef Jahn, *Einführung in die vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 234.

<sup>1330</sup> cf. *ibid.*

analyse primary sources published in different languages, it would be advisable to trust a diverse team with advancing this study's research focus. In doing so, the full exploitation of primary sources and thus, the drawing of informed conclusions, could be ensured.

Besides exploring this thesis' research focus further by using additional examples or the MDSD, a future project may want to investigate how the FR-2020 and 2012-COR played out beyond the first implementation stage. This should include an evaluation of reservists' satisfaction levels, which could be achieved by conducting a large-sample survey. Moreover, a future study should explore what measures are needed to increase recruitment for the reserve. Again, a large-sample survey could aid in this endeavour. Here, youngsters graduating from either secondary school or undergraduate university programs should be surveyed to ascertain what incentives MoD's should offer to encourage adolescents and young adults to consider a career as a reservist. Moreover, a similar survey should be conducted with adult specialists. Here, groups should be identified, who possess skills that are most valuable to the reserve.

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# Appendix A

## Glossary of Terms

<b>Abitur</b>	The German equivalent to the British A-Levels.
<b>Berufssoldat</b>	A career soldier who intends to stay with the <i>Bundeswehr</i> until retirement; see ‘ <i>Bundeswehr</i> ’.
<b>Brexit</b>	Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
<b>Britain</b>	The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
<b>Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv</b>	The federal archives, military section.
<b>Bundesland</b>	A German federal state, e.g., Bavaria. Germany consists of 16 <i>Bundesländer</i> . Being a federal republic, each <i>Bundesland</i> has its own capital, parliament, and constitution. Therefore, legislation may differ according to the region, e.g., educational policies are in the jurisdiction of the individual <i>Bundesland</i> . Policies affecting the whole of the country, e.g., defence, is in the jurisdiction of the federal government.
<b>Bundesrat</b>	Federal Council, the upper house of the German parliament.
<b>Bundestag</b>	Federal Parliament, the lower house of the German parliament.
<b>Bundesverfassung (CH)</b>	The Swiss Constitution; abbreviation in the legal context: BV.
<b>Bundeswehr</b>	Literally ‘Federal Defence Force’; Germany’s armed forces. The <i>Bundeswehr</i> consists of three services (Army, Navy and Air Force) and two support services (Joint Support Service and Medical Service). In the political discourse, references are usually made to the <i>Bundeswehr</i> as a whole and not to the individual services.
<b>Bundeswehrreform</b>	The reform of the <i>Bundeswehr</i> . The term has also been used for previous reforms of the <i>Bundeswehr</i> . Therefore, it is usually accompanied by the commencement

	year of the respective reform, e.g., 2010 <i>Bundeswehrreform</i> .
<b>Conscript (FRG)</b>	A service member forced to serve in the <i>Bundeswehr</i> under the <i>Wehrpflicht</i> ; see ‘ <i>Wehrpflicht</i> ’.
<b>Conservatives (FRG)</b>	The German equivalent to the British Conservative Party. The conservative party in Germany consists of two so-called sister parties, namely, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) and the CSU (Christian Social Union). The latter is only electable in Bavaria, while the former competes for votes in the remaining <i>Bundesländer</i> . They usually enter the campaign for the federal elections together and combine votes.
<b>Draftee (FRG)</b>	See ‘Conscript’.
<b>Feldheer</b>	The 1970s <i>Feldheer</i> was part of the German Army. The <i>Feldheer</i> was under NATO command and served as a liaison between the <i>Bundeswehr</i> and NATO commands.
<b>Germany</b>	The term ‘Germany’ is used to refer to the Federal Republic of Germany (1949-1990, excluding the German Democratic Republic) and the re-unified Federal Republic of Germany (as of 1990, including the former territories of the German Democratic Republic).
<b>Grundgesetz</b>	The German constitution; abbreviation in the legal context: GG.
<b>Heeresstruktur 1, 2, 3, 4</b>	Literally ‘Army Structure’; a term used to refer to restructuring efforts in the German Army. During the Cold War, four reforms were conducted, hence the numbering.
<b>Heimatschutz</b>	Homeland Defence.
<b>Heimatschutztruppe</b>	A unit in the <i>Territorialheer</i> ; see ‘ <i>Territorialheer</i> ’.
<b>Kriegsdienstverweigerer</b>	Conscientious objector; a term widely used until the 1990s.
<b>Kriegsdienstverweigerung</b>	The process of conscientious objection; a term widely used until the 1990s.
<b>Landesverteidigung</b>	Homeland Defence.
<b>Liberals (FRG)</b>	The Free Democratic Party. The German equivalent to the British Liberal Democrats.
<b>Militärgesetzes (CH)</b>	The Swiss Military Act; abbreviation in the legal context: MG.
<b>Neue Ostpolitik</b>	Initiated by the Brandt administration in the early 1970s, the <i>Neue Ostpolitik</i> refers to a West-German attempts to normalise relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries.



<b>Regular Service Member</b>	Also referred to as ‘regular’; an active service member, who is not part of the reserve.
<b>Regular Troops</b>	Also referred to as ‘regulars’; active, non-reservist troops.
<b>Regular Units</b>	Active, non-reservist units.
<b>Rekrutenschule (CH)</b>	Basic training in the Swiss Armed Forces.
<b>Reservist (FRG)</b>	In Germany, there are/were four kinds of reservists; a volunteer (e.g., <i>Ungedienter</i> ), a former <i>Wehrpflichtiger</i> (until 2011), a former <i>Zeitsoldat</i> or a former <i>Berufssoldat</i> . Depending on their status and period of service, the obligation to serve varies/varied in length; see ‘ <i>Ungedienter</i> ’, ‘ <i>Wehrpflichtiger</i> ’, and ‘ <i>Zeitsoldat</i> ’.
<b>Reservist (UK)</b>	Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of reservists in Britain; ex-regulars (regular reservist), who may be obliged to serve for a specified period upon completion of their service and volunteer reservists, who sign up for reservist duty without having served in the armed forces before.
<b>Social Democrats (FRG)</b>	The Social Democratic Party of Germany. The German equivalent to the British Labour Party.
<b>Territorialheer</b>	The 1970s <i>Territorialheer</i> was part of the German Army. The <i>Territorialheer</i> had been assigned the responsibility to defend the West-German territory in wartime and entirely remained under the command of the German government.
<b>The Greens (FRG)</b>	Alliance ‘90/The Greens. The German equivalent to the British Greens Party.
<b>Ungedienter</b>	A German citizen without prior military experience.
<b>Voluntary Conscript (FRG)</b>	A citizen who completes basic military training and serves in the <i>Bundeswehr</i> for a limited period on a voluntary basis.
<b>Wehrdienst</b>	Literally ‘Defence Service’; (Mandatory) Military Service. The <i>Wehrdienst</i> describes the period a <i>Wehrpflichtiger</i> received basic military training and served in the <i>Bundeswehr</i> under the <i>Wehrpflicht</i> ; see ‘ <i>Wehrpflichtiger</i> ’.
<b>Wehrgerechtigkeit</b>	This term refers to the attempt for a fair drafting process. <i>Wehrgerechtigkeit</i> is achieved when all (male) members of society are drafted equally no matter their social standing, educational background or physical abilities.
<b>Wehrmacht</b>	The armed forces of Nazi-Germany.

<b>Wehrpflicht</b>	Literally ‘Defence Duty’; (Mandatory) Military Service. A <i>Wehrpflichtiger</i> received, if drafted, basic military training and subsequently served in the <i>Bundeswehr</i> for a specific number of months.
<b>Wehrpflichtiger</b>	A (male) German citizen of military age. All <i>Wehrpflichtige</i> underwent medical examinations by a <i>Bundeswehr</i> physician to determine their fitness for duty. If deemed fit, they either served as service members in the <i>Bundeswehr</i> or as <i>Zivildienstleistende</i> in social organisations; see ‘ <i>Zivildienstleistender</i> ’.
<b>Wehrstruktur</b>	Defence Structure.
<b>Wehrstrukturreform</b>	Defence Structure Reform.
<b>Wiederholungskurs (CH)</b>	Literally ‘Repetition Course’; annual training for Swiss reservists.
<b>Zeitsoldat</b>	A soldier who serves in the <i>Bundeswehr</i> voluntarily for an extended period. Upon completion of her/his term, s/he enters the civilian workforce.
<b>Zivildienst</b>	Literally ‘Civil Service’; before the suspension of conscription took effect in 2011, all young men of military age, who were deemed fit for duty, could opt out of military service and work in the public sector instead. They usually assisted in hospitals, retirement homes or kindergartens.
<b>Zivildienstleistender</b>	A conscientious objector serving in the <i>Zivildienst</i> .

Please note that...

...all German words have been translated into English by the author. The Glossary of Terms lists all German words in their masculine and singular form. To simplify matters, this thesis uses the masculine form throughout the text; however, it should be taken to refer to both women and men. The author used the feminine form and (or) the appropriate plural form where applicable.

# Appendix B

## Serendipitous Research Opportunities

**Definition and Regulations.** With the ‘Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research Opportunities’, King’s College London has established a policy, which allows King’s staff and doctoral students to conduct research and gather information with human participants when unanticipated research opportunities arise, e.g., serendipitous interviews. In order to conduct this kind of research, staff and doctoral students are requested to sign and register the ‘Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research Opportunities’ form with the Research Ethics Office. Submission to and registration of the form with the Research Ethics Office is required before conducting any serendipitous research; the processing and using of information acquired before submission of the form is prohibited.

**Submission and Registration.** The author signed and submitted the ‘Code of Conduct for Serendipitous Research Opportunities’ form as indicated on the form to [sshl@kcl.ac.uk](mailto:sshl@kcl.ac.uk) on 10 May 2013. On 13 May 2013, the Research Ethics Office confirmed via email that the form had been received and logged.

## Formal Ethical Approval

**Ethical Approval Application.** Ethical approval for this thesis was sought for conducting structured interviews with individuals who work/worked in the field of British and German defence or related fields. Being a non-high risk application, the author sought ethical approval from the War Studies Group Research Ethics Panel (WSG REP). To obtain ethical approval, the RESC/REP Application Form A, an information sheet and a consent form were submitted.

**Submission.** A hard copy of the ethical approval application was submitted as indicated on the form to the Research Support Office, 5.2 Franklin Wilkins Building, (Waterloo Bridge Wing), Waterloo Campus, King’s College London, Stamford Street, London SE1 9NH on 11 June 2013. A scan of the ethical approval application was further sent to [rep@kcl.ac.uk](mailto:rep@kcl.ac.uk) the same day.

**Approval and Registration Number.** Full ethical approval was granted on 23 July 2013. The ethical approval is registered with King’s College London’s Research Ethics Office under REP(WSG)/12/13-47. The ethical approval for conducting structured interviews was granted until 23 July 2015.